More to the point - if you accept strong verificationism, statements are only meaningful to the extent they constrain expectations as to future experiences. "I will die" does not, because being dead is not an experience. It's a meaningless statement. It's silly to be afraid of a literally incoherent "possibility".
Sure, but the reaction to that should be different - one should focus on access to painkillers and such rather than some kind of incoherent existential dread.
By this logic, shouldn't a person be indifferent between 1) an accident where they die, and 2) an accident where they and their partner die, since "being dead is not an experience"?
Your framing is wrong. Neither of those two textual descriptions represent something that could possibly happen. It's as nonsensical as asking "should you be indifferent between xhskgkrid happening or kwntocusbw happening?"
If you take strong verificationism seriously, that is. I can't give the entire theory here, but there are strong arguments for it, and also critiques that I personally don't find compelling.
