That's a bigger ask than you might at first think. Scalia is noted for his concurrence in Raich (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gonzales_v._Raich) in favour of federal marijuana prohibition despite its apparent incompatibility with the interstate commerce clause.
> I understand he was trying to make sure that the Constitution was followed to the letter of the law, and that if the people were unhappy with it, let them change it so that it reflected the popular desires. But let it follow that process.
That view can itself be radical. McCullough v Maryland (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCulloch_v._Maryland) was decided in 1819 -- well within living memory of the constitution's drafting -- and cemented an expansive understanding of federal powers that was arguably at odds with a strict textualist interpretation of the constitution. Adopting a strictly textualist argument today that would refute centuries of legal tradition is just as significant of a change as the constitutional amendments called for by Scalia-style arguments.
(As a practical matter, also look at the pressure points of change in the US system: it takes double supermajorities to enact a constitutional amendment, but only majority control over a sufficient period of time to appoint the Supreme Court. The latter is by far the path of least resistance.)
On the other hand, you can punt this problem even further back: the United States has no codified set of principles for statutory or (especially) constitutional interpretation.
> And that the writers of the Constitution were trying to prevent disaster as much as trying to enable progress
Note that they didn't do this. The constitutional order envisaged in the 1780s broke down with the US Civil War. If you treat the US as having a single continuous political and legal tradition (a reasonable point of view), then that tradition has both its successes and failures.
> Other unintended side effects may include: politicization of the judiciary, which we know all too well today.
Politicization of the judiciary is unfortunately a historical default. Keeping the process apolitical requires a broad, cross-partisan consensus towards either a particular model of neutral judiciary or towards appointment processes (not seen in the US) that remove judicial selection from direct political interference.
Mind you, those of radical political ideologies will point out that an "apolitical" judiciary is still political -- just one that reinforces the status quo and all injustices that entails.
That's a bigger ask than you might at first think. Scalia is noted for his concurrence in Raich (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gonzales_v._Raich) in favour of federal marijuana prohibition despite its apparent incompatibility with the interstate commerce clause.
> I understand he was trying to make sure that the Constitution was followed to the letter of the law, and that if the people were unhappy with it, let them change it so that it reflected the popular desires. But let it follow that process.
That view can itself be radical. McCullough v Maryland (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McCulloch_v._Maryland) was decided in 1819 -- well within living memory of the constitution's drafting -- and cemented an expansive understanding of federal powers that was arguably at odds with a strict textualist interpretation of the constitution. Adopting a strictly textualist argument today that would refute centuries of legal tradition is just as significant of a change as the constitutional amendments called for by Scalia-style arguments.
(As a practical matter, also look at the pressure points of change in the US system: it takes double supermajorities to enact a constitutional amendment, but only majority control over a sufficient period of time to appoint the Supreme Court. The latter is by far the path of least resistance.)
On the other hand, you can punt this problem even further back: the United States has no codified set of principles for statutory or (especially) constitutional interpretation.
> And that the writers of the Constitution were trying to prevent disaster as much as trying to enable progress
Note that they didn't do this. The constitutional order envisaged in the 1780s broke down with the US Civil War. If you treat the US as having a single continuous political and legal tradition (a reasonable point of view), then that tradition has both its successes and failures.
> Other unintended side effects may include: politicization of the judiciary, which we know all too well today.
Politicization of the judiciary is unfortunately a historical default. Keeping the process apolitical requires a broad, cross-partisan consensus towards either a particular model of neutral judiciary or towards appointment processes (not seen in the US) that remove judicial selection from direct political interference.
Mind you, those of radical political ideologies will point out that an "apolitical" judiciary is still political -- just one that reinforces the status quo and all injustices that entails.