> That does happen, but many including the biggest tech companies found a clever way around it. Via a combination of ultra-low interest bearing bond sales and share repurchases. It does the same thing but avoids those taxes. So there's no incentive for profit retention on net.
The loans allow the money to be transferred back into the domestic entity, but there are then restrictions on issuing more in dividends or buybacks than you have in profits, and borrowing isn't considered profit. So they can get the money back into the US and use it for wasteful empire building but they can't give it to the shareholders -- it makes the problem worse.
And buybacks have more advantageous tax treatment than dividends but they're still taxed as capital gains on the difference between the price you bought the shares and the price you tender them for, which doesn't happen if the money stays inside the corporation.
> Part of going into business is accepting risk, including systemic risk. That's why the corporate veil exists and it's generally positive for the overall economy when weak businesses fail. A strong business would have an operating model that can withstand such risk.
You're using two incompatible definitions of weak. In the first case you want weak businesses to fail because they're inefficient, i.e. they're consuming more resources than they produce and go bankrupt. In the second case the business fails because there is a situation resulting in a temporary loss of revenue (shutdowns) but the business still has operating expenses (e.g. rent) and is too efficient to have enough slack to bridge the gap. The inefficiency wasn't caused by the business occupying space it couldn't use, because at the time nobody could use that space -- the loss was a sunk cost to society at large.
If you let them fail then when the temporary situation ends there is greater market concentration because the leanest companies failed, which allows the remaining ones to charge higher margins due to the reduced competition to the detriment of their customers or suppliers.
> I'm surprised that opportunity costs of capital allocation are ignored when defending bailouts. They introduce market inefficiency and reward complacency.
This is why "bailouts" should be distributed uniformly without regard to risk of failure, e.g. through lower interest rates or fixed sum payments to everyone. Then you're not rewarding the most precarious companies because they get no more than anyone else, but you still prevent them from failing. Meanwhile those in a stronger position can use the money they received to increase investment or consumption, which is what you want in a down economy anyway.
> In principle, yes. In reality, most markets are not competitive to that degree.
It still works like that in practice much of the time. Blockbuster's product wasn't as good as Netflix and now they're gone. GM's product wasn't as good as competing ones and it led them into bankruptcy. Blackberry, Sears, RadioShack, Circuit City, AOL.
It could happen more than it does, but it still does.
> but there are then restrictions on issuing more in dividends or buybacks than you have in profits, and borrowing isn't considered profit. So they can get the money back into the US and use it for wasteful empire building but they can't give it to the shareholders
The argument has been subtly shifted here, from businesses not being able to return capital in the form of dividends due to taxes to business not being able to do so due to loan covenants. Irrespective of the latter point, it is clear that given low interest rates, repatriation tax policy has no effect on incentives for capital repatriation. The biggest most profitable companies that pay out large dividends and do share buybacks make frequent use of this.
As for the loan covenant restrictions, from an economic stability perspective, it's very poor incentive design to allow companies to repay dividends when they're not profitable. This is in effect what you mean when you say "restrictions on issuing more in dividends or buybacks than you have in profits". A business thus impacted should focus on getting profitable. Liquidation is also an option. Dividends and buybacks should not be.
> This is why "bailouts" should be distributed uniformly without regard to risk of failure
This policy sends a message that foresight doesn't matter and reinforces a short-term oriented time horizon. Not only is that worse for society, it's worse for business in the long-run due to investment disincentives. Providing temporary support to individuals or local small businesses to preserve communities, especially vulnerable ones, is a different story and this is not an argument against it. Bailing out large well-managed businesses on the other hand makes no economic sense, these businesses can easily be restructured, sold, and given a new lease on life under new ownership. Antitrust concerns should be handled by courts, not by bailouts.
> increase investment or consumption, which is what you want in a down economy anyway.
Not all investment is equal, some investments have a much better return than others. Good policy incentivizes the latter as opposed to incentivizing indiscriminately. Investment for the sake of investment leads to waste and is bad for the economy in the long-run.
> and is too efficient to have enough slack to bridge the gap. The inefficiency wasn't caused by the business occupying space it couldn't use, because at the time nobody could use that space -- the loss was a sunk cost to society at large.
This is very oversimplified. Larger businesses can tap into financing, working capital, and have many other tools available to deal with this. And if they can't, that's not efficiency, that's poor operational discipline. Since the owners stand to gain when such a business does well, they should be ready to lose when things go poorly. It shouldn't matter if the cause is one akin to a force majeure.
> Blockbuster's product wasn't as good as Netflix and now they're gone.
Netflix had a much lower cost of capital in the beginning and also a much lower fixed expense. In their case not having storefronts improved the product but that's not a fixed relationship. One can come up with many cases where the opposite holds. Therefore it only applies to that particular case and doesn't support the general argument. Similar nuances exist for the other anecdotal examples listed.
F.A. Hayek provides great arguments against government intervention in the economy. There can be a role in providing assistance to individuals or communities, Hayek was famously supportive of both, but it's important to not let that bleed over into market dynamics which must remain competition-based.
The loans allow the money to be transferred back into the domestic entity, but there are then restrictions on issuing more in dividends or buybacks than you have in profits, and borrowing isn't considered profit. So they can get the money back into the US and use it for wasteful empire building but they can't give it to the shareholders -- it makes the problem worse.
And buybacks have more advantageous tax treatment than dividends but they're still taxed as capital gains on the difference between the price you bought the shares and the price you tender them for, which doesn't happen if the money stays inside the corporation.
> Part of going into business is accepting risk, including systemic risk. That's why the corporate veil exists and it's generally positive for the overall economy when weak businesses fail. A strong business would have an operating model that can withstand such risk.
You're using two incompatible definitions of weak. In the first case you want weak businesses to fail because they're inefficient, i.e. they're consuming more resources than they produce and go bankrupt. In the second case the business fails because there is a situation resulting in a temporary loss of revenue (shutdowns) but the business still has operating expenses (e.g. rent) and is too efficient to have enough slack to bridge the gap. The inefficiency wasn't caused by the business occupying space it couldn't use, because at the time nobody could use that space -- the loss was a sunk cost to society at large.
If you let them fail then when the temporary situation ends there is greater market concentration because the leanest companies failed, which allows the remaining ones to charge higher margins due to the reduced competition to the detriment of their customers or suppliers.
> I'm surprised that opportunity costs of capital allocation are ignored when defending bailouts. They introduce market inefficiency and reward complacency.
This is why "bailouts" should be distributed uniformly without regard to risk of failure, e.g. through lower interest rates or fixed sum payments to everyone. Then you're not rewarding the most precarious companies because they get no more than anyone else, but you still prevent them from failing. Meanwhile those in a stronger position can use the money they received to increase investment or consumption, which is what you want in a down economy anyway.
> In principle, yes. In reality, most markets are not competitive to that degree.
It still works like that in practice much of the time. Blockbuster's product wasn't as good as Netflix and now they're gone. GM's product wasn't as good as competing ones and it led them into bankruptcy. Blackberry, Sears, RadioShack, Circuit City, AOL.
It could happen more than it does, but it still does.