> End-to-end encryption does little to change the availability of information in a targeted investigation
A secure E2EE system must resist even targeted, legally authorised attacks. Are you suggesting that secure, practical E2EE systems do not currently exist? Would a world in which law enforcement must install physical listening devices and exploit unpublished software vulnerabilities to surveil suspects be more private than our current world, where E2EE is available but often disabled by default, and trusted intermediaries like Facebook and Google can be legally compelled to disclose non-E2EE messages?
> Forbidding end-to-end encryption, in combination with our mass surveillance apparatus, changes the societal default to be that substantially all conversations are trivially and automatically accessible
That is not (publicly acknowledged to be) the case today, even though non-E2EE platforms like Facebook are widely used. While Facebook could currently comply with laws authorising mass surveillance, and implementing secure E2EE would prevent them from doing so, the warrants under which they currently hand over non-E2EE messages are at least somewhat targeted. This controversy is not about a proposal to relax the need for warrants, it's about asking Facebook to preserve their ability to comply with them.
A secure E2EE system must resist even targeted, legally authorised attacks. Are you suggesting that secure, practical E2EE systems do not currently exist? Would a world in which law enforcement must install physical listening devices and exploit unpublished software vulnerabilities to surveil suspects be more private than our current world, where E2EE is available but often disabled by default, and trusted intermediaries like Facebook and Google can be legally compelled to disclose non-E2EE messages?
> Forbidding end-to-end encryption, in combination with our mass surveillance apparatus, changes the societal default to be that substantially all conversations are trivially and automatically accessible
That is not (publicly acknowledged to be) the case today, even though non-E2EE platforms like Facebook are widely used. While Facebook could currently comply with laws authorising mass surveillance, and implementing secure E2EE would prevent them from doing so, the warrants under which they currently hand over non-E2EE messages are at least somewhat targeted. This controversy is not about a proposal to relax the need for warrants, it's about asking Facebook to preserve their ability to comply with them.