Generally yes (there are a lot of SSH implementations out there), but that isn't the only thing you want to protect against:
1. If there is a critically broken cipher an attacker that can perform a MiTM attack and claim it only supports the broken cipher between both ends which can force an association using that and thus break your crypto transparently.
This type of attack would be high effort and targeted. Most threat models don't really need to address this issue, but disabling ciphers is so easy you mind as well spend a couple of keystrokes doing it.
2. If the cipher implementation is broken (think OpenSSL's heartbleed) then leaving the cipher available opens you up to being directly attacked by botnets.
This type of attack has a high initial cost for the attacker (developing the exploit) but can be sprayed across the entire internet. This is the type of attack that would affect most people and should be protected against by patching and disabling known bad ciphers.
1. If there is a critically broken cipher an attacker that can perform a MiTM attack and claim it only supports the broken cipher between both ends which can force an association using that and thus break your crypto transparently.
This type of attack would be high effort and targeted. Most threat models don't really need to address this issue, but disabling ciphers is so easy you mind as well spend a couple of keystrokes doing it.
2. If the cipher implementation is broken (think OpenSSL's heartbleed) then leaving the cipher available opens you up to being directly attacked by botnets.
This type of attack has a high initial cost for the attacker (developing the exploit) but can be sprayed across the entire internet. This is the type of attack that would affect most people and should be protected against by patching and disabling known bad ciphers.