Not only that, but economics seems to have suffered (and in many cases largely ignored) many of the methodological and foundational critiques of both its predecessor (as political economy) and its modern incarnation (capitalist economics). These criticisms come from both inside and outside the field, not to mention from a variety of hetorodox (periphery) sources, not limited to neo-Ricardians, Marxians, Post-Keynesians, Walrasian, and even Austrian School.
Every science has its object (that's what Plato thinks anyway) and thus different tools and methods are required for different objects. The tools in the science of philosophy are different to those of biology, which are still different to psychology. This is not a criticism of economics, philosophy, or science, since I don't consider science to be purely the methodology of the natural sciences. The multiplicity of seriously considered and valuable views within both philosophy and economics (there are more examples though) is unheard of in the natural sciences to my knowledge.
To say that economics is a science in the same sense as the natural sciences requires excluding heterodox schools since their methodology leads to different conclusions to orthodox economics. That is to say, we would need to declare one methodology as absolutely correct and all others as incorrect. From my limited knowledge reading around heterodox economics[0], I don't think such an exclusion is warranted.
[0] The likes of Sraffa, Veneziani and Yoshihara, Shaikh, Kliman, Mohun, etc.
I would rather say that most sciences differ from natural sciences.
This is certainly true for any social science, but also for biology, medicine, certainly psychology and so on.
Similarly, heterodox schools are usually peripheral because they are peripheral to the current academic discourse. So for example Marxian primary material is a critique of past-tense economics. Post-Keynesians have a fetish for one particular concept or method (flows, MMT, crisis prediction) and reject everything outside of it. The Austrian School rejects the use of data and even formal modeling altogether, all while academic economics becomes more experiment based.
Nevertheless, there are heterodox professors even at universities ranked within the top 10, and numerous initiatives for inclusion. So given the wide chasm that needs to be bridged for academic discussion, I think the degree of exclusion is actually rather low.
>So for example Marxian primary material is a critique of past-tense economics.
Marxism has come a long way since Marx, though; a big part of the field today is the applicability of Marxian theories to aspects of modern economies, such as globalization, neoliberalism, imperialism and digital goods. By saying their critique is only aimed at political economy, you're charging them with irrelevance, which to me doesn't seem the case. Being ignored does not mean irrelevance.
Every science has its object (that's what Plato thinks anyway) and thus different tools and methods are required for different objects. The tools in the science of philosophy are different to those of biology, which are still different to psychology. This is not a criticism of economics, philosophy, or science, since I don't consider science to be purely the methodology of the natural sciences. The multiplicity of seriously considered and valuable views within both philosophy and economics (there are more examples though) is unheard of in the natural sciences to my knowledge.
To say that economics is a science in the same sense as the natural sciences requires excluding heterodox schools since their methodology leads to different conclusions to orthodox economics. That is to say, we would need to declare one methodology as absolutely correct and all others as incorrect. From my limited knowledge reading around heterodox economics[0], I don't think such an exclusion is warranted.
[0] The likes of Sraffa, Veneziani and Yoshihara, Shaikh, Kliman, Mohun, etc.