“When the economy slowed, defaults went up across income spectrums. But while the chance of a low-income borrower defaulting increased from 6 percent pre-crisis to 12 percent post-crisis, the chance of a high-income borrower defaulting went from almost zero to around 5 or 6 percent. And the latter group was defaulting on bigger loans.” [1]
I think the homeownership rate over time also tells a story, but perhaps this is dwarfed by the rate of sales and the collapse of prices causing ~25% of houses to actually be underwater.
However if you look at Mortgage Origination by Risk Score over time [2] and Debt-to-Income ratio over time [3] there is truth to the claim that the overall portfolio of homeowners also changed in the lead up to the crisis.
“When the economy slowed, defaults went up across income spectrums. But while the chance of a low-income borrower defaulting increased from 6 percent pre-crisis to 12 percent post-crisis, the chance of a high-income borrower defaulting went from almost zero to around 5 or 6 percent. And the latter group was defaulting on bigger loans.” [1]
I think the homeownership rate over time also tells a story, but perhaps this is dwarfed by the rate of sales and the collapse of prices causing ~25% of houses to actually be underwater.
However if you look at Mortgage Origination by Risk Score over time [2] and Debt-to-Income ratio over time [3] there is truth to the claim that the overall portfolio of homeowners also changed in the lead up to the crisis.
[1] - https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/rethinking-how...
[2] - https://infogram.com/1pwez02vj1mld0fvlzvmn3r1k9s9y7x5zgp
[3] - https://infogram.com/1pk6ve560vyl93c97kvpwy5dymt3kz1rd5g