I believe opinion is a defence against libel even in the UK. Accusing them of being a scam strays close to being a claim that requires proof. But I wouldn't have thought it would be that hard to lodge a defence that it was an honest opinion and the wording in question is used in the context of common language/slang where scam can also be considered to mean not worth the money.
>First, the defence of honest opinion. The Claimant submits that the defence of honest opinion cannot succeed in circumstances were the words used convey an allegation of fraud. Mr Bradshaw referred me to the case of Wasserman v Freilich [2016] EWHC 312 (QB), an unreported decision of Sir David Eady sitting as a High Court judge. At paragraph 16 of his judgment Sir David said:
> > "The common sting in the various natural and ordinary meanings, pleaded in paragraph 27 of the particulars of claim, is that the Claimant was dishonest. That has generally been regarded as a factual allegation. It has long been recognised that "the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion": Edgington v Fitzmaurice (1885) 29 Ch D 459. Juries are deciding on every day of the week, as a matter of fact, whether a particular Defendant was, or was not, dishonest. Accordingly, it is an allegation which in the context of libel is readily understood as being susceptible to a plea of truth under s.2 of the 2013 Act (as was the case with justification). It is not thought to be a matter of opinion: nor can one convert an allegation of dishonesty (or, for that matter, of murder or rape) into a matter of opinion by merely inserting in front of it a formula such as "I believe ..." or "she thinks ...": see e.g. Hamilton v Clifford [2004] EWHC 1542"
>And at paragraph 22 of his judgment he said:
> > "An allegation of dishonesty, fraud or attempted fraud will usually fall fairly and squarely on the side of fact rather than opinion. The same is true also, as I have already mentioned, where the allegation is of "reasonable grounds to suspect". Accordingly, I cannot allow a pleading to go forward in the form of paragraph 19A. It must be struck out."
>Here Mr Bradshaw submits that the allegation of dishonesty made that the Defendant is that it is "a scam solicitor", has the plain meaning that the Claimant is dishonest and fraudulent. The Defendant seeks to present this as an opinion. Mr Bradshaw argues this is impermissible, the Defendant is putting forward the Claimant's dishonesty as a matter of fact and cannot simply say by way of defence "this is my opinion". In the circumstances I accept the law is as stated in Wasserman v Freilich and am satisfied Mr Bradshaw's submission is correct, with the result the defence of honest opinion should be struck out.
IANAL but the judgement seems to saying, you can't just use prepned an actualy allegation of fraud with "It is my opinion" to claim it is opinion.
My argument isn't that, it's to challenge the idea that calling something a scam can ONLY mean I'm accusing them of fraud.
>First, the defence of honest opinion. The Claimant submits that the defence of honest opinion cannot succeed in circumstances were the words used convey an allegation of fraud.
The foundation of this argument is to challenge the assumption the words actually convey an allegation of Fraud.
It would get pretty deep into the evolution of language/multiple meanings and slang and probably isn't worth fighting, but I still think it's a valid (or at least interesting) defense.
In US law this idea is called defamation per se. [0] If a statement is defamation per se, then the court can skip analysis of whether the statement is defamatory. Defamation per se statements are divided among several categories, one of which is stating that the plaintiff is unfit to practice his or her profession. Accusing an attorney of being "a scam solicitor" falls into that category.
