FACS (the guys on the ground to direct the aircraft fire), as far as I have read, say that it is quicker to get a slow mover like an A-10 or helo updated on the situation, familiar with the layout of the terrain, and make sure they know where the good guys and the bad guys are before they let the fly-boys start firing / dropping.
One of the things that is supposed to make the F-35 as capable as an A-10 in CAS/COIN (counter-insurgency, despite the wildly different approach, is it's "Sensor Fusion" system. Basically it gives the pilot so much information that it offsets the "fast-mover" disadvantages (and then some). Whether it lives up to the claim is no something I can comment on.
Of course, when it comes to recent wars, everything the US military uses is massive overkill and massively expensive (apart from drones, maybe).
There is a popular view held that the Airforce brass doesn't like CAS/COIN (They all about killing MiGs) and that prop planes aren't sexy enough which is why this program has been taking so long.
It has nothing to do with sex appeal. A prop plane used for CAS/COIN will siphon funds away from the F-35. That's fine, as long as you don't need to engage in combat with a near peer competitor like China/Russia etc. Planes like the Tucano (and the A-10) will NOT survive against a modern AD. Nor will Apache etc; witness the performance of the Apache when used in 2003. When assaulting the Republican Guard positions at Karbala (with rudimentary AD), the Apaches suffered an incredible amount of casualties:
"Of the 29 returning Apaches, all but one suffered serious damage. On average, each Apache had 15-20 bullet holes. One Apache took 29 hits. Sixteen main rotor blades, six tail blades, six engines, and five drive shafts were damaged beyond repair. In one squadron only a single helicopter was fit to fly. It took a month until the 11th Regiment was ready to fight again. The casualties sustained by the Apaches induced a change of tactics by placing significant restrictions on their use.[11] Attack helicopters would henceforth be used to reveal the location of enemy troops, allowing them to be destroyed by artillery and air strikes.[3]"
The A-10 was designed for a hot war in Europe and would have been nothing more than a “speed bump” for a Soviet invasion in the Fulda Gap, let alone a modern peer.
The problem is really casualty aversion - we lost 10’s of thousands of airmen in WW2 and that’s not sexy. The fighter mafias in the USAF and USN are real things, driving the specification of unrealistic capabilities in fiscally constrained universes.
Fiscally affordable wars are going to require less bling and a higher tolerance for losses.
Extending your thought we should expect F-35 shortcomings to lead to tactical limitations due to operational risks leaders will be unwilling to take when facing a real peer.
Yes, we've imposed tactical (and strategic) limitations due to operational risks in our current wars/engagements. The B-2 for example, will never fire a shot in anger since there are so few airframes. It'll be retired in short order after the deployment of the B-21.
Same with the F-22. Other than a token deployment to the Mideast with a sortie or two in Syria, they won't see combat unless we get in a hot war with a peer. And until recently, they lacked the required capabilities to attack ground targets. No need to risk them for bomb truck missions.
My real worry is that our risk aversion will cause a conventional war to go nuclear in short order, when a more robust conventional military would be able to prevent that. Imagine if we lost a CVN to the Chinese? 5000+ sailors and airmen dead.
> Planes like the Tucano (and the A-10) will NOT survive against a modern AD.
That wasn't in their design briefs.
They're for low- (and maybe medium-) risk areas; they're not for Day 0 (or perhaps even 1) operations.
But "victory" is often achieved after a bit of a slog over hill and dale, and high-end gear may not be need for for all of it. Yes, the tip of the spear may need pricey kit, but the baseball bat of suppression may be able to do with a bit less.
As long as your wars are expeditionary in nature you're fine with a low end force. But in a peer conflict, these are useless. And they siphon away pilots (something the USAF is short of), while simultaneously making it easier to get into an expeditionary fight.
> There is a popular view held that the Airforce brass doesn't like CAS/COIN (They all about killing MiGs) and that prop planes aren't sexy enough which is why this program has been taking so long.
This may be getting in "jurisdiction" issues, but if the USAF doesn't really want to do CAS/COIN, why can't the Army do it?
The USAF keeps think clear at >3,500 feet (1000m), and Army CAS planes mops things up for the folks on the ground. If extra muscle is needed USAF ordinance can be dropped or an AC-130 be requested.
You've just complicated your logistics and added a whole bunch of personnel requirements for the Army to have any significant amount of planes for use in combat. Not to mention, the Army has helicopters to perform this exact same function already.
Well for one, the Army would have to start worrying about bases with full landing strips, pilot training, the bureaucracy and command structure that would be required to run the squadrons. They would need mechanics that know how to repair them, people that know how to arm and refuel them.
You end up doing a good amount of work just to try and protect a very expensive plane from Air Force politics. Ideally, the Air Force would just settle on an inexpensive prop plane that could perform the same missions as the A-10 at much less of the cost.
I'm not knowledgeable on how effective a helicopter is for CAS.
One of the things that is supposed to make the F-35 as capable as an A-10 in CAS/COIN (counter-insurgency, despite the wildly different approach, is it's "Sensor Fusion" system. Basically it gives the pilot so much information that it offsets the "fast-mover" disadvantages (and then some). Whether it lives up to the claim is no something I can comment on.
Of course, when it comes to recent wars, everything the US military uses is massive overkill and massively expensive (apart from drones, maybe).
The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Light_Attack/Armed_Reconnaissa... is supposed to be the "cheap COIN" aircraft for these kinds of conflicts.
There is a popular view held that the Airforce brass doesn't like CAS/COIN (They all about killing MiGs) and that prop planes aren't sexy enough which is why this program has been taking so long.