This is also absent in the analysis of "security theater." I've often felt the "theater" does in fact have a material impact on target selection. One doesn't need to actually have a methodology that results in better capture of terrorists to deter them to other targets: one just needs a methodology that has plausibility of increasing the risk of failure. The unfalsifiability of "security theater" is actually a feature not a bug: it means there's always a non-zero weight on it's potential risk impact to terrorist considering air travel as a target.
All other things being equal, the opportunity cost will shift towards targets that have less elements akin to "security theater", since it's basically 'money on the table' to de-risk the attack.
So, the real question to ask about "security theater" is not if it has a material impact on human safety with flying, but if its deterrent effect pushes risk to places we'd rather it not go or if the costs of performing it do not outweigh this deterrence benefit. Given the potentially paralyzing effect it would have on the global economy if air travel were covered in a blanket of fear of flying, it's hard to argue that "decentralizing" this risk to other targets is a bad idea.
All other things being equal, the opportunity cost will shift towards targets that have less elements akin to "security theater", since it's basically 'money on the table' to de-risk the attack.
So, the real question to ask about "security theater" is not if it has a material impact on human safety with flying, but if its deterrent effect pushes risk to places we'd rather it not go or if the costs of performing it do not outweigh this deterrence benefit. Given the potentially paralyzing effect it would have on the global economy if air travel were covered in a blanket of fear of flying, it's hard to argue that "decentralizing" this risk to other targets is a bad idea.