Right, but if the essence of the question is by what function you measure utility, then the question as posed by the article is a moot point. utility, priority, equality - they're just slightly different cost functions for the utility. And it's not even the case that they're well-defined and clearly separated; some level of interpretation is going to be required regardless.
For example, people routinely act as if money has a non-linear utility; we'll insure ourselves against stuff partially because being destitute is worse than the mere loss of money might suggest; i.e. each additional dollar is worth less.
But exactly how you define those non-linear relationships, especially once you include stuff like happiness, health, and intend to aggregate over multiple individuals is clearly tricky, and it's not reasonable to expect any one simplified model to work well in all situations in reality. It's not even reasonable for that to be knowable or computable.
So it's both perfectly reasonable to consider it ludicrous to label one such scenario as having "40" and "80" utility without having had the critical discussion of what that utility is measuring, while also conceding that the concept of utility is reasonable and... sometimes... enlightening.
Thanks, this was a really insightful comment (as someone who spent years of my life getting a graduate philosophy degree, before doing something more 'useful'). I think the concept of utility is clearly, uh, useful, and the reason that it's aversive to people is that they tend to bundle it up with a lot of the (sociologically, not logically) related views, which tend to be more problematic.
Hedonic utilitarianism in particular turns a lot of people off, and partly for good reason. I'm deeply ambivalent about it, and I think the surrounding debates, and the assumed primacy of moral intuition in applied cases, are far harder and more open questions than most people reckon. But I can still see how examples like utility monsters, or gang rape being morally superior to garden-variety rape because there are more people to enjoy it, might make people feel like it's really on the wrong path.
Those examples are hilariously egregious, yeah! It's slightly taboo in polite conversation to see increased utility there, yep. Thanks for the kind words, too.
No problem! And yeah, I had a moral philosophy professor who had endless examples like that, including that one. They were hilarious and so intuitively potent, I just wish I could remember more of them. He could spend a full 5-10 minutes in a lecture just retailing dozens of those ridiculous counter-examples. (It was especially funny because he was a very urbane old Oxonian professor - think Richard Dawkins for a pretty close analogue to his general mien - whom you wouldn't expect to start enthusiastically talking about gang rape.)
There are good examples in the comments too, though I mostly recall it for getting into a heated argument with someone making utilitarian arguments for torture.
Interesting, thanks! My position on the whole 'using moral intuitions in applied cases to disprove fundamental moral theories' is basically what I said in this thread: https://twitter.com/samziz/status/1412198411579887622
Incidentally I wouldn't agree with utilitarian arguments for torture, but not - necessarily - because I don't agree with utilitarianism. I think it's certainly possible to make higher-order or rule-utilitarian arguments against torture, within the parameters of utilitarianism.
For example, people routinely act as if money has a non-linear utility; we'll insure ourselves against stuff partially because being destitute is worse than the mere loss of money might suggest; i.e. each additional dollar is worth less.
But exactly how you define those non-linear relationships, especially once you include stuff like happiness, health, and intend to aggregate over multiple individuals is clearly tricky, and it's not reasonable to expect any one simplified model to work well in all situations in reality. It's not even reasonable for that to be knowable or computable.
So it's both perfectly reasonable to consider it ludicrous to label one such scenario as having "40" and "80" utility without having had the critical discussion of what that utility is measuring, while also conceding that the concept of utility is reasonable and... sometimes... enlightening.