You sir have no clue what you talking about, a payload geter in your ssd-firmware survives your distro-hop and can adapt to every OS (if your information is worth the work). And an encrypted disk...on man i stop arguing, it's obvious that you really don't have a clue.
You just keep talking straight past my points without even trying to understand them. Why bother writing answers at all?
I'm not advocating for installing a fresh OS on an exploited hardware and calling it a day, no matter how hard you try to present my words this way.
The point is to keep any single environment around only for a short period of time so that adversaries don't have enough time for replicating your systems and crafting a targeted exploit chain.
It is not meant to be the only line of defense. You would still harden every system you own, putting particular focus on tamper & intrusion detection (including retrospective analysis).
Couple that with strong compartmentalization (e.g. using different hardware for different purposes, Qubes OS style virtualization approaches) and defense in depth (exploit mitigations, traffic anonymization).
Here, I have spelled it out for you. Feel free to outline how you would approach attacking such individual adversary, even with NSA level team at your disposal. Silent assumptions being that 1) if person's physical location is known, CIA is a cheaper option than NSA and 2) failed offensive operation leaving attributable evidence is considered by NSA worse than missed opportunity.
Wow you change your meaning pretty fast, yes if you trow your laptop away after 1 hour you are pretty safe...well if the laptop is from a secure source...like amazon ;)
