> Objects, geographic features, even animals, don't have rights of their own.
That, or the converse argument that there can be anything that has rights of its own, is here presented as an axiom that requires no further proof. However, I don't think it's that self-evident.
If rights come with responsibilities, why do e.g. the mentally disabled have rights - what responsibilities to they confer to them? When someone can suffer, why would they not have a right to minimise that suffering, even if they're "just" an animal?
The Constitution (I assume the US one) was made up by humans, and any rights it confers were conferred by humans. If humans also confer those rights to, say, lakes, those should theoretically be just as valid as others, I'd presume?
That, or the converse argument that there can be anything that has rights of its own, is here presented as an axiom that requires no further proof. However, I don't think it's that self-evident.
If rights come with responsibilities, why do e.g. the mentally disabled have rights - what responsibilities to they confer to them? When someone can suffer, why would they not have a right to minimise that suffering, even if they're "just" an animal?
The Constitution (I assume the US one) was made up by humans, and any rights it confers were conferred by humans. If humans also confer those rights to, say, lakes, those should theoretically be just as valid as others, I'd presume?