Yeah you're pretty much right. But this can be solved pretty simply with a pigovian tax.
It's not inconsistent with any definition of rights that I'm aware of to say that you can't pollute our air without consequences. By contrast, the current state of affairs does not mesh with any philosophical system that I've found. Under what theory can some stranger pollute my air? That's no more justifiable than me pouring perchlorate in my neighbor's well. The stronger someone believes in individual rights, the stronger they support my argument.
I think it's a misreading of philosophy (not saying you're doing this) to say that we need to justify restrictions on obvious negative externalities like air pollution. The polluter needs to justify his actions, not the neighbor whose air is being poisoned.
(The science on the deleterious effects of air pollution is of course settled regardless of what anyone thinks about global warming.)
I think the problem with your argument is that you assume there is always an a priori agreed upon definition of what constitutes negative externality, and this is just not true. Specifically, the line (emphasis mine):
> It's not inconsistent with any definition of rights that I'm aware of to say that you can't pollute our air without consequences
What exactly does pollute mean here?
I could say that my neighbor generating sawdust while sawing wood to build their deck is "polluting" the air. Or me sneezing while standing on my porch outside is "polluting" the air. Or if I'm watering my plants and some water flows downhill to my neighbor is "polluting" their lawn. Or me practicing piano in my house is polluting the soundscape of the neighborhood. Or, ..., or, ..., or, ..., or, ... See, there are limitless ways that one could construe basically any action someone takes as producing a negative externality. Almost certainly all of the examples I mentioned have been argued as negative externalities, and the answer is not to either accept every argument or reject every argument, because the details and circumstances matter.
My point is: Don't presume that negative externalities are automatically identified, and don't presume that every identified negative externality automatically justifies action to correct it, and don't presume that your chosen favorite corrective action produces no externalities of its own.
To be clear, I agree that there is enough evidence against CO2 that it is worth considering taking action to force CO2 generators to bear the cost of the externalities they produce. I don't agree that it's "obvious" that: 1. the negative externality exists, 2. the chosen remedy will actually solve the problem, 3. that the chosen remedy is known to be sufficiently free of its own negative externalities to consider forcibly changing our behavior. I think these things are true, but I don't think it's obvious that they're true, and trying to assert their truth by trying to make them axioms is dangerous and counterproductive.
It's not inconsistent with any definition of rights that I'm aware of to say that you can't pollute our air without consequences. By contrast, the current state of affairs does not mesh with any philosophical system that I've found. Under what theory can some stranger pollute my air? That's no more justifiable than me pouring perchlorate in my neighbor's well. The stronger someone believes in individual rights, the stronger they support my argument.
I think it's a misreading of philosophy (not saying you're doing this) to say that we need to justify restrictions on obvious negative externalities like air pollution. The polluter needs to justify his actions, not the neighbor whose air is being poisoned.
(The science on the deleterious effects of air pollution is of course settled regardless of what anyone thinks about global warming.)