The American shuttle also had a few things that needed to be done by hand, like deploying the landing gear and the air data probes. These were actions that are irreversible (once the Shuttle drops its gear, they can't be raised without outside help) and would lead to destruction if they happened too early.
During the early Shuttle program, there was a worry about these events happening due to a software problem, so the decision was made to isolate them from the computer.
Post-Columbia, cables were made that allowed the shuttles to be re-wired to allow these events to occur under the control of the computer, to allow a damaged shuttle to attempt a return without crew, or to dispose of itself safely.
> Post-Columbia, cables were made that allowed the shuttles to be re-wired to allow these events to occur under the control of the computer, to allow a damaged shuttle to attempt a return without crew, or to dispose of itself safely.
As grisly of a question as this is, are there launch failure scenarios that involve complete loss of crew but successful orbit?
IANARC, but it seems if something goes bad in the launch sequence, it's normally catastrophic.
I believe the idea was for this capability to go along with the ISS as a life-boat contingency. That is: shuttle is damaged on launch such that a safe return is no longer a sure thing, so the crew links up with the ISS, shuttle attempts an automated return (or ditching), and the crew hang out while another shuttle is prepared to fetch them.
This is also why all but one post-Columbia mission either went to or was within range of the ISS. The only mission for which this wasn't true was the final repair of the Hubble, and for that they had a second shuttle on stand-by for a potential rescue launch on short notice.
> are there launch failure scenarios that involve complete loss of crew but successful orbit?
Explosive decompression. Not sure if shuttle crews wore pressure suits. Happened on a Russian mission once, during reentry. They opened the capsule on landing and everyone was dead.
Soyuz 11. It wasn't an explosive decompression per se, merely a rapid decompression, but no less lethal to a crew without oxygen masks.
Decompression can be explosive, but in space you'd only be dropping from 1 atmosphere to 0, which isn't that far to drop. For decompression to truly be explosive, a greater pressure differential is required. In the infamous Byford Dolphin incident, four saturation divers were depressurized from 9 atmospheres down to 1 in an instant, and that was a sufficient pressure differential to explode them.
NB: The Apollo Command Mudule operated at 5 PSI in spave, about 34% og atmospheric sea level pressure. Over 25,000 feet / 7600 meters elevation. The LM operated at 3.5 PSI.
The Space Shuttle and ISS operate at 14.7 PSI -- normal sea level atmospheric pressure.
Mir, the Soyuz fleet and the Salyut stations were operating at sea level pressure too. I'm not sure how influential that was in the Shuttle's design, but it certainly simplified docking the Shuttle to Mir. The pressure difference between Apollo and Soyuz was a source of complication for the Apollo-Soyuz Test Program.
During the early Shuttle program, there was a worry about these events happening due to a software problem, so the decision was made to isolate them from the computer.
Post-Columbia, cables were made that allowed the shuttles to be re-wired to allow these events to occur under the control of the computer, to allow a damaged shuttle to attempt a return without crew, or to dispose of itself safely.