Great. Might as well just jack up the consequences to the point that perpetrators realize they have everything to lose and guarantee there is no low-hanging fruit, and that whatever you do end up having to infiltrate will have a "like-your-life-depends-on-it" security posture.
This is how cures become worse than the disease. Life isn't black and white, nor do things tend to be doable without gratuitous unintended consequences.
Encryption is not, nor has it ever been the be all end all to child predation. Effective investigation techniques have been the issue, and awareness have been the problem, because of the ephemerality of any distribution system once its existence is outed to hostiles in the non-pedophilia community at large.
If you want to take these people down, you have to map the logistics. If you want to map the logistics, you have to consume content; once you have the content, you need to analyze the crap out of it for every possible clue you can about how and where it was made in order to try to make some reasonable guesses about how the production industry works, then you have to double down and go deep to figure out what these production rings look like, whether they know each other, and how do they work. I'm talking picking apart the audio for environmental noise that might clue you in, or developing profiles of certain quirks of equipment. Analyzing the medium of exchange to see if you can exploit the financial traceability aspect, etc... All of which can also be sanitized once the opponent knows you look for it by the way. Proper OPSEC on their part will leave as few breadcrumbs as possible for you to find, and the closer you get to the heart of the op, the more heinous the infiltration will likely get.
All of that has zilch to do with e2e encryption. That's all meatspace work. Ugly work, but work that'll need to happen nevertheless.
This is how cures become worse than the disease. Life isn't black and white, nor do things tend to be doable without gratuitous unintended consequences.
Encryption is not, nor has it ever been the be all end all to child predation. Effective investigation techniques have been the issue, and awareness have been the problem, because of the ephemerality of any distribution system once its existence is outed to hostiles in the non-pedophilia community at large.
If you want to take these people down, you have to map the logistics. If you want to map the logistics, you have to consume content; once you have the content, you need to analyze the crap out of it for every possible clue you can about how and where it was made in order to try to make some reasonable guesses about how the production industry works, then you have to double down and go deep to figure out what these production rings look like, whether they know each other, and how do they work. I'm talking picking apart the audio for environmental noise that might clue you in, or developing profiles of certain quirks of equipment. Analyzing the medium of exchange to see if you can exploit the financial traceability aspect, etc... All of which can also be sanitized once the opponent knows you look for it by the way. Proper OPSEC on their part will leave as few breadcrumbs as possible for you to find, and the closer you get to the heart of the op, the more heinous the infiltration will likely get.
All of that has zilch to do with e2e encryption. That's all meatspace work. Ugly work, but work that'll need to happen nevertheless.