He's rather saying that in the asymmetric wars of the last decades the carrier did its job, and will continue to do so. However facing a symmetric opponent, whether its likely to happen or not, means that carriers aren't as useful, at least until you've ensured that you have accounted for all their subs as well as high speed missiles and rockets.
Facing a symmetric opponent that isn't holding back (e.g., to maintain deniability about their actual involvement), the US’s entire conventional arsenal is irrelevant (and, heck,even the tactical nuclear arsenal is mostly irrelevant.)
Of course, the same is true of the symmetric opponent, that is the way symmetry works.
I'm rejecting the idea that, for analysis of the utility of US military forces outside of the strategic triad, “real opponents” = “symmetric opponents”, and even casting doubt on the idea that, in the same context, “real opponents” ⊆ “symmetric opponents”.
