The idea that naturally mild strain of the coronavirus would provide a durable benefit, but a human-created vaccine would not, seems to me like an idea that needs a lot more explanation. The mechanism of immunity should be the same between those two.
The main argument here is that finding a mild strain (and having it tested implicitly by virtue of it infecting many humans) could be faster than developing a human-created vaccine.
I don't have any credentials in this field, but IMHO we should attack the problem from all possible angles, including the search for a natural, less harmful strain.
> Apart from the time it will take to develop, trial, and mass produce a vaccine (12-18 months), it is unlikely that any vaccine will be practicable. The reason why is immunity to respiratory viruses (like corona) doesn’t last long – 6 months to 2 years. We would have to keep vaccinating everyone in the world every year (or maybe every 6 months if we are unlucky). This just isn’t going to work in the real world (especially poor countries) and is one of the reasons we don’t have a vaccine for the coronavirus strains that cause the common cold. Unless we can drive the current dangerous SARS-CoV-2 strains to extinction we are going to have a problem with this disease indefinitely.
Every one of these objections also applies to a less harmful strain.
For example, one reason vaccines don't confer durable immunity to many respiratory infections is because the infectious agents change over time, migrating away from the vaccine response. Well, by the same token, a less deadly strain of such an infectious agent would also change over time at the same rate.
On the other hand if we think a naturally occurring strain would provide stable immunity over a long time, then a human-created vaccine would also be stable for a long time.
There is nothing magical about naturally occurring strains. They work in the body exactly the same way vaccines do. (Which is of course why vaccines work in the first place.)
Nature may have run enough experiments to know that the less deadly strain is as safe as a vaccine, but she won't just tell us that. We would have to discover it for ourselves with the same scientific method we use to interrogate vaccine candidates. Which BTW is the time-consuming part... we already have some candidates.
This matters because if someone were to do anything to promote or help others infect themselves with the strain... that person or company could face significant civil liability if the strain turns out to not be safe for everyone. Even one wrongful death suit can ruin your day.
Vaccine liability is "manually managed" via federal legislation. Encouraging people to have infection parties is not.
Yes we use the scientific method of epidemiology - has been working since John Snow used it to determine that there was a cholera problem with the Broad Street Pump [1].
I am not encouraging anyone to do anything other than look for a natural attenuated strain. This point seems to be missed time and time again.
If you're proposing an investment of effort to find new information, it's absolutely fair game to ask what we will do with that information--how we will benefit from it.
a) We find a naturally attenuated strain and do nothing to promote or spread it.
b) We find such a strain and treat it like a vaccine candidate with all the testing.
c) We find such a strain and treat it like a vaccine candidate but without all the testing.
If someone does a) or b) they are on solid legal and scientific ground, but arguably have not created any new benefit beyond what is already happening to develop a vaccine.
Whoever does c) would certainly deliver a benefit in terms of speed... but if they cause any unexpected harm, would be exposed to legal liability.
I guess my fundamental question is whether the hard part of developing a vaccine is attenuating the virus or proving such attenuation is safe. Epidemiology can help us find natural versions of the former, but it can't help us with the latter.
Epidemiology cannot satisfy a question of safety. It can only identify risk factors, as John Snow did with the water pump. If your idea succeeds, at best we will be able to say "this strain seems to be a low risk factor for serious illness or death in this population." Then what?
The critical moment for cholera was to run an experiment: remove the pump handle and see what happens. But in the case of vaccines or vaccine-like strains, we are not talking about an experiment to remove a risk factor, we are talking about spreading a risk factor after properly qualifying its risk as low. That is much harder to do. The only way is to run a bunch of experiments.
No matter what is done or not done there is risk. This is the nature of this problem. I am of the belief that the more options you have the better. If there is an attenuated strain out that has infected a large number of people we should look for it. What we do with it if we find it is a political question, not a scientific one.
