The premise of your argument seems to be that investors are entitled to the best possible price improvement, rather than the RegNMS NBBO, and that any sliver of a penny they get less than the best available price at any brokerage is a "fleecing".
That argument doesn't make much sense to me. People trade slivers of pennies for all sorts of things across the economy. Literally just liking a UI color has a value you can denominate in some sliver of a penny.
The SEC's problem with Robinhood isn't that they weren't offering the best available price improvement. It's that they knowingly weren't, but told customers otherwise. The implication is that if they'd simply been up front about it, and said "we don't charge commissions and have a snappy UI, and we make up for it by taking a bigger share of the rebates our upstreams offer to retail traders", they'd have been just fine.
(Robinhood is bad, but the reasons have very little to do with PFOF).
Terms like "fleecing" are subjective, and I wasn't claiming that RH necessary fleeced anyone in this instance. I was pointing out that opaque pricing models are problematic, since they make it much harder for customers to compare competing services and determine which offers more reasonable costs. In the extreme case, this can harm competition and make everyone worse off than they would be in a transparent regime, aka "people get fleeced".
In this case the real questions are: (1) does RH's model result in some customers paying more for the same services than they would pay at competitors, and (2) can these customers realistically make the determination before they choose a service?
We don't exactly know the answer to (1), and the reason we don't know the answer to that is because the answer to (2) is "almost certainly not". In fact the RH model is so opaque that even the SEC can't fully answer the question, and on top of this normal opacity RH added a layer of clear misrepresentation.
Maybe in the end, it should be totally fine for brokerages to make all their money from order flow fees, in ways that are completely invisible and opaque to the customer, and regulators should just back off the whole thing as long as there are a few lines of text in a ToS somewhere. To me as a customer that seems kind of crummy, but I'm not a regulator.
What I don't see in this comment is an acknowledgement that for all practical purposes (besides niche venues like IBKR Pro) all retail order flow is done through brokerages that do PFOF. Can you be more precise about what part of Robinhood's "model" you're talking about? Depending on what you mean, I might agree with you, or I might strongly disagree with you. Does your critique apply to all brokerages, or Robinhood in particular? If it applies to everyone, what does it matter what the SEC says? The SEC doesn't have any problem with Schwab.
Rather than asking me the question, you should read the article that summarizes the SEC investigation or the investigation report itself. The article directly addresses the “isn’t PFOF common practice” and “maybe PFOF was beneficial to the customer” arguments and provides fairly detailed evidence that RH did this at a different scale and with more significant detrimental effects on its customers than common practice.
Maybe you’ve read both and you disagree with the evidence presented. That’s ok by me: but it would be more efficient for you to state your arguments for why this case didn’t harm customers, rather than asking me to (poorly) litigate the SEC’s case. My only point here is a simple one: that opaque pricing schemes seem like a recipe for anti-competitive behavior.
I've read both and I'm not sure I know enough about your argument to challenge it directly, which is my critique of it. You're invoking these "isn't PFOF common practice" and "maybe PFOF was beneficial" questions as if they were controversies; of course, they are not. PFOF is practically universal, and it is universal because separating out non-toxic order flow is a win-win.
If I had to summon a direct rebuttal to your argument, it would be this:
I perceive you to be suggesting that the problem with Robinhood is that it uses PFOF, which means that customer outcomes are dependent on private deals Robinhood inks with companies like Citadel, which aren't transparent.
The problem with that argument is that literally everybody, including, apparently, IBKR, inks private deals with companies like Citadel, which means you can't suggest that something is distinctively wrong with Robinhood for having done so.
I perceive you to be suggesting that Robinhood would be more honest and transparent if they simply charged a commission that covered their expenses, rather than doing weird PFOF deals. Again: practically every brokerage does PFOF, because it would be dumb not to. Most brokerages charge commissions, but that doesn't make them transparent; they are still turning a private dial in their back office that trades off customer savings with brokerage profits based on PFOF deals.
Robinhood, for what it's worth, is bad, and the badness does have something to do with "no commissions". But the problem isn't shady execution; it's that Robinhood is a gambling site, not an investment site.
I think what you are trying to do is take an argument that has shades of gray and turn it into a black/white argument. This is a very CS thing to do, but I'm not sure it's really a very good way to look at this business situation.
From what little I've read here it seems that there is a continuum of different business strategies in which brokerages use their customer base and clout to negotiate PFOF deals that simultaneously (1) produce revenue for the brokerage, and (2) produce better prices for their customers. Since exchanges have finite financial resources, there is some tension between these two goals, which means that at some point brokerages are essentially trading their own interests against their customers' interests. This creates a power and information imbalance that can probably harm customers if the exchange behaves in ways that maximize (1) at the cost of (2). (RH is alleged to have pushed this balance much farther than common industry practice.) But that does not mean all PFOF deals are definitionally bad.
The question in this case is not "is PFOF always bad", but rather "is there some point at which brokerage-revenue-maximizing PFOF negotiations actually harm customers by overcharging them compared to a more transparent system." The answer to that question is simple: almost certainly there does exist such a point and when a brokerage reaches that point, customers probably won't be able to tell that the point has been reached. Moreover, brokerages with no commissions seem clearly incentivized to optimize towards or beyond that point. Maybe you could argue that RH hasn't reached that point in this specific case, but this does not seem to be your argument.
The question then is: what do you do about it? Should all PFOF be disallowed? You seem to be making a compelling argument that this is not a good solution. Should there be some kind of standard for how much that brokerage/customer balance should be allowed to stretch? Plenty of business practices are regulated along lines like this, where the regulation doesn't outright ban the practice but instead provides some guidelines and standard practices to prevent abuse of weaker parties like customers.
I'm not here to give an answer: I'm just pointing out that eventually if you allow brokerages to keep optimizing for revenue, customers will be harmed. Maybe they already have. At that point it's up to the regulators to do something, because that's their job.
When you suggest that I'm collapsing this down to a binary issue, is that based on information you have about market structure? Have you done a bunch of research on this? Can you be more specific about it? Or is it just a thing you feel happens on message board threads?
As I've said: I'm a little bit at a loss as to what your problem with Robinhood even is. They don't charge trading commissions. But they do take an 80/20 share of price improvement payments where other brokerages take 20/80. We can all agree that it's not OK to lie about doing that. But now we know†, and they've been fined. What next? Should they take 20/80? Why not 15/85? Is the right split just what the majority of the other discount brokerages take?
Again: I loathe Robinhood. They are a force for evil. But when people come up with weird diagnoses for why they're bad, it leads them to make silly decisions about other discount brokerages, none of whom (a) seriously prioritize their customers (perhaps excepting Vanguard), or (b) operate the way people on message boards believe brokerages operate.
† You might be able to argue that knowing the right Google query here, and also giving a shit††, would have enabled you to know this before the SEC announcement, because Robinhood's most important venue is also Schwab's, and you can just compare the per-share rebate they're getting. My confidence level here is not super high.
†† (my subtext here is that people don't really give a shit)
My point, which I think I made clearly in the very first post of this thread, is that highly opaque pricing structures are bad for consumers. You justify this with “consumers don’t give a shit”. I think consumers clearly do give a shit about trading costs, and my evidence for this is that zero-fee brokerages like RH are taking over the industry.
What consumers don’t have the time or resources to do is try to reverse-engineer the costs that they are actually paying when using RH’s platform. I’m not even sure they possibly could do so given the information asymmetry between firm and customer, and your “maybe there’s a Google search but I have low confidence” counterargument isn’t moving me. The SEC report shows that for some customers RH’s costs were inordinately high compared even to competitors that charged fees and had PFOF revenue, but others weren’t. How do I, as a customer, actually figure out how much a trade is going to cost me at different brokerages? Under the current regime (even without RH actively lying about PFOF revenue) it seems like customers cannot figure this out in any reasonable way.
The question then is: what should regulators do about it? Your position seems to be some kind of binary “we must either disallow PFOF entirely or allow any PFOF arrangement without reservation as long as brokerages disclose that PFOF revenue exists somewhere in their TOS.” My point is that different PFOF arrangements have very different impact on customer prices. For example, it's easy to envision a large class of PFOF arrangements that are undeniably harmful to customers, and yes, absolutely regulators should find some reasonable grounds to police those. Because at the highest level, a situation in which those deals are allowed is going to be terrible for consumers. With brokerages hunting for new revenue sources, those situations are going to become increasingly the norm.
ETA: Even ignoring the “bury it somewhere in the TOS” problem, it’s not obvious to me that simply disclosing “we have PFOF arrangements” is sufficient. It seems problematic that a single disclosure should apply equally to everyone from Vanguard to Schwab to RH (or even some hypothetical future scam brokerage that massively overcharges its customers via PFOF) when all of these companies have wildly different arrangements that affect customer trading prices differently. The nature of the arrangements matter too, and at minimum customers deserve sufficient disclosure of the arrangements that they can make determinations about which company is going to cost more to trade with. I hope we can agree that current disclosures and your random low-confidence Google searches do not achieve this goal.
You understand that all these brokerages are in fact required to disclose many of these details already, and that the SEC pursued Robinhood not because of the details of its PFOF arrangements but because of what it's marketing materials said, right? In what way are the current disclosures in inadequate? I'm prepared to hear that they are, but maybe less sanguine about a thread about how the big problem is you didn't know about them.
> For most orders of more than 100 shares, the analysis concluded that Robinhood customers would be better off trading at another broker-dealer because the additional price improvement that such orders would receive at other broker-dealers would likely exceed the approximately $5 per-order commission costs that those broker-dealers were then charging. The analysis further determined that the larger the order, the more significant the price improvement losses for Robinhood customers—for orders over 500 shares, the average Robinhood customer order lost over $15 in price improvement compared to Robinhood’s competitors, with that comparative loss rising to more than $23 per order for orders over 2,000 shares.
Given who RH's target customers are, it seems that the majority of them benefited from no commission and worse execution than if they used a competing broker.
I've never used RH, but I'm happy that they forced all competitors to get rid of their per trade fees.
So in other words, a small subset of customers significantly overpaid so that a large number of customers could get a bargain. The question is whether that's this a good thing, and also whether it's sustainable. Presumably those high-paying customers are going to be top candidates for competing brokerages to steal away with offers of better execution price. If that happens, does RH just content itself with lower profits -- or do they start finding new ways to increase revenue on the backs of their remaining customers?
You are conflating Reg NMS NBBO with a broker-dealer’s duty of best execution. RH has a fiduciary duty to customers to (on balance) achieve best ex. And a fiduciary duty means they must act in the best interest of their customers — including putting customer interests ahead of their own. Here RH was clearly prioritizing their own interests ahead of their customers.
I've read the SEC's order and I am certain what I've said is accurate. This is about best execution, not Reg NMS. See paragraphs 5, 13-4, 43-44 and footnote 2.
There are two violations in the order:
(1) Securities Act Sec. 17(a) arising from Robinhood's failure to fulfill their duty (in this case, of best execution).
(2) Exchange Act Sec. 17(a) arising from Robinhood's failure to keep adequate records which means that during the course of the investigation the SEC asked for one or documents and Robinhood, for whatever reason, failed to produce the requested document(s).
Neither of those violations relate to Reg. NMS or NBBO which was promulgated under Exchange Act Sec. 11A and is not mentioned anywhere in the Order.
You're right, of course. I think what happened here is that I jumped the gun on what I perceived your argument to be; that you were expressing something like the sentiment that Robinhood has to maximize customer outcomes on trades; that, for instance, if it has a dial that can go 80/20 -> 20/80 broker/customer on rebates, it actually is required to turn that dial to 0/100 if possible.
That argument doesn't make much sense to me. People trade slivers of pennies for all sorts of things across the economy. Literally just liking a UI color has a value you can denominate in some sliver of a penny.
The SEC's problem with Robinhood isn't that they weren't offering the best available price improvement. It's that they knowingly weren't, but told customers otherwise. The implication is that if they'd simply been up front about it, and said "we don't charge commissions and have a snappy UI, and we make up for it by taking a bigger share of the rebates our upstreams offer to retail traders", they'd have been just fine.
(Robinhood is bad, but the reasons have very little to do with PFOF).