> If you give E2EE to the masses, then the endpoints will need to remain vulnerable by design, or LE/IC won't be able to do their jobs fighting criminals.
I don't buy this argument. Law enforcement still has plenty of other ways of going after criminals. All the E2EE in the world won't stop an informant from turning over decrypted versions of communications to the cops. In fact, E2EE makes that evidence more valuable since it's harder for the person at the other end to claim they didn't send it when they're the only one with that private key.
> LE/IC will have a more difficult time fighting crime
I'm not even sure that's true. LE/IC will have to rely more on different methods of fighting crime, but it's not at all clear that those methods are less effective than snooping on everyone's communications. Snooping on everyone's communications sounds easy until you realize how tiny the signal to noise ratio is--that is, if you're actually trying to find real criminals instead of just finding reasons to mess with more people in general.
I don't buy this argument. Law enforcement still has plenty of other ways of going after criminals. All the E2EE in the world won't stop an informant from turning over decrypted versions of communications to the cops. In fact, E2EE makes that evidence more valuable since it's harder for the person at the other end to claim they didn't send it when they're the only one with that private key.