I am not a pilot. But based on my understanding the activation of nose down due to MCAS doesn't present itself like the standard runaway trim that pilots are trained on.
Trained Behaviour:
- In case of continuous trim
- perform yoke jerk to disable the automatic trim (per previous 737 models)
- turn off electronic trim
- grab the trim wheel and hold it in place
---------------
MCAS Behaviour:
- On nose down event, pilots pitch the flight up, adjust trim
- Which disables MCAS for 5 seconds
- No continuous trim event manifests
---------------
From what I've read on some pilot forums, Boeing made a few errors:
- Removed "Yoke Jerk"
- The 5 second delay removed the continuous trim conditions
- Didn't sufficient train pilots on this condition i.e. intermittent automatic trim
- Pilots did not see the behavior that they were trained for in the few seconds between each nose down event
> From what I've read on some pilot forums, Boeing made a few errors:
I'll agree with #2-4, but #1 was the entire point of MCAS - to reduce the response of the aircraft to pulling back on the yoke in high AOA situations. Disabling MCAS when pulling back on the yoke would thus make the aircraft less safe, and cause it to (rightly) fail certification.
Trained Behaviour:
- In case of continuous trim
- perform yoke jerk to disable the automatic trim (per previous 737 models)
- turn off electronic trim
- grab the trim wheel and hold it in place
---------------
MCAS Behaviour:
- On nose down event, pilots pitch the flight up, adjust trim
- Which disables MCAS for 5 seconds
- No continuous trim event manifests
---------------
From what I've read on some pilot forums, Boeing made a few errors:
- Removed "Yoke Jerk"
- The 5 second delay removed the continuous trim conditions
- Didn't sufficient train pilots on this condition i.e. intermittent automatic trim
- Pilots did not see the behavior that they were trained for in the few seconds between each nose down event