A small fraction of software developers work on safety-critical software. Safety-critical software is (or at least should be) developed with quite different methodologies, as the cost/benefit assessment is very different regarding development speed against number and nature of defects.
If there are lessons written in blood for the development of safety-critical software, they haven't propagated to the wider field of software development.
(Disclaimer: I don't work on safety-critical software.)
NASA's guidelines are not written in blood, but certainly in lost spacecraft. The most famous is the Mars Climate Orbiter that was lost due to ground system and orbiter using different units of measurement, but that's not the only example [1]
Only one of those particularly affected guidelines. After, anything that might end up in a pure oxygen atmosphere had to be non-inflammable, and very uncomfortable.
And they didn't even get any new regulations written that I've seen. The hand wheels for the horizontal stabilizer trim became too hard for average pilots to physically operate if the aircraft is going too fast and out of trim far enough (even without being outside the safe operating envelope). There was no regulation limiting how much force the trim wheels can need while within the operating envelope. AFAIK, there's still no such regulation. So the "fixed" 737 Max models didn't change the hand wheels, meaning the physical backup in case of a trim runaway might not actually be usable. Yet they certified it without changes, because there's no regulation saying that the safety backup wheels have to be physically usable by average pilots in the event the primary powered system fails!
