Part 1 is just a matter of public policy. This is all armchair theory anyway.
Regarding Part 2, I actually don't see the problem. If the result is causing insurance companies to be more cautious about lowball offers when there's a range of reasonable outcomes, is that bad? The plaintiff still must succeed at proving damages, so it's not like that outcome is unforseeable.
It does increase "settlement risk" for insurers, but _they're insurers_. Of every kind of entity out there they should be the most comfortable with risk. The greater risk of unfavorable settlements would obviously increase insurance premiums, but if premiums increase because insurers are actually paying more in fair settlements and/or punitive judgements because they failed to pay a fair settlement, again I cannot see the problem.
>but if premiums increase because insurers are actually paying more in fair settlements and/or punitive judgements because they failed to pay a fair settlement, again I cannot see the problem.
But the problem is that in the example I given, the lowball option is fair given the probabilities/expected value.
Regarding Part 2, I actually don't see the problem. If the result is causing insurance companies to be more cautious about lowball offers when there's a range of reasonable outcomes, is that bad? The plaintiff still must succeed at proving damages, so it's not like that outcome is unforseeable.
It does increase "settlement risk" for insurers, but _they're insurers_. Of every kind of entity out there they should be the most comfortable with risk. The greater risk of unfavorable settlements would obviously increase insurance premiums, but if premiums increase because insurers are actually paying more in fair settlements and/or punitive judgements because they failed to pay a fair settlement, again I cannot see the problem.