As far as I understand it, the "hard problem of consciousness" is the claim that consciousness is something absolutely separate, that there is a jump between constructive processes that make up the informal view of consciousness and the full formal, philosophical view. That approach always seemed like a complete dead end.
I mean, "philosophical zombie" construct would seem to experience "Colors, tastes, feelings" and whatever concrete, they just would lack the ineffable quality of (philosophical, formal) consciousness - you could brain pattern akin to color sensation for example. This final view is kind of meaningless and I think people are attracted to the view by misunderstanding, by thinking something concrete is involved here.
The concreteness is your own subjective experience. All this other stuff about constructive processes and zombies is word play. It doesn't change your experience.
The issue is providing a scientific explanation for how the physical world produces, emerges, or is identical to consciousness. Arguments like p-zombies and Mary the color scientist are meant to showwe don't know how to come up with such an explanation, because our scientific understanding is objective and abstract, while our experiences are subjective and concrete.
I prefer Nagel's approach to the hard problem, as he goes to the heart of the matter, which is the difference between objective explanation and subjective experience. Science is the view from nowhere (abstract, mathematic, functional), while we experience the world as being from somewhere as embodied beings, not equations.
I mean, "philosophical zombie" construct would seem to experience "Colors, tastes, feelings" and whatever concrete, they just would lack the ineffable quality of (philosophical, formal) consciousness - you could brain pattern akin to color sensation for example. This final view is kind of meaningless and I think people are attracted to the view by misunderstanding, by thinking something concrete is involved here.