> In retrospect, a lesson in not letting your biggest customers drive your development pipeline.
A new airplane program is not, and pretty much cannot be, started without having major commitments from airline customers. They are developed very much based on conversations with airlines and what they need and will pay for.
Still, the decision by Boeing to try to shoehorn the new, bigger engines onto a 737 body, was a mistake. Whose job was it to know that this was not a good idea, because it would make the plane difficult to fly, and thus difficult to train for? Hint: the one that employs a lot of aeronautical engineers, and whose CEO should have been listening to them.
This is a mischaracterization. The problem was everything was being squeezed simultaneously. There are lots of ways to make a 737 that's safe with new engines. A combination of schedule, desire to avoid transition training, and desire to avoid signifiant systems changes made it hard to do that though.
The critical moment was in flight testing when a pitch instability was discovered at low speed and low angle of bank. MCAS originally was a hack, but would have been safe, using a G sensor and AoA to activate. The new low speed instability didn't trigger the G sensor, and needed a bigger trim correction, so they either had to redesign the augmentation system, or make MCAS much less reliable and more dangerous. They chose to ship and meet their deadline.
> There are lots of ways to make a 737 that's safe with new engines.
Yes, but all of the non-insane ways would have required the 737 MAX to be re-certified as a new aircraft type and pilots to be re-trained before flying it. Which Boeing did not consider to be a viable option. And that decision was probably driven by their airline customers, since they're the ones who pay the costs of recertifying their pilots.
No, it wasn't. The design of the MCAS system was faulty. Jet airliners have used augmentation to compensate for stability problems since the 707, and airliners not being flyable without the help of computers has been the norm for decades.
They are implying that the fundamental design of the 737 MAX was a mistake due to the engines. MCAS is a like applying a poorly designed bandaid to a deep vein cut.
> They are implying that the fundamental design of the 737 MAX was a mistake due to the engines.
That wasn't the mistake. The mistake is several problems with the implementation of MCAS, all straight-forwardly fixable, along with some minor additional pilot training. I think this will turn out to be a business case study in crisis mismanagement.
I also believe pilot error was a significant factor in the crashes, because during the first instance of MCAS malfunction, the pilots dealt with it and landed safely, despite not knowing about MCAS. The latter two incidents were not handled properly by the pilots, indicating a gap in training.
> I also believe pilot error was a significant factor in the crashes, because during the first instance of MCAS malfunction, the pilots dealt with it and landed safely, despite not knowing about MCAS. The latter two incidents were not handled properly by the pilots, indicating a gap in training.
This sounds disingenuous from my reading of the problem. The pilots were not trained in the new system or even told of its existence.
Seems pretty unfair to blame them for not being able to respond correctly within 3 seconds to correct a system that they didn't even know existed and literally makes the plane not respond to pilot input.
I think it's amazing that the other crew was able to survive TBH. Didn't they have to pull a fuse?
It could be deactivated by shutting off the stab trim motors. The switches for it are right there on the center console, and pilots are trained to throw those switches in the event of stab trim runaway. The MCAS failure presented itself as stab trim runaway.
It's like if your car engine runs away, you turn off the ignition. It is not necessary to know why it ran away, just that you can shut off the engine. (Which I have had occasion to do.)
yes, but you forget to mention that before the second crash they actually disabled the stab trim motors and they couldn't manually correct the trim trying to turn the wheel with all their strength so they had to reengage them and that activated again MCAS and puff..
Or are you saying that is their fault because they should have been stronger than that killing machine?
Reminds me of the conversations between Pan American's Juan Trippe and Boeing's Bill Allen described in Skygods [0] (don't have exact quote but this blog [1] is close enough).
> With the head of Boeing as captive audience, Trippe laid out his vision for an airliner that would multiply the astounding success of Boeing’s 707 by adding capacity for more than twice as many passengers. Allen, already sitting on the substantive plans of Boeing’s proposal for the USAF CX-Heavy Lift System (soon to be won by the Lockheed C-5 Galaxy), was more than interested.
> The meeting is supposed to have concluded with his famous line ‘If you’ll buy it, I’ll build it.’ To which Trippe replied ‘If you build it, I’ll buy it’.
Sure, but there's an issue in business where people lacking the degree of technical understanding required to evaluate feasibility are the ones that give (or rather demand) the go ahead on a major change.
The relentless promotion of cynically optimistic arse-kissing yes-men will one day doom us all.
A new airplane program is not, and pretty much cannot be, started without having major commitments from airline customers. They are developed very much based on conversations with airlines and what they need and will pay for.