The same capabilities that are necessary to test defenses against chemical and biological attacks also prepare the way for offensive applications. If party A doesn't trust B, they are naturally wary of B's calls for A to halt defensive research. If B doesn't trust A, they are naturally wary that said "defensive" research is merely a precursor to or cover for weaponization. Party Z may later come along and use the research of parties A-Y to their own ends (e.g. Aum Shinrikyo cribbing the chemistry of nerve agents from open chemistry literature, poisoning people for their own weird reasons.)
I personally don't think that DARPA actually wants famine-causing bioweapons. The US has a large nuclear arsenal should it ever want to inflict mass destruction on the world, and its incentives align against making mass destruction cheaper or more accessible. But I can also understand why countries the US is hostile to may be less assured than I am. I can also understand the point of critics who worry that if this sort of research becomes normal and openly published, results may be later weaponized by some group, maybe a group that's not even a nation state.
If you're interested in issues like this, I can recommend the book "A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare" by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman. Caveats: I found some technical errors in areas where I have knowledge (chemistry). It goes beyond documented history into speculation in places. But it's what first introduced me to the complicated issues around trust and Janus-like defensive-offensive R&D in this area; those have remained useful insights.
If they wanted to counter a biological weapons attack on food crops, they would be creating a detection network, a facility to produce a specific compound to counter the threat, and a delivery network comprising of dusting aircraft.
They would NOT be creating mosquito-delivered viruses. Through public research. Now their enemies have access to the same technology too. What's the fucking point? To kickstart a biological weapons race?
IMHO the US needs to put a cap on the emerging bioweapons race right now. Academics can be part of it, please deny developing dual-use technologies like this, which is obviously single-use. The world is going to become a horrifying place to live in if this trend continuous the way it's set.
Significant difference is that nuclear weapons are not deniable, bioweapons are.
The United States (and allies) have already used rain seeding, river damns, and a number of other techniques for damaging adversary nation's economic and agricultural abilities. It's even a relatively common practice in geopolitics (India uses the Indus river as a carrot/stick against Pakistan).
Nukes, in the general sense, also cause massive destruction of an area and make it uninhabitable for long periods. The "targeted" use of bioweapons (in theory) allows for the clearing of people sans the mess and down time.
I'm pretty sure that that is common knowledge and openly discussed among people who care about such stuff.
> The United States (and allies) have already used rain seeding, river damns, and a number of other techniques for damaging adversary nation's economic and agricultural abilities.
Would you provide more information in the form of a reliable source?
"Operation Popeye (Project Controlled Weather Popeye / Motorpool / Intermediary-Compatriot) was a highly classified weather modification program in Southeast Asia during 1967–1972. The cloud seeding operation during the Vietnam War ran from March 20, 1967 until July 5, 1972 in an attempt to extend the monsoon season." [1]
"After World War II, the U.S. military bombed dams in North Korea and North Vietnam to destroy the communist governments’ electricity and irrigation infrastructure. This was, until the Iran-Iraq War, the final occurrence of such soggy tactics. In 1977 the Geneva Conventions specifically outlawed the targeting of water infrastructure in wartime." [2]
Your points are true for all technology. It can be used for good or evil. I work almost exclusively under DARPA grants doing NLP work - things like automated sentiment analysis might be used to detect fake news or to fabricate it. Detecting people tweeting about a need for medical supplies in some obscure language could be used to provide those supplies, or to confirm that your bomb just destroyed their stash. I think you’re correct in your assessment - the US already has all the destructive power it needs. We spend more effort today on relief or more precise strikes.
I personally don't think that DARPA actually wants famine-causing bioweapons. The US has a large nuclear arsenal should it ever want to inflict mass destruction on the world, and its incentives align against making mass destruction cheaper or more accessible. But I can also understand why countries the US is hostile to may be less assured than I am. I can also understand the point of critics who worry that if this sort of research becomes normal and openly published, results may be later weaponized by some group, maybe a group that's not even a nation state.
If you're interested in issues like this, I can recommend the book "A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare" by Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman. Caveats: I found some technical errors in areas where I have knowledge (chemistry). It goes beyond documented history into speculation in places. But it's what first introduced me to the complicated issues around trust and Janus-like defensive-offensive R&D in this area; those have remained useful insights.