There is a lot to respond to here (and I think you're looking for responses) so I am just gonna stick with what I think are the key points and be brief.
> If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will?
Let's please replace random with uncertain. If _part_ of an entangled system is uncertain the _whole_ system is uncertain [1].
> Does that encapsulate the notion of free will?
free will [2]
the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate;
the ability to act at one's own discretion.
To me this subjectively means: Are my choices the result of something greater than the material sum of my parts? Yes.
> That is, I cannot make you change your choice, only you can.
Your free will attempts at influencing me to make a certain choice would seem to entangle my state with your's and perhaps change the probability I will make one choice over another.
> If an omniscient external individual cannot alter your behavior,
'omniscient external individual' is a quite an assumption here.
> Why should the non-omniscient individual seeking change be held responsible?
Free will is the _only_ way to hold the individual responsible.
> but I think at some point the notion of free will starts to lead to counterintuitive problems and/or becomes very poorly definable. At some level I suspect it implies not only autonomy but complete agency, which is suspect.
(I may be misunderstanding you here) Free will over a decision must ultimately collapse to a choice made. At that point it is determined reality and no amount of free will can undo it.
You either took the Red pill or the Blue pill. If the decision is never observed the choice was never made ergo it didn't happen, it is not real.
In the spirit of Spinoza [3] I actually find bestowing free will upon particles very intuitive. We then have free will because it is an attribute of our fundamental components. If particles have no free will and are pre-determined we have no free will and are pre-determined. If we have free will then particles must have free will.
Full disclosure, I am an armchair philosopher with an interest in the cross-section with physics.
The idea of free will sort of deriving from some properties of particles is interesting. I admit there's a lot to our understanding of things from a fundamental physical perspective that is lacking, so although I doubt it's the case I don't think it can be ruled out on a logical basis.
I know I'm in the minority, but I object to the idea of responsibility actually, and prefer to think of change in a kind of "neurobehavioral engineering" or transformative justice sense. That might seem pathological or even psychopathic (which is ironic because I'm anything but); I just mean that I think responsibility (like randomness maybe, at least with reference to free will) is sort of a red herring. It's one of the reasons I'm interested in free will issues, because I think the notion of responsibility (outside of a very strict causal sense, as in "this geological formation is responsible for this waterfall") is misguided, and also shifts focus away from change efforts, toward retribution. To me, punishing an individual for a crime out of retribution makes as much sense as punishing a car for breaking down; I'd prefer to see the individual "fixed" in the same way I'd prefer to see my car fixed. The primary obstacle to the former from my perspective is lack of knowledge, which will diminish rapidly with time whether we as a society want it or not. I think one of the biggest challenges we will face as a society in the next 200 years (assuming we don't disappear or devolve into a dark age) is how to integrate advances in neuroscience and psychology into our sense of justice and responsibility. E.g., if you could change a person completely for the better, is withholding that change unethical? What's the point of retributional justice then? Aren't you just shooting yourself in the foot, societally speaking?
This is all tangential to the paper, but I think issues of free will become critical when you are faced with the possibility of total change in an individual.
>...I think the notion of responsibility (outside of a very strict causal sense, as in "this geological formation is responsible for this waterfall") is misguided, and also shifts focus away from change efforts, toward retribution.
My belief in determinism as a driver of free will is predicated entirely on the principle that without that there is no responsibility. Taking out determinism breaks the connection between my self, my persistent state, and my decisions. My choices have to come from me in a deterministic way, or they are not mine. I want to be responsible for my choices.
This is of course a mechanistic interpretation in the sense you describe, so it also leads me away from a retributive justice stance towards a rehabilitative stance even though I strongly believe in responsibility.
> If you have a prior state that is in part systematic, and part random, is the randomness per se free will?
Let's please replace random with uncertain. If _part_ of an entangled system is uncertain the _whole_ system is uncertain [1].
> Does that encapsulate the notion of free will?
To me this subjectively means: Are my choices the result of something greater than the material sum of my parts? Yes.> That is, I cannot make you change your choice, only you can.
Your free will attempts at influencing me to make a certain choice would seem to entangle my state with your's and perhaps change the probability I will make one choice over another.
> If an omniscient external individual cannot alter your behavior,
'omniscient external individual' is a quite an assumption here.
> Why should the non-omniscient individual seeking change be held responsible?
Free will is the _only_ way to hold the individual responsible.
> but I think at some point the notion of free will starts to lead to counterintuitive problems and/or becomes very poorly definable. At some level I suspect it implies not only autonomy but complete agency, which is suspect.
(I may be misunderstanding you here) Free will over a decision must ultimately collapse to a choice made. At that point it is determined reality and no amount of free will can undo it.
You either took the Red pill or the Blue pill. If the decision is never observed the choice was never made ergo it didn't happen, it is not real.
In the spirit of Spinoza [3] I actually find bestowing free will upon particles very intuitive. We then have free will because it is an attribute of our fundamental components. If particles have no free will and are pre-determined we have no free will and are pre-determined. If we have free will then particles must have free will.
Full disclosure, I am an armchair philosopher with an interest in the cross-section with physics.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schr%C3%B6dinger%27s_cat [2] https://www.google.com/search?q=define%3A+free+will [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethics_(Spinoza)