Well suppose the valuation mechanism for determining the relative value of patents that the escalating fees were levied upon was implemented by requiring IP holders to declare the price at which they were willing to permanently release the discovery into the public domain in exchange for a one-time payment.
The result of such a scheme might be that is nearly always cheaper to pay the patent office to permanently destroy your competitor's patents and release the discovery into the public domain for everyone then it is to hire lawyers to go to court with your competitor in order to obtain a settlement and mutual licensing agreement.
So whenever large tech companies have disputes with each other they might start destroying each other's patent arsenals rather than going to court, which would level the playing field for everyone else. And if a large number of smaller startups were being harassed by a large company they could crowd source the money needed to pay the patent office to destroy the large firm's patents without spending any money on lawyers or legal fees and without having to halt development.
The result of such a scheme might be that is nearly always cheaper to pay the patent office to permanently destroy your competitor's patents and release the discovery into the public domain for everyone then it is to hire lawyers to go to court with your competitor in order to obtain a settlement and mutual licensing agreement.
So whenever large tech companies have disputes with each other they might start destroying each other's patent arsenals rather than going to court, which would level the playing field for everyone else. And if a large number of smaller startups were being harassed by a large company they could crowd source the money needed to pay the patent office to destroy the large firm's patents without spending any money on lawyers or legal fees and without having to halt development.