Why would being security conscious automatically disqualify biometrics?
Security is all about threat models, and I can imagine quite a few scenarios where biometrics might fare better than passwords. Shoulder surfing and trivial passwords/PINs come to mind, for example.
And who said that it's biometrics vs. anything else? It's quite advisable to combine authentication factors.
Shoulder surfing and weak passwords are both something you can control at any time. Biometric identification can be exploited involuntarily by someone literally using force to apply your finger to a device or similar. I shouldn't need to say this, it's so obvious that it's a common plot device in action movies.
If you are so easily swayed, you would probably not be in an adversarial situation with a government anyway.
But this article is about a system for giving up passwords under duress without necessarily compromising all your security, such that your antagonist has no way of knowing or showing that there's another password concealing more important information.
Pretty sure Guantanamo Bay and “enhances interrogation” has shown us that after your antagonist has used the $5 wrench to beat a working password out of you, they then keep on beating you every day for another few weeks just in case there’s more you should have told them.
If “those guys” are your adversary, you were fucked before you started.
> If you are so easily swayed, you would probably not be in an adversarial situation with a government anyway.
Complying in the face of threats of physical violence is equivalent to "being easily swayed"?
You seem to have a pretty specific threat/defense model that you didn't clarify. I wouldn't generalize from that to "biometrics are bad for all users in all situations".
People who realistically anticipate opponents (the state, kidnappers) using force to get at information on a personally targeted basis are likely willing to deal with a degree of real pressure, as shown by the long-term intransigence of many political prisoners through history.
What I'm saying is that if such threats are unacceptable to a person, chances are they are not going to involve themselves in the sort of activities that require keeping secrets in the first place, or are sufficiently disciplined to have weak device security because they don't write anything down.
> Shoulder surfing and weak passwords are both something you can control at any time.
How, exactly? And "require users to watch out for shoulder surfing and use strong passwords" does not count.
Any chance you are thinking about pretty specific circumstances here (security-aware, technical employees generally not having to enter passwords in public spaces)?
I don't understand why you wouldn't think those count. At some point security rests upon the discipline and good judgment of the person with information to secure. I don't believe you can make a technological system which offers perfect security and perfect convenience. Biometrics are very convenient, but can be exploited by force. Strong passwords and environmental awareness (of snoopers) are quite robust, but at a considerable loss of convenience.
Security is all about threat models, and I can imagine quite a few scenarios where biometrics might fare better than passwords. Shoulder surfing and trivial passwords/PINs come to mind, for example.
And who said that it's biometrics vs. anything else? It's quite advisable to combine authentication factors.