FWIW, the goal of the allied bombing campaign was always to cripple the adversary nation by bombing industrial infrastructure; the doctrine pre-dated the outbreak of WW II.
The invention of radar-assisted targeting thwarted this mission in the early phases of the war in Europe, and it took a tech arms race to get past it.
In the Pacific, the US’s primary objective was to secure an air base within strategic bombing range of Japan. It pursued this by capturing islands and investing in aeronautics (extending the range and carrying capacity of bombers).
Once within range of Japan, the Air Force tried strategic bombing at first, but found themselves unable to hit their targets. They had to fly above flak, and aim through the previously-undiscovered jet stream. They eventually gave up and turned from strategic bombing to recently-invented (demonstrated in 1942/3, mass produced in 1944) napalm. They knew it was awful, but considered it a trade of X lives now for 10x lives later.
All this to say, I don’t believe that war weariness significantly influenced the decision to use napalm and atomic weapons, in Europe or Japan. If the allied powers had encountered the opportunity to use them within the first year of the war, their military doctrine would have dictated their use.
The invention of radar-assisted targeting thwarted this mission in the early phases of the war in Europe, and it took a tech arms race to get past it.
In the Pacific, the US’s primary objective was to secure an air base within strategic bombing range of Japan. It pursued this by capturing islands and investing in aeronautics (extending the range and carrying capacity of bombers).
Once within range of Japan, the Air Force tried strategic bombing at first, but found themselves unable to hit their targets. They had to fly above flak, and aim through the previously-undiscovered jet stream. They eventually gave up and turned from strategic bombing to recently-invented (demonstrated in 1942/3, mass produced in 1944) napalm. They knew it was awful, but considered it a trade of X lives now for 10x lives later.
All this to say, I don’t believe that war weariness significantly influenced the decision to use napalm and atomic weapons, in Europe or Japan. If the allied powers had encountered the opportunity to use them within the first year of the war, their military doctrine would have dictated their use.