Various pilot unions aren't mincing words. Here's one quote:
"This is the first description you, as 737 pilots, have seen,” the message from the pilots association at American reads. “It is not in the American Airlines 737 Flight Manual … nor is there a description in the Boeing FCOM (Flight Crew Operations Manual). It will be soon.”
It doesn't seem unreasonable to me that the jumpseat rider made an educated guess based on some prior experience. Aided by the fact that he didn't have other things to do besides observing.
It doesn't seem unreasonable to me that the jumpseat rider made an educated guess based on some prior experience. Aided by the fact that he didn't have other things to do besides observing.
Or he went back into the cabin and pulled out a copy of the FCOM to do some emergency diagnostic work.
As opposed to posting alternative facts and shallow dismissals? HN brings out a lot of knowledgeable folks, but on these 737 related posts the difference between HN and aviation centered forums is pretty stark.
Sure, it's not surprising that a forum of specialists would do better. If you know more, it's great if you share what you know so people can learn. Please just follow the site guidelines also.
> The deadheading pilot recognized a problem with something controlling the stabilizer and went off script.
It's not like he was pushing random buttons. He knew what the system was, he knew that it was likely to be the cause of the problem, and he knew how to disable it. He must have been informed about the system.
Yay he solved the puzzle. The reason that pilots train extensively is so they don't have to solve complex puzzles with terminal penalties while in the air. Most airline passengers prefer that.
How would he know something that was undisclosed? It's not conjecture here, no airlines and no pilots knew of the presence of MCAS before the Lion Air 610 crash.
The article says that all of the pilots were supposed to know what to do in this situation:
> The so-called dead-head pilot on the earlier flight from Bali to Jakarta told the crew to cut power to the motor driving the nose down, according to the people familiar, part of a checklist that all pilots are required to memorize.
This guy didn't go off script. It seems like he was the only one of the three who knew the script.
This guy didn't go off script. It seems like he was the only one of the three who knew the script.
The script says to stop if the trim adjustments stop when you counter with manual trim input. MCAS, by design, stops. You can see where MCAS stops trimming nose down on the preliminary Indonesian report (they graph both the fatal flight and the previous flight).
"told the crew to cut power to the motor driving the nose down, according to the people familiar, part of a checklist that all pilots are required to memorize."
Yeah, that's part of the checklist for runaway trim (which I've posted in a previous comment). That same checklist says to stop if the stabilizer stops moving after you counter with trim button input. MCAS stops after you counter with the trim buttons.
