> If asked to list three beliefs that matter to me, I might offer the following:
> 1. that my children’s happiness is far more important than their academic or financial success;
> 2. that women and men are equally moral and equally intelligent;
> 3. that most people are basically good at heart.
> I care that I believe these things. I want to be the kind of person who believes such things. I feel as though if I didn’t believe these things, it would be rather sad.
> I also feel like I am saying something true when I assert these propositions. When I pause to reflect on the matter, I feel sincere inner assent. I feel confident that these claims are correct. I explicitly and consciously judge them to be so. In other words, I intellectually endorse these propositions.
> On one view of belief, intellectual endorsement is sufficient for belief—or nearly sufficient, or sufficient in normal circumstances. If upon reflection I say “Most people are basically good at heart” with a feeling of confidence and sincerity, then that’s what I believe. My beliefs are, so to speak, written on the face of my intellectual endorsements. Let’s call this view intellectualism about belief.
> On another view, intellectual endorsement isn’t enough for belief. To determine whether I genuinely believe the propositions I sincerely affirm, we must inquire further. We must look at my overall pattern of actions and reactions, or at how I live my life generally. Do I in fact tend to treat my children’s happiness as far more important than their academic success? For instance, am I generally more heartened by signs of their emotional health than by their good grades?
> Similarly, in my day-to-day interactions with women and men, do I tend to treat them as intellectually and morally equal? For instance, am I as ready to attribute academic brilliance to a woman as to a man? If I do not generally act and react in a way that reflects the wise, egalitarian, uncynical vision that I proudly endorse in affirming propositions 1–3, then, on this second type of view, it’s not quite right to say that I really or fully have those beliefs. I might simply fail to have those beliefs. Alternatively, it might be best to describe me as being in a muddy, inconsistent, indeterminate, or in-betweenish state. Let’s call a view of belief pragmatist if it treats belief as behaviorally demanding in this way.
> In this essay, I will argue for a pragmatic approach to belief and against an intellectualist approach. I will argue that the pragmatic approach is preferable because it better expresses our values, keeps our disciplinary focus on what is important, and encourages salutary self-examination. It directs our attention to what we ought to care about most in thinking about belief: our overall ways of acting in and reacting to the world.
> 1. that my children’s happiness is far more important than their academic or financial success;
> 2. that women and men are equally moral and equally intelligent;
> 3. that most people are basically good at heart.
> I care that I believe these things. I want to be the kind of person who believes such things. I feel as though if I didn’t believe these things, it would be rather sad.
> I also feel like I am saying something true when I assert these propositions. When I pause to reflect on the matter, I feel sincere inner assent. I feel confident that these claims are correct. I explicitly and consciously judge them to be so. In other words, I intellectually endorse these propositions.
> On one view of belief, intellectual endorsement is sufficient for belief—or nearly sufficient, or sufficient in normal circumstances. If upon reflection I say “Most people are basically good at heart” with a feeling of confidence and sincerity, then that’s what I believe. My beliefs are, so to speak, written on the face of my intellectual endorsements. Let’s call this view intellectualism about belief.
> On another view, intellectual endorsement isn’t enough for belief. To determine whether I genuinely believe the propositions I sincerely affirm, we must inquire further. We must look at my overall pattern of actions and reactions, or at how I live my life generally. Do I in fact tend to treat my children’s happiness as far more important than their academic success? For instance, am I generally more heartened by signs of their emotional health than by their good grades?
> Similarly, in my day-to-day interactions with women and men, do I tend to treat them as intellectually and morally equal? For instance, am I as ready to attribute academic brilliance to a woman as to a man? If I do not generally act and react in a way that reflects the wise, egalitarian, uncynical vision that I proudly endorse in affirming propositions 1–3, then, on this second type of view, it’s not quite right to say that I really or fully have those beliefs. I might simply fail to have those beliefs. Alternatively, it might be best to describe me as being in a muddy, inconsistent, indeterminate, or in-betweenish state. Let’s call a view of belief pragmatist if it treats belief as behaviorally demanding in this way.
> In this essay, I will argue for a pragmatic approach to belief and against an intellectualist approach. I will argue that the pragmatic approach is preferable because it better expresses our values, keeps our disciplinary focus on what is important, and encourages salutary self-examination. It directs our attention to what we ought to care about most in thinking about belief: our overall ways of acting in and reacting to the world.
-----
from The Pragmatic Metaphysics of Belief
http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~eschwitz/SchwitzAbs/PragBel.htm