I did not say or imply I know more than Eisenhower. I was contextualizing his words; something that’s necessary when you pull quotes from 60 years ago.
The document you link to would also benefit from the same treatment, being written in 1946 by the Strategic Bombing survey (a group that notably preferred precision bombing of industrial infrastructure, to the indiscriminate destruction of napalm and atomic weapons).
It not only makes the point you describe (that the Japanese population was war fatigued), but it also concludes that the use of atomic weapons (plus the Soviet declaration of war) gave the peace-seeking factions of the war council a platform to strong arm the army (which wished to continue the war) into accepting the Potsdam terms (unconditional surrender).
Prior to the use of atomic weapons, Japan was seeking a conditional surrender where they kept Korea, Taiwan, and parts of Manchuria. They were also sincerely developing strategies to prolong the defense of a home invasion. Even the emperor (who was pro-surrender) encouraged the simultaneous development of both plans. It is true that there were influential factions who preferred peace. Without the atomic bombs, we cannot know how long it would have taken for them to gain ascendancy in the government, and how many would have perished before they came to an unconditional surrender.
Again, I’m not saying it’s cut and dry that they were necessary. I’m saying it was and is complicated and nuanced.
The document you link to would also benefit from the same treatment, being written in 1946 by the Strategic Bombing survey (a group that notably preferred precision bombing of industrial infrastructure, to the indiscriminate destruction of napalm and atomic weapons).
It not only makes the point you describe (that the Japanese population was war fatigued), but it also concludes that the use of atomic weapons (plus the Soviet declaration of war) gave the peace-seeking factions of the war council a platform to strong arm the army (which wished to continue the war) into accepting the Potsdam terms (unconditional surrender).
Prior to the use of atomic weapons, Japan was seeking a conditional surrender where they kept Korea, Taiwan, and parts of Manchuria. They were also sincerely developing strategies to prolong the defense of a home invasion. Even the emperor (who was pro-surrender) encouraged the simultaneous development of both plans. It is true that there were influential factions who preferred peace. Without the atomic bombs, we cannot know how long it would have taken for them to gain ascendancy in the government, and how many would have perished before they came to an unconditional surrender.
Again, I’m not saying it’s cut and dry that they were necessary. I’m saying it was and is complicated and nuanced.