A great read, really gets at both what military history can be, and the way that it can be reductively criticized. The roots of military history within the education systems of the elites is important, it promoted so much focus on military history as a way to teach future military leaders how to win future wars, not to understand the past.
Unfortunately, I don't know if it can, as a discipline, break away from some of the problems that it has been saddled with. There is a lot of bad military history out there, and specifically a lot of REALLY popular bad military history.
A lot of people don't want critical and expansive (beyond the battlefield) military history. They want either good guys vs bad guys narratives or deep rivet-counting/platoon-chasing level histories that ignore anything beyond a very narrow focus on specific actions on the battlefield.
The author makes a distinction between the "drums and trumpets" / "cult of the badass" following and the actual academic discipline, so I think this field is doing fine. It has a similar problem as the "pop sci" fluff resulting from badly copied university press releases which were inaccurate in the first place. The enthusiasts which then pick up from there are just a lot more, because to them war is just too interesting and emotionally satisfying. This then has an effect on the society as a whole, something for maybe military sociologists to research? But nothing the field itself can be blamed for, if anything without it the situation might be a lot worse.
I found this quote fitting: "[..] military historians study conflict in the same way that doctors study disease; no one assumes that doctors like diseases, quite the opposite."
Edit: Also thought provoking and reflecting on the fascination of war, in the comments the user TomBombadil quotes musings of a sentient machine from Iain M. Banks Culture novel Excession:
"It was a warship, after all. It was built, designed to glory in destruction, when it was considered appropriate. It found, as it was rightly and properly supposed to, an awful beauty in both the weaponry of war and the violence and devastation which that weaponry was capable of inflicting, and yet it knew that attractiveness stemmed from a kind of insecurity, a sort of childishness. It could see that—by some criteria—a warship, just by the perfectly articulated purity of its purpose, was the most beautiful single artifact the Culture was capable of producing, and at the same time understand the paucity of moral vision such a judgment implied. To fully appreciate the beauty of the weapon was to admit to a kind of shortsightedness close to blindness, to confess to a sort of stupidity. The weapon was not itself; nothing was solely itself. The weapon, like anything else, could only finally be judged by the effect it had on others, by the consequences it produced in some outside context, by its place in the rest of the universe. By this measure the love, or just the appreciation, of weapons was a kind of tragedy."
Not arguing, but just want to throw in the rivet-counting can have its place. For example Shattered Sword, one of the examples he gives of a “campaign” history that has deeper value, uses a ton of technical detail to show the tactical options that were available to the Japanese fleet, and ultimately puncture a lot of myths about Midway.
The important point in this case is that the rivet-counting has a purpose, it isn’t just for forum warriors to obsess over gun weights or which battleship was the most badass. Shattered Sword uses it to show that a lot of the popular account of the battle is factually impossible.
Another example would be Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting by J.M. Campbell. As far as analysis goes, it's fairly weak. On the other hand, it's a good and extremely detailed base collection of who did what, when, and with what result. It is therefore a excellent reference to start from for more actual analysis.
That is a product of bad education, not anything subjectively limited to military history. I took a military history class in college and it was all about second and third order consequences on technology innovation, politics, and evolution of leadership. It was one of the best and most remembered classes I ever took.
History in general has had (and has) that same problem; see the Great Man Theory. But the better classes of professional (and amateur) historians now regard that as poor analysis and try to produce and promote better things.
Ultimately, narrative history---and that includes a lot of good-guys-vs-bad-guys and rivet-counting---isn't going to go away. In fact, it can't, because that is some of the base data for critical history.
It is no real secret that as a discipline, military history is sometimes held in low regard by other historians.
The crux of his argument is that military history needs to be studied so that we can have less wars. He throws shade at other historians for looking down on military history. But as a total outside to this debate, who am I to trust?
It's the red-headed stepchild of historian specialties, in significant part because popular military histories rarely even qualify as histories, except insofar as they refer to particular dates and historical figures.
> As Peter Paret summarised in 1966 (!?), "Is there another field of historical research (military history) whose practitioners are equally parochial, are as poorly informed on the work of their foreign colleagues...and show as little concern about the theoretical innovations and disputes that today are transforming the study and writing of history?"
But this is also simply a value judgment by historians. The argument that its all about 'culture', like in so many other fields is a very questionable approach. Similar arguments are often made about Political Scicne that we must study 'political culture' and that this will give us information about why things happen.
In both cases I think this is very questionable assumption being made. Individual choice in one battle or one political move can and does change things, and if you want to understanding what happens is absolutely relevant.
Also, things like doctrine that has been studied for a long time, are very related to culture so I don't even fully agree that military historians have ignored culture.
> The crux of his argument is that military history needs to be studied so that we can have less wars
Former military here, now a technologist. When they teach military history in the military (and I imagine the goal of academics like this person are similar) the goal isn't explicitly to fight less wars. That's a lofty goal, and maybe attainable, but probably far off for humanity as a whole.
This article talks about war and militaries in general but I wanted to talk about how this can benefit Americans.
The reason they teach military history is so that we learn what's worth going to war for, what's not, and what we can do differently in the future. Ignoring what popular culture entertains around military logic for a second, the military (and governments) put a lot of factors into going to war. Those deserve some honest review, what often happens is outright downplaying, dismissal, etc because as they said the sentiment is that war is ugly. No matter the side you find yourself on this is the case.
This thought can be refined that war is ugly, but someone has to do it. Critical to any military, much less society, is the concept of a warrior class. Americans by in large, at least the ones I know, have no knowledge of the qualities, creeds, or convictions of the warrior class and thusly don't respect it much beyond some stuff they see in movies or read in books.
History can help shape the warrior class through the generations but also gives us good lessons on how to be healthier, more efficient, and more effective when needed. Learning from groups like the Israelis or the French Foreign Legion who maintain strong warrior cultures can teach us things about mental health, strategy, traditions, etc...
Also by teaching military history you actually form trust in the institution of the military. For instance, America's military at the time of it's forming was quite unique. You had a military force of volunteers that sprung up and after the revolution maintained some autonomy from the government but took a solemn vow of apoliticalness. This vow is still alive and well in military institutions but it can wane. Not only could it garner the trust of the public that people like the Joint Chiefs have the American people in mind but it would also remind service members why that vow is sacrosanct in a world that increasingly pressures you to be and act politically.
The last thing I'd like to mention is that provides some real pride around the military. Not nationalistic, chauvinistic pride but pride that even the people who have to do the most seemingly in-humane jobs have some humanity about them. Additionally, there's some confidence that if a powerful foreign nation did start World War III that we would be well equipped with citizens who can deal wit it. In my life I've met people who have some facade appreciation of the military or people who clearly hate the military and let those convictions infect other thoughts. Seemingly there's pretty few inbetween and I think a lot of this comes from a lack of understanding.
One of the stories I found more recently is the story of The Bonus Army (further reading: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonus_Army#:~:text=The%20Bonus....) Patton and McArthur are widely regarded as champions for the idea that no service member should be left behind, even if they were a corpse. It's the same ideology that fuels us continuing to search for bodies to this day. These same people, of the same convictions, right before the war attacked an encampment of veterans from WWI who were seeking early cash out of their war bonds because they were already homeless and had lost everything. They drove tanks into DC with Army Infantryman to take down peaceful demonstrators of their own ilk. I don't think McArthur and Patton are bad people, on the contrary I think they're people of astounding convictions, but knowing this history lets us understand a bit about people and maybe a little about life.
> Also by teaching military history you actually form trust in the institution of the military.
An easy argument can be made that the pretty absurd deference the US population has for its military is harmful both to the military and the population.
For me we don't need claims of the use of military history, other then that it is history. If we measure by impact on history, military history is undeniably important.
> the pretty absurd deference the US population has for its military is harmful
I'm still going to have some respect for the people who rush to stand between me and the bullets aimed at me. The local Starbucks, for example, has a sign that says free coffee for military personnel. A relative who used to run a coffee shop also always offered free coffee to military people. It's a small thing, but important.
It's not about glorifying the military, but about acknowledging the risks they take on our behalf.
They don't stand between you and the bullets, they are the ones firing bullets at others. There is next to no military risk of the US being invaded, if only because you are surrounded by two oceans.
Yes, it's often the wrong kind of deference, one that puts people on a pedestal but doesn't try to get to understand what's going on well enough to discuss war and military issues in a serious way.
> An easy argument can be made that the pretty absurd deference the US population has for its military is harmful both to the military and the population.
I wouldn't call what I see in modern times deference. As I described it in my post it's more nationalistic and chauvinistic. There's a big difference.
I disagree. When hearing Americans talk or in American media its not 'raw raw nationalism' its more like 'the army is really good and you should always honer and support them even when shitty politicians give them shitty jobs'.
The amount of deference to veterans and how they are all heroes is not about nationalism or chauvinism, its about the genuine believe that everybody who served in the military has served the country. Saying anything against the military is often interpreted as a direct attack on veterans and soldiers. Giving out metal before ever sports match is not exactly normal in most of the Western world.
The people in the US have a incredible deference to military, they trust it more then almost anybody else. The military as a institution specifically, not the nation. This is true even for people who have no trust in the presidency, congress or literally any other federal institution. Consistently the military is the most trusted institution.
Even people who are not very nationalistic or chauvinistic almost universally support the military, are happy with or want to increase military spending. Decreasing military spending in US politics basically gets you labeled as a traitor and despite people voting for anti-war candidates, they don't vote for 'reduce military spending candidates'.
All this without people even having the slightest understanding of what the military does and why. This goes even for politicians, most couldn't tell you the difference between Sunni and Shia or point out Afghanistan on a map. That of course doesn't matter, all that matter is that we are supporting the bois, a couple 10s of billions for new <thingding> that help even 1 solider is worth the cost. Just never ever question why any of this is done in the first place, those boring details don't matter.
Something actual military history could help people understand, but that is besides the point.
I understand your sentiment, but your arguments are presented as facts and not as reasoned arguments. You might be right in the general sense, but the assertion that
'most couldn't tell you the difference between Sunni and Shia or point out Afghanistan on a map.' is probably not true.
This is a long running debate inside and outside America, and while your opinion is useful, presenting it as fact is not.
Are you talking about politicians or normal people? Avg people have no idea what Sunni and Shia mean. And we have many examples of high level politicians and bureaucrats who don't know what it means.
And that is before getting into any even remotely complex questions about Iraq and the Middle East.
> The people in the US have a incredible deference to military, they trust it more then almost anybody else.
This is probably situational. I moved from the South to the West Coast and I've observed the behavior you described as well as people who exhibit a total breakdown of rationale as soon as they hear the word military. I'd say both perspectives are worthless.
> Decreasing military spending in US politics basically gets you labeled as a traitor and despite people voting for anti-war candidates, they don't vote for 'reduce military spending candidates'.
and
> Saying anything against the military is often interpreted as a direct attack on veterans and soldiers. Giving out metal before ever sports match is not exactly normal in most of the Western world.
Not quite. I served from 2009-2013 which means I got to witness "The Tea Party" and it's affect on the military by cutting DOD funding. [1] These efforts garnered some good support of Democrats as well, it was an unholy alliance of sorts. [2] Did they cut a couple planes, tanks, trucks, and programs? Maybe, but they also closed the Single Marine Program and our commissary on base. I was going to the range less and sitting in the field more. You likely didn't hear about this stuff in the news because the nature of a base is a bubble. I think taking a good honest looks at spending and decision making are worthwhile endeavors that should be reviewed constantly but the outcomes cannot be like when I served and all too often they are.
Spending decisions also play personally into the lives of troops, so I think it affects how they view someone who wants to take that money away. If you go down to Camp Lejeune to some random barracks room and ask to see their gear you might find some units with new gear but for the most part it's heavily worn, heavily used, heavily abused equipment that we try to replace before deployment. My plate carrier had some nasty fraying on my deployment that made it difficult to attach MOLLE gear but others have had to deal with. [4]
Even policy decisions play important factors in how veterans end up viewing people, motives, and parties. The notable rules of engagement change during Obama's presidency remains in a lot of peoples minds and was sparsely covered by news outlets who preferred putting lists of the dead on TV [3].
I think Republicans often are in a position where they're trying to do something beneficial for military members or veterans but it's often for show. If you want a good example of what "for show" looks like with veterans then simply examine how Veteran's Choice has evolved over the times. The problem was clear and yet it took us three different presidents to get it where it needed to be. What's too much is when they begin to use us as a political pawn and create some adoration culture out of it. I was personally shocked when I saw a veteran returning home used in a speech more than once and I think this sends a really terrible message to the American people. We can't descend into the 70's when liberals thought it okay to spit on military members but we can't be walking around thinking they're gods either. The latter I don't think is really happening outside of small circles but it's good to watch out for.
Democrats often don't realize their policy and fiscal positions with the military have impacts on troops which are seen and remembered when those troops are veterans. Having some empathy and understanding for these scenarios could totally be aided by teaching military history but I also think it necessitates some change in the anti-war constituent rhetoric. Learning to talk about and criticizing a war without insulting the people who fought in it or had their lives changed by it is a tricky business, but it's one you subscribe to when you get into the business of critiquing war. This rhetoric probably deserves it's own thread but it's one that I think can't be had online.
All the same, as a veteran and someone who falls on both sides of this debate, I understand your frustration.
I have a hard time understanding what these statements are talking about.
> to fight less wars. That's a lofty goal, and maybe attainable, but probably far off for humanity as a whole.
It's not only lofty and "maybe" attainable, it's already happened, beginning decades ago. You're living in the most peaceful time in human history. There are almost no international wars (maybe Armenia and Azerbaijan count?). The great powers fight no wars with each other. War is almost unimaginable across vast geographic areas: Europe, especially sans Russia. North America, South America - the entire Americas. South and Southeast Asia, with the possible (and significant) exception of India and Pakistan. East Asia except North Korea. Etc.
It's not an accident or luck; it was a program of the early 20th century to make war illegal, and that came to fruition after WWII when the victors (who were not daydreamers - they knew more about war than we can ever imagine or want to know) formed the UN and the roots of the EU explicitly to prevent future wars.
It's like saying that extending human average human lifespan past 50 years is "a lofty goal, and maybe attainable, but probably far off for humanity as a whole."
> Critical to any military, much less society, is the concept of a warrior class.
There is no "warrior class" in the West or in the democratic world. For most of American and democratic history, wars were fought using draftees and citizen soldiers, like the Minutemen - everyone, not a class. The current American and most wealthy country militaries are filled with volunteers, people from all walks of life - not a class, unless we redefine the meaning of "class" as 'any group of people in the same job'. They are not trained over generations; in fact, many in the U.S. military are immigrants and the children of immigrants.
A 'warrior class' doesn't have a place in U.S. society, which is explicitly anti-class. That doesn't mean there is perfect social mobility, but generally we expect and encourage individuals to follow their own paths - not many reading this follow the family profession (especially in IT!) - and to succeed or fail by their effort and merit. If Mary's mother was a farmer, we aren't shocked if Mary becomes a programmer or doctor or artist. Obviously, we have much work to do to achieve those ideals, but the ideal is certainly not a caste system.
There is certainly less war now than before, but from the standpoint of "should a society be prepared for thinking about use of force", the reduction is basically immaterial, ESPECIALLY for America. America weighs the question of "what force should be used, where, when and for what purpose" constantly.
America also has a "warrior class" in a few different ways of looking at it.
B) While the body of America military is nominally grafted from the same stock of the rest of the populace (see above for distortion), a significant portion the leadership of the military is absolutely a distinct beast. While yes, they are nominally just another citizen, they have part of a distinct culture (how could you not if you spent 10+ years in service of an institution) with a distinct way of seeing the world.
In both senses, it is worthwhile to consider that something "like a warrior class" exists, and that we should take its presence, its way of thinking and acting, and its implications seriously.
> America weighs the question of "what force should be used, where, when and for what purpose" constantly.
Yes, but I think every country makes those decisions and uses its military from time to time, at least every major country (kudos to Costa Rica for eliminating its military!) including all the NATO countries. The U.S. is a different case; it has been the guarantor of the post-WWII order and so uses its military more than some others (that doesn't justify the actions).
> 30% of recruits have parents who served, 70% have a relative who served
I'm surprised those numbers aren't higher for the population as a whole. For one thing, people were being drafted as recently as the 1970s. I'd expect that almost everyone has a relative who was in the military. I don't come from a military-oriented family in any sense, and I have at least three living ex-military relatives and of course many deceased ones.
But of course there is some continuity from generation to generation. That applies to any profession, locale, etc. People aren't surprised that the engineer's child becomes an artist, but the child is more likely to become an engineer than most people. Does that mean there is an 'engineer class'?
> a significant portion the leadership of the military is absolutely a distinct beast. While yes, they are nominally just another citizen, they have part of a distinct culture (how could you not if you spent 10+ years in service of an institution) with a distinct way of seeing the world.
The GP was talking about a sort of caste (my word), trained and treated distinctly from generation to generation. Every profession, community, ethnicity, etc etc. creates a distinct way of seeing the world. Look at people in SV! Y Combinator does the same. Other parts of government do the same. There's nothing special about the military in that regard.
>> Critical to any military, much less society, is the concept of a warrior class
> The GP was talking about a sort of caste, ... treated distinctly from generation to generation
If it's true that the kodah meant that, then it is patently hilariously absurd. There are many militaries, and many societies, that haven't worked that way, and some of them have been successful. You mention the modern "west" (though I don't know why, because it's just as true in the USSR or in China or in etc etc), but this isn't even the best example. Many societies required all citizens to be equally warriors, such as most first nations societies, or for example the Mongols. So clearly, if kodah meant what you claim they meant, they would be really really really wrong, like ludicrously wrong.
As such (and this is my point), it's probably better to assume that the kodah didn't mean that. It's probably better to steelman, rather than strawman.
I just said the West because I was thinking quickly and didn't know clearly about other countries. It was conceivable, even if unlikely, that officers in China or Russia (USSR? :) ) or someplace else are mostly hereditary, and I saw no need to raise that issue.
> So clearly, if kodah meant what you claim they meant, they would be really really really wrong, like ludicrously wrong. / As such (and this is my point), it's probably better to assume that the kodah didn't mean that. It's probably better to steelman, rather than strawman.
Always important to remember. And I should have phrased it that way. Thanks.
It's not only lofty and "maybe" attainable, it's already happened, beginning decades ago.
That is a very rose-colored glasses viewpoint. WW2 ended only 80 years ago, which is a minuscule amount of time in the grand scheme of things.
And since that time we haven't had a global conflict, but add up all the proxy wars, civil wars, "low intensity conflicts" and we're still looking at millions of dead.
I'd argue that the reason why we haven't seen a major global conflict is just the immediate post-WW2 global order (2 major superpowers with nuclear weapons) which drove it to multiple smaller conflict. Depending on how the world order changes (i.e. China) there is nothing to say we won't see another major global conflict.
And yes, organizations like the UN are great ways to address conflict before they become major wars, but I'd argue the effect has been incredibly small. The UN existed at the same time as the Vietnam War, the Afghanistan War, the Rwandan genocide, both Gulf Wars and it was basically "the UN issued a strongly worded statement" and the wars happened anyways.
No, it's factual. I didn't say there were no wars; I said there were fewer than at any time in human history.
If our standard is perfection, then every human endeavor has failed and we should return paleolithic life. People still die of illness, so we could argue that modern healthcare has failed; don't bother using it. Regarding the UN, in politics there is no certain proof ever of cause and effect, so arguably we should eliminate all political institutions.
The lack of war is the fact. The parent's theory of why or how and its predictions have no basis that I see.
There is ungodly amount of garbage history military history out there, because people want to read it. However, that does not mean there is not a huge amount of great work done in that field.
Its quite simply the case that for 1000s of years states major spending was on military and military matters, and the greatest transformation of society and economics happen during conflicts. Trying cut out military history from other fields is a fundamental mistake of the modern historians and more importantly universities.
I often listen to lectures from military historians and they quite often have a 'black sheep' feel around them, making self-depreciating jokes about how they still exist, this often leads to good lectures because they are already not inhibited by the conventions and trends other historians tend to follow.
> I often listen to lectures from military historians and they quite often have a 'black sheep' feel around them, making self-depreciating jokes about how they still exist, this often leads to good lectures because they are already not inhibited by the conventions and trends other historians tend to follow.
Sort of.
My wife is a historian, so I am friends with an unusually large number of history faculty. There is good military history that is widely respected by the community. The problem is that there are a lot of very old academics who refuse to acknowledge new ideas and methods, leading to a lot of continued publication of bad work.
It isn't military historians being free from conventions that trap other historians. The available analysis methods of modern history are very wide and there isn't a trend trapping the field. If anybody is stubborn and stuck in conventions, it is the aging group of military historians who refuse to integrate new ideas.
There are some older military historians who do great work and don't get respect, because just doing military history is considered old fashioned. And some of the old methods are not necessary bad, just considered bad but I don't always agree with that assessment.
And somewhat younger historians who are military historians but feel like they are kind of outsiders from their peers.
Many old methods are great! The point is that not all old methods are great. Fields move forward one funeral at a time, and there do remain a lot of aging researchers who are stuck in the past. This is not to say that every old researcher is doing a bad job or that every military historian is doing a bad job... it just seems to be the field that has resisted progress the most.
I obviously don't have a full view of the field, but I do know a few military history faculty in their 30s and they don't view themselves as pariahs. They also scream at their laptops when terrible scholarship ends up flying off the bookshelves because bad military history sells like hotcakes.
Being a professional technologist (which is probably as far away as one could get from being a historian), it baffles me that the academic military history discipline is treated as said in the article —- war is still
being waged daily in the modern world, and in the very foreseeable future it will not end. Surely at least the military academies around the world would do serious studies on the past to predict the future wars, at bare minimum?
Serious studies are being done all the time. The "anti military history" positions expressed in the blog post are not reflective of the position some monolithic "board of academics" who control all the funding and classes. They are opinions that are sometimes held by some individuals in a diverse field, who sometimes are in positions to deny or attempt to deny funding in local situations.
Serious research is being done, serious books and papers published, serious courses and lessons are taught.
If you want a technologist analogy, there are some parallels to what I assume PHP or Perl communities might be like. Whenever you go out into the broader world, you need to acknowledge how everyone else likes to take potshots at your language, and then move on to explain why your language meets certain needs anyways. And in the end, all the pot shots taken at PHP or Perl don't remove any of the immediate needs.
Well that's the thing the article touches, people tend to think that military history is not studied in a serious manner as far as an academic discipline goes. Military academies can do the bare minimum in rigor as far as they need to impart their military tradition and form effective officers, just like the author said about aristocrats learning how other aristocrats did their thing before smashing some peasants.
It’s also plausible that military institutions are less likely to want to share their findings than civilian ones though. If the US military thought it had found a unique predictive insight in history, it really wouldn’t want anyone else to know about it.
Strange. In Chrome this IP address can't be found, whereas it loads just fine in Firefox. This is the second time in a week I've come across a problem with a .mil domain, though the other one wasn't browser-specific.
I recently picked up the 1834-1842 issues of Journal Des Armes Spéciales which was a French technical journal about arms and armament. ( https://aaronnewcomer.com/document/journal-des-armes-special... ). An article introducing it gives a pretty good reasoning for the importance of studying military history, translated:
“Let the lessons of history not be lost for us, that the progress of military art is marching in concert with those of the industrial arts. If we are richer and more enlightened, let us also be stronger and more valiant. Let us not let this sword rust in our hands that Brennus and Clovis left us, that Charlemagne and Napoleon walked all over Europe; then all the tyrants and all the barbarians of the earth will not prevail never against a nation that can present a compact mass of eight million men, ready to pay their blood for the defense of the fatherland.
It is for the purpose of contributing to such a glorious result that we are undertaking today the publication of the Journal Des Armes Spéciales. Happy if we can contribute to maintain among the French, the sacred fire, the taste for arms that have always distinguished our ancestors; if we can root out these alluring doctrines, but disastrous, which tend to effeminate one whose people will always be passionate about war, and who will always support or the terror of Europe. The more the sweets of peace take root in the heart of our statesmen, the more the taste for peaceful pleasures tends to spread, the more gold finally gains consideration among us, the more urgent it is to return the honors due to it to the iron. Then the French people, drenched by the revolution, will again travel fourteen centuries of existence; if he conquers, they will be peaceful: he will have allies, friends and no subjects; it will use force only to resist an unjust aggression, to defend its allies, to avenge the injury done to only one of its citizens, and if some reckless enemy were to challenge in combat the great people, one would see reappear the great army more numerous and more formidable than ever.”
No yeah, I wrote in my article that this thing is “amazingly intense, aggressive, rooted in French military pride and filled with the glories of warmongering.” But the gist is that they look into it to make sure they don’t repeat mistakes and so that they understand their past so they can better appreciate how good life is now.
Exactly my thoughts. Even if it's audience is definitely amateur, it's incredible how Dan Carlin gives all the points me ruined in the post throughout all of his series. Especially, to me, ww1 and supernova in the East.
I've heard it said that the reason Pizzaro was able to conquer the Inca Empire with so few men is because of writing, meaning Pizzaro had access to a thousand years of military history on what worked and what didn't. (While the Incas did have writing, there's no evidence they had a written military history.)
The Roman army could beat a barbarian army that was 10 times larger and better armed, again due to studying military history.
Knowledge of military history also appeared to play a decisive role again and again in the battles between the Colonial/US armies and the Native Americans.
Either study war, or get beaten badly by the army that did.
I don’t know, did the Chinese study less military history than the Mongols?
For someone like Pizzaro, where’s the line between studying military history and being the recipient of a body of institutional knowledge and practice? Is the claim that the Inca didn’t have a body of institutional knowledge and practice that was effective within their own context and material culture?
Saying this as a fan of military history, this sounds awfully reductive. I suppose you could argue that printing, or at least an extensive written record, makes it easier to retain and transmit knowledge, but that’s not quite the same claim.
Worth noting that in 18th c France, the artillery officers were essentially the only ones with any formal military education.
> did the Chinese study less military history than the Mongols?
I know next to nothing about the wars between the Chinese and the Mongols. I could read a book about it, and why one or the other won, which is precisely my point :-)
> For someone like Pizzaro, where’s the line between studying military history and being the recipient of a body of institutional knowledge and practice?
Not much of one. Institutional knowledge and practice is transmitted via writing, far more than being carried around in one's head.
> Is the claim that the Inca didn’t have a body of institutional knowledge and practice that was effective within their own context and material culture?
Military techniques that work transcend culture. For example, attempting to decapitate the command structure is a well-known technique used by the west, and the command structure is designed to be tolerant of that. The Incas apparently never thought of that, and fell apart when Pizarro disrupted their command structure.
Just my own personal library has probably far more than 1000 times as much information as any person could carry in their head, let alone transmit to the next generation. When that's military knowledge, that is a tremendous advantage.
(Edit: Cut a response about the Mongols here bc I felt it came out a little snide. My understanding is the Mongols had no writing until Ghengis Khan, nowhere near the written culture of the chinese, but don’t know we’ll enough to argue the details)
> Military techniques that work transcend culture.
Material culture, ie no guns or steel armor. Military technique is highly contingent on the society and technology that gives rise to it: the army is always in some fashion a mirror of the state. For example Fire in the Lake is a really fascinating analysis of (in part) why transplanting western military practice to south Vietnam (as ARVN forces) failed while the Viet Cong flourished.
Ignoring that requires reducing military knowledge to contextless aphorisms like “decapitate the command structure”. I’m open to seeing evidence, but I’d be shocked if the Inca actually never thought of “kill the leader”.
I’m not saying that military history isn’t valuable or important. Obviously it is. My point is that the transmission of practice and the study of history are not the same thing. Calling the study of military history the decisive factor in military history is a strong claim that calls for strong evidence. Just identifying having a highly developed material culture with having greater access to historical knowledge doesn’t cut it.
> but I’d be shocked if the Inca actually never thought of “kill the leader”.
Not having a plan on transfer of control in case the leader is dead or otherwise unable to lead is, for intents and purposes, the same thing as never thought of it.
> Just identifying having a highly developed material culture with having greater access to historical knowledge doesn’t cut it.
I already identified how the Romans could beat a barbarian army 10 times their size and better armed. This was done with organization, tactics, and discipline. These were developed through centuries of experience, and writing is how these things are remembered.
A big part of what West Point teaches is military history, and it's not for the lulz. It's to learn the lessons of the past. My father (Air Force) received a lot of training as an officer, I still have his training books, and it's largely military history. The military is very interested in learning from history, and you can even see the constant changes in tactics in wars like WW1 and WW2 as they learn from mistakes.
> transplanting western military practice to south Vietnam (as ARVN forces) failed while the Viet Cong flourished.
That is indeed an interesting case history. The US, though, crippled itself by being unwilling (not unaware) to employ what was necessary to win. The VC took every advantage of what they knew the US was unwilling to do. Ho Chi Minh was no fool, had spent time in the west, and had access to military history. I.e. it was not a conflict between a society with military history knowledge and one without.
I realize I’m making more of this than it warrants, so I won’t go any further after this post. We agree that military history is valuable, we disagree that it’s the causative heart of a unified theory of the history of conflict. To me, the original thought reads like a pithy observation meant to underscore the value of military history. To push it to the point where it is itself historically decisive and includes all forms of the transmission of military knowledge is unwarranted. A key that claims to fit every lock should be treated with suspicion.
> Not having a plan on transfer of control in case the leader is dead or otherwise unable to lead is, for intents and purposes, the same thing as never thought of it.
This is beginning from a result and working backwards to infer possible causes. You can raise interesting questions that way, but it isn’t evidence that the inference is correct.
Rome was sacked by the Gauls in 390, came right to the edge against Hannibal and Pyrrhus, was never really able to come to grips with the Parthians or push meaningfully past the Rhine, and in the west was finished by an invasion of Goths. It’s not so cut and dried—-events rarely are, which is why we should be suspect of one size fits all theories. Chalking Roman organization, tactics, and discipline up to historical study means including a host of technological, social and economic systems which one could easily argue were themselves decisive. My original point was that the claim is reductive, not that it’s flat out wrong.
> [Vietnam] was not a conflict between a society with military history knowledge and one without.
Yes, that point was aimed at the claim that military knowledge transcends culture. The argument in Fire in the Lake doesn’t have anything to do with the US’s willingness to do “what was necessary” (ie the old “if they only let our boys off the leash” saw). It’s about how the VC approach to recruitment, organization and indoctrination was congruent with Vietnamese cultural and philosophical practice in a way that the US imposed South Vietnamese government and ARVN organization failed to match. We modeled ARVN on US military practice because that’s what our generations of military history and institutional knowledge told us to do, and it was a mistake.
I’m not interested in refighting Vietnam on HN, but Fire is a really interesting book. Whether you come out agreeing or disagreeing with her conclusions, it’s a strong recommend.
I know nothing about this field, nor its criticisms. Can anyone point me to some good reading that describes the detailed strategy and nuances that led to wars being won or lost? Things like not planning for muddy terrain contributing to a battle being lost -- that sort of thing. I don't know if this is what the author is for or against, but it's definitely something I'd be interested in reading.
I think there are broadly two types of ways to lose in a war.
The first way is that you've been to articulate clear goals, have been able to string together methods and means that at least on paper allow you to reach those goals, have been able to secure the relevant support (so national/popular will, backing of an aristocratic class, etc etc) to see through the task, and then come up short. For a classic example of this, we can look at WW1 Germany. Despite everything we know about how the war ended up, there was a path (but treacherous) to the Central Powers achieving their goals and being able to set the terms at the end of the war.
The second level is that you've failed one or more of the above tasks. In which case you're likelihood is losing gets much higher, possibly to the point where future historians might look back and say that you've lost before you even started. For classic examples of this, you would look at WW2 Japan and Pearl Harbor. It is incredibly difficult to find any analysis that didn't require continuous strings of miracles for Japan to achieve its aims once it had attacked the United States. Note that the second case consists mostly of a lot of "non-military" things.
Another thing that may help you out in your quest is to grasp of some of those is to understanding the three tier organization of tactics, operations and strategy. In fact, I can point you right back to one the author's blog series (this is part one of a six part series) where he analyzes the siege of gondor (yes LOTR) from a realistic-ish point of view (https://acoup.blog/2019/05/10/collections-the-siege-of-gondo...).
It'll probably start to give you a feel for maybe how you could rephrase your original question into forms that'll more likely give you the types of answers that you'd be satisfied with.
> Can anyone point me to some good reading that describes the detailed strategy and nuances that led to wars being won or lost?
This is a whole field of political science.
> Things like not planning for muddy terrain contributing to a battle being lost
That really has nothing to do with how wars are won and lost. Wars are won or lost when the politicians or depending how you look at it society at large stops fighting.
A muddy terrain might be a tactical consideration that could help you win one battle, or campaign and that you can then maybe leverage into something you could then call a victory. In every war millions of mistakes are being made, pointing to 1 of them and assigning and extra ordinary relevance to it, is very difficult.
What I can tell you is that there is no universal answer neither in political science, nor economics, nor military theory. In fact, this very question has baffled military theorists for literally 1000s of years.
The most popular reference is from Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist, he claimed you have to identify the 'center of gravity' and and then do what is in your power to shift that.
> The definition of a CoG is "the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act."[2] Thus, the center of gravity is usually seen as the "source of strength".
Of course you will notice that this is incredibly vague and provides little practical guidance.
This is the difference between historians, who try to find the end of individual wars, and military theorist and political scientist who try find more abstract descriptions.
You can read something like 'Strategy: A History' to get a general overview of how people have thought about it.
I highly recommend going to reddit.com/r/AskHistorians. They have a great wiki and reading list, or you can ask for books.
Wars are rarely won by single battles. That said, it really depends what period of history you are interested in. If you want to stick to the XXth century, Anthony Beevor regularly produces very readable books on WWII or the period immediately before (mostly concerned with the European theater).
If you are interested in more ancient history, I can warmly recommend Keagan's Peloponnesian War (which mostly draws on Thucydides eponymous masterwork).
Think you'll find it hard to find a reliable generalist primer, but there are plenty of singular examples to consider and find interesting things.
1 - Book: A Bridge Too Far - until Cornelius Ryan wrote the book in 1974, operation Market Garden (WWII) was regarded with somewhat muted, neutral or positive outcome, the kind political leadership wanted to bury and did for decades. But his book detailed just how horribly disastrous it went and how out of touch commanders ended up being in their planning, tying confidence to their egos. An example of one thing that went wrong, they landed some 35,000 paratroopers in the operation and the British group's radios had an effective range of 3 miles, but the groups that needed to talk to each other were landed 8 miles apart. Another part of the plan called for a group to head down a road to join another contingent for the next step, but didn't accurately estimate the road's capacity or how clogged it would get and how long it would take for them to make it - which ended up being 3x+ times as long, obviating their combat role.
Takeaway: that muddy terrain thing you mentioned is pretty important. Also, a realistic sequence of events.
Takeaway: western countries keep ignoring cultural differences, sending off military instructors and advisors in waves after waves and expecting a particular unrealistic outcome from the effort.
3 - find your own rabbit hole on various information and writeups about all-women antiaircraft teams in WWII. Short version, British women could do maintenance, spotlighting, loading and aiming but were not allowed to pull the trigger because only men were allowed to shoot at other men. By contrast, Russian AA all-women teams were allowed to. Here's a starting point that just barely touches on this very-fascinating subject and shows how wide it is - https://www.iwm.org.uk/history/the-vital-role-of-women-in-th...
Takeaway: German pilots had their opinion of the matter, and they much preferred the British solution.
Pedantic observation in case you didn't know: the word you were looking for was not "treaty", it was "treatise". If you did know, or if you don't care, ignore me.
Unfortunately, I don't know if it can, as a discipline, break away from some of the problems that it has been saddled with. There is a lot of bad military history out there, and specifically a lot of REALLY popular bad military history.
A lot of people don't want critical and expansive (beyond the battlefield) military history. They want either good guys vs bad guys narratives or deep rivet-counting/platoon-chasing level histories that ignore anything beyond a very narrow focus on specific actions on the battlefield.