I predict this will be abandoned (or the blockchain figleaf dropped in favor of an explicitly centralized and far simpler/cheaper store) in 2, maybe 3 years.
Or about as long as it takes for the fundamentally unsolvable problems of decentralized governance to become pathological to group integrity. If you are a junior stakeholder in this nominally decentralized system you eventually have to accept that you have no influence over the direction of the protocol's development, or get together with a group of similarly disadvantaged peers and fork your own implementation where your relative influence is more comparable.
Until that consortium, too, falls apart due to leverage-seeking behavior by individuals within it, or ossifies into a de facto centralized network, but one saddled with a bunch of expensive and now superfluous blockchain game-theory casino infrastructure.
Those are strong words, "fundamentally unsolvable problems of decentralized governance".
I'm not dis/agreeing with your scenario: I also think it's quite likely that this JPMorgan crypto would ossify into a de facto centralized network.
But the phrase "fundamentally unsolvable" feels like it needs some harder proof or logical explanation. There are many instances of (and variations on) "decentralized governance", like open-source projects, technical or social organizations, etc. Would you say all those attempts are doomed to failure? (Or maybe that they could continue to operate despite being potentially unstable/flawed based on fundamentally unsolvable problems. Or perhaps that they all tend to become centralized.)
Thinking of attempts at decentralized governance in a larger sense (including but beyond specific applications in the crypto sphere), it does seem that most of them are failing due to some inherent structural issues. I wonder whether it can be demonstrated that all such decentralized governance systems are fundamentally flawed (similar to Gödel's incompleteness theorem..?).
Or about as long as it takes for the fundamentally unsolvable problems of decentralized governance to become pathological to group integrity. If you are a junior stakeholder in this nominally decentralized system you eventually have to accept that you have no influence over the direction of the protocol's development, or get together with a group of similarly disadvantaged peers and fork your own implementation where your relative influence is more comparable.
Until that consortium, too, falls apart due to leverage-seeking behavior by individuals within it, or ossifies into a de facto centralized network, but one saddled with a bunch of expensive and now superfluous blockchain game-theory casino infrastructure.