In particular, he argues that the way you avoid things like World War II is in part precisely by making sure the military does not make decisions of war and peace.
The link is actually referencing Germany in WWI, not WWII.
For context on that, Bismarck's abdication in 1890 left a leadership vacuum that was was gradually filled-in by military elites, who were more interested in the mechanics of warfare than the nuance of politics. Where Bismarck used military force as political tool, in his absence every problem began to look like something that only the military could solve.
Although, it's worth taking this opportunity to repeat: the same military elites responsible for the tragedy of WWI and the Dolchstoss myth were responsible for appointing Hitler into power and legitimizing his militant tactics. Hindenburg and Ludendorff created Hitler, from inside and outside the establishment, respectively.
> For context on that, Bismarck’s abdication in 1890 left a leadership vacuum that was was gradually filled-in by military elites, who were more interested in the mechanics of warfare than the nuance of politics.
The significance of that, while it shouldn’t be dismissed either, often exaggerated; while, yes, that absolutely did happen, you see in the entirety of Europe, no matter the role of military vs. civilian authority, the myth of offense dominance, aggressive mobilization plans and hair-trigger activation, etc.
Basically everyone, civilian and military, had drawn the wrong conclusions about the direction of the evolution of warfare, and it affected every major powers diplomatic strategy, military posture, etc., because everyone saw the other side getting ahead of them as an existential threat.
In particular, he argues that the way you avoid things like World War II is in part precisely by making sure the military does not make decisions of war and peace.