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At least in this case, the lack of reaction from Apple shows that his accusations are not baseless. Don't blame it on the messenger.



My thoughts exactly. If this was just an overlooked bug, which was reported to Apple and which Apple then fixed, that would be the system working as intended.

In reality, a very simple bug was reported more than a year ago, and Apple apparently hasn't cared enough to fix it. The only way I can interpret that is to conclude Apple doesn't really care about the integrity of their sandbox.

IMO, this more than justifies the author's accusation of "security theater". My browsing history is among the most sensitive data on my machine—certainly more private than anything in my Documents folder, which Apple felt the need to protect in a highly-disruptive way. I agree that it can be worth trading some degree of usability for privacy and security, but only if those privacy benefits are real. If they're not, then we're left in the worst of both worlds.

It's really quite damning.


> The only way I can interpret that is to conclude Apple doesn't really care about the integrity of their sandbox.

There are many other ways to interpret it. Here is one completely made-up example that I created just now for this reply:

"Apple can't lock this down further without breaking open() calls in the majority of existing applications; therefore, they made a pragmatic choice to allow this issue to exist until their long-term roadmap plan to remove direct disk access to protected folders ships in a future macOS update; while declining to share their decision with the reporter, as is completely normal for Apple."

If you define "security theater" as "any practice that would not stand up to a human attacker", then all security is guaranteed by definition to be security theater, since all security protections will be found to have weaknesses, compromises, and design decisions that could be theoretically exploited. That definition is clearly non-viable in reality, and so all security decisions — even Apple's — will have unpalatable outcomes that do not invalidate the relevance of security.


> while declining to share their decision with the reporter, as is completely normal for Apple

This is completely normal for Apple, but that doesn’t make it OK for them to treat security fixes like product launches where they can choose an arbitrary timeline and keep the reporter hanging forever.


Sure but it also doesn’t justify innuendo about Apple not caring about privacy.

You know as well as I do that this stuff is complicated.


Yeah, it probably is; maybe it requires substantial changes in the kernel or something. The issue is that Apple never communicates this, they just sit on bugs until they fix them. This is a really poor experience for people reporting issues.


These security features are only nominally about protecting the user. Apple implements them to protect their services and platforms from competition and sells them via the privacy argument.

Does it happen to improve the security situation? Yes, for many people it does. Is it worth the cost? That's debatable, especially because of Apple's apparent apathy (and occasional hostility) towards the community.


> These security features are only nominally about protecting the user. Apple implements them to protect their services and platforms from competition and sells them via the privacy argument.

Stallman[1] and others[2] have talked about just this issue for over a decade now.

[1] https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/can-you-trust.en.html

[2] https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html


This is explicitly untrue.




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