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> moved to a fanless x86_64 running a minimal normal distro, which uses apt-get over HTTP by default

Fixed that for you.




Normal distros have package signatiure pki that works :-)


Ha! apt-get had 17 vulnerabilities in the last few years, two of them with very high severity score, easily exploitable [0]. For example:

CVE-2019-3462 Incorrect sanitation of the 302 redirect field in HTTP transport method of apt versions 1.4.8 and earlier can lead to content injection by a MITM attacker, potentially leading to remote code execution on the target machine.

[0] https://www.cvedetails.com/vulnerability-list/vendor_id-23/p...

Edit: many of the CVEs for apt-get are in the "bad pki" class, all of them are "severe" as they allow malicious code execution:

CVE-2009-1358 apt-get does not check for the correct error code from gpgv

CVE-2011-1829 APT does not properly validate inline GPG signatures

CVE-2011-3634 APt accepts connections when the certificate host name fails validation

CVE-2014-0478 APT does not properly validate source packages, allow installation of Trojan horse packages by removing the Release signature.

etc etc.

Facts of life: all software contain an uncountable number of severe vulnerabilities. It is unfair to single-out openwrt IMHO.


Yes, it's true... for redhat the worst rpm cve I could see from a quick google was back in 2012.

The CVE you mention is about the transport part, it's not easy to get right and everything that goes on the network is at some risk of that. Still that seems a different kind of implication than nobody checked if packages could be tampered successfully for 3 years and afterwards nobody changed the infrastructure.


And so does openwrt, since you'll notice that that CVE was fixed.


Yes it was fixed when pointed out to them, after all openwrt users from 18.06+ had been exposed to this for three years. There's no known way to guard against bugs in the end, but... you can empirically test... they didn't check at all if their package signature check could detect tampering after patching it? For 3 years?

Then no infrastructure changes as a reaction to what happened? Like I said good for them, the PR mentions they will get some funding this is the kind of thing they can spend it on.




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