I think it's important to point out that the names chosen are not only denotations of race, they are denotations of class. Maybe instead of the liberals feeling better about killing the white guy to save the black guys, they feel better about killing the rich guy to save the poor guys.
There is a tendency to conflate class issues with race issues in America, and I think that really muddles the debate somewhat.
There is a tendency to conflate the two because they are strongly correlated. It's not a mistake to assume that Tyrone is poor and black and Chip is rich and white -- it's a best guess based on observations about reality in the US.
Does it make it absolutely moral to make that assumption? Of course not, people should be treated without regard to previous biases, etc. But it doesn't mean the statistical inference is invalid.
"The idea is not that people are or are not utilitarian; it’s that they will cite being utilitarian when it behooves them. People are aren’t using these principles and then applying them. They arrive at a judgement and seek a principle."
The real joke is that philosophers do this, too. If your ethical theory doesn't quite fit with people's moral intuitions, most philosophers will argue that, in itself, is a problem with the theory.
This is why I don't put much stock in ethical theory--if intuition is a good enough moral guide that we use it to refute ethical theories, why do we need a theory? More damningly, on what other grounds can we possibly criticize an ethical theory?
Well, I think the search for an ethical theory is still valid. That's one of the main exercises of philosophy, taking a lot of particular data points (in this case, moral intuitions) and trying to find some overarching pattern or system. Just because we haven't found a consistent one yet (or even if such a system does not exist) it doesn't mean the search isn't worthwhile.
Of course I cannot speak for people on HN, but this has been my anecdotal experience. People cite all sort sof utilitarian justifications for believing in the absolute power of free markets, or of democracy, or of paying lower taxes, or whatever.
I'm certainly representative. I like having the government provide my children's health care and enjoy living in a safe city. What a shocking surprise, I advocate those principles that I perceive (rightly or wrongly) as providing me with the things I like.
From looking at the voting habits of California residents, it looks to me like people will generally vote for anything that gives them something without much cost, and vote against anything that looks like an increased cost without a visible benefit. I wouldn't be surprised if people are making these votes, then trying to fit them to whatever political philosophy they have.
The book "Ill Gotten Gains" by Leo Katz explores this subject in depth from the perspective of a lawyer. His thesis is that libertarianism can not be founded on utilitarianism, rather, it must have (and does) have a deontological foundation. It's a must read for anyone who finds this sort of thing interesting.
That explains the behavior of all the drivers as I cycle to work.
They are all moral philosophers and believe that by killing me they provide donor organs to save 6 others.
Maybe I need a cycling top that says "I don't carry a donor card"
This version of the "trolley" thought experiment is explored in the book I mentioned in a previous post. It turns out people will not choose to steer a trolley of people needing organ replacements into a healthy potential organ donor. Thus, most people really aren't utilitarians, even if they claim to be. Unfortunately, one of the chemical processes in the brain reverses this attitude when someone prone to road rage spies a cyclist.
A typical response is that these sorts of mental games are silly, but how people answer these questions actually forms the basis of legal systems throughout the world.
We used to use the "would you kill a jogger for his organs" question on smug medical student applicants - those who wanted to be doctors "to help people".
Another good question is ask them why they don't become civil engineers - good drains save a lot more people than doctors ever did.
I remember watching a documentary where they found that drivers are much more likely to cut off cyclists wearing helmets than those without helmets. They also measured things like average distance between car and bike when passing. If people see you not wearing a helmet they assume that you are unsafe and will stay further away from you.
A friend of mine got access to the traffic accident statistics for Connecticut for several years. He found that it was safer to use smack than to ride a bike. If I remember correctly he also found that in the event of a reported accident, a bicyclist had a 15% chance of a "life-altering event". (For instance you might live, but never walk normally again.)
After that he gave up biking and switched to tennis.
The research was conducted by a prof at my old school.
He also discovered that drivers gave a female cyclist much more space - although since he did the experiment himself in a blonde wig he did consider that perhaps they just give unconvincing transvestites more room !
No offense, I was a successful bmx racer for a number of years so I used to be a hardcore bicyclist, but I really have a problem with bicyclists riding on roads on which they have no ability to maintain the posted speed limit.
I experience this nearly every day on a road I drive to/from work. This is a four-lane highway with a posted speed limit of 45mph. It is a favorite of bicyclists for some reason so there are a lot of riders on the road, even during rush hour. There are a handful of stoplights on this road over about a 5 mile stretch.
I have yet to see an bicyclist able to maintain a speed of 45mph nor do I see them have the ability to accelerate away from a stoplight with the same ability as an automobile. This leads to many traffic issues and numerous dangerous situations. The issue is only barely related to the bicyclists. It is mostly related to their abilities relative to other motorists. A car/motorcycle that was driving on the same road with the same acceleration and speed capabilities would be a nearly equivalent danger.
While I would never endanger a cyclist, I have seen many drivers put in danger by the habits of cyclists. And in my personal opinion, there should be a law that states that a cyclist should only be able to ride on roads for which they can maintain the proper speed.
I agree 100%. 45mph is way too fast; the speed limit should be a more reasonable 15mph, and then everyone is on equal footing. (There are a lot less serious injuries when cars collide at 15mph as opposed to 45mph. So even the car drivers are safer!)
If there was sensible infrastructure for commuting by bicycle, there wouldn't be a problem. As it stands you're just asking people to give up a healthier and cheaper means of transportation with fewer negative externalities for little more than the convenience of motorists[1]. That's bad public policy.
[1] I don't buy the safety argument one bit--cars put cyclists in danger far more than cyclists put cars in danger.
I agree with your footnote. It's very easy for drivers to slow down and share the road, but they don't want to. They are Very Important and are late to their next appointment. (Of course, so am I, and I have to pedal there! They should be making way for me!)
I ride my bike to work (almost) every day and do about 100 miles of road riding a week in addition to that. Rarely do I have problems on the streets of Chicago, because I choose wide roads that are "off the beaten path" and there is plenty of room for cars to use the other 3 lanes (giving me one to myself). People interact safely because it doesn't inconvenience them.
The other day, though, I had an interesting encounter with the driver of (you guessed it) an SUV. I was waiting to go straight through an intersection where there is only one lane for left turns, going straight, and turning right. I'm stopped at the red light. The car comes up behind me, and the driver gets out of the car and asks if I can "get off the road" so she can "make a right on red". I told her the lane is not marked for that, and I tried to choose the safest position for myself while waiting for the light to change. This annoys her, so she drives over the curb, onto the sidewalk... and has to wait for pedestrians crossing the street. The light turns green and there are pedestrians crossing the other way, so there she waits... stuck on the sidewalk.
The reason I don't feel bad about making her wait is that if there was a car there waiting to turn left or go through, then she'd be stuck, too. But the mentality of drivers is "us vs. them"; a car is a normal, a red light is normal... but a bike in my way! That's some selfish bastard (her words) stealing 15 seconds of my life!
Now I know why most people drive to work -- they don't want to get yelled at (or be endangered by) other drivers. You have to have a thick skin if you want to cycle and survive. And thus the cycle continues; "those damn cyclists need to get off my God-given roads, because someone told me that the one time I wanted to ride my bike to the store."
Every aspect of the roads were built for multi-ton automobiles. From the lane widths, to the radii of the curves to the posted speeds. You don't drive a car on railroad tracks or bike paths. I honestly don't follow the logic. It's like me saying I can ride a horse to work on the roads.
If a bicyclist wants to be equivalent to an automobile on areas that are designated for travel by automobile, then that bicyclist should be able to safely travel with other automobiles. If they cannot do so, they should not travel on those roads. The same rational as to why you don't see bicyclists on highways.
I see your request as me deciding that I want to drive my car down the train tracks and then asking trains to work around what the limitations of my car are on the tracks.
The infrastructure is outdated. It was designed for a world when pollution didn't matter, distances to be traveled were long, and oil was free. Now times have changed. Most trips are under 2 miles. Oil is pricey. We're killing the planet by pumping toxic fumes into the atmosphere.
It just isn't sustainable, but sustainable infrastructure costs too much money. So it's time to get rid of the cars, and let bikes fill the gap while we wait for proper mass transit to become affordable.
Clearly you're an idealist. I don't mean that as an insult. The problems you've brought up can be solved by other means while retaining the existing infrastructure. For example, you could have cars that are non-oil-based. You could increase the amount of telecommuting allowed by the workforce. I would think those things are more likely in the US than making everyone ride a bike.
Your vision of the future basically kills every suburb and urban area and would reduce humans to extremely high population densities in highly concentrated areas. Leading to problems of it's own. But we're really off-topic at this point.
Interestingly enough, you said above you are in chicago. The area I am talking about above is in the western suburbs of chicago.
For example, you could have cars that are non-oil-based.
Not really a solution. The problem is the sheer energy required to move a 1-2 ton steel cage, not the specific source of that energy, though petroleum is an especially bad one.
"You could increase the amount of telecommuting allowed by the workforce."
While that would help, it would also be useful if you could, for instance, buy groceries or really just leave the house without having to bring the steel cage with you.
"I would think those things are more likely in the US than making everyone ride a bike."
The current infrastructure policy in the US can be described as "making everyone drive a car", even if they live in cities which are easily large enough to make other solutions more practical. I don't want to make anyone ride a bike--but I sure want to allow people to safely ride bikes if they so choose, maybe even encourage it.
The suburbs were created 50-60 years ago in the era of cheap petroleum and post-war infrastructure development. They aren't anything important to be preserved or saved--for various reasons it would be more accurate to view them as a failed social experiment.
Hopefully, when we do move away from the internal combustion engine we will move to something lighter. Currently the batteries are the source of massive weight for electric cars but we're all hoping that improves. We will (hopefully) have cars that are much lighter, more efficient, and based on some energy source than oil derivatives.
It just seems that that path is more likely than everyone in the suburbs giving up their homes and communities and moving within biking distance of home and work. I support initiatives that allow people to safely ride bikes. What I don't particularly like is expecting multi-ton vehicles driving at high speeds to negotiate 1/10th ton people going much slower speeds. There has to be a better/safer solution.
Which is why I said "If there was sensible infrastructure for commuting by bicycle, there wouldn't be a problem." There might be a few bike paths around for recreational use, but you're hard pressed to find adequate bike infrastructure in any American city. (More on this issue can be read here: http://daily.sightline.org/daily_score/series/bicycle-neglec...)
I completely agree with you (which was why I didn't respond to what you said). Doing something like adding a extra bike lane next to the car lanes and things like that. I would love to see something like that and it would probably make me want to bike to places more frequently as well. It would be safer for everyone.
How would it be safer for everyone? Most cyclists die because they are going straight through an intersection where a car is turning right. Move the bikes farther to the right, and it's even more likely that they'll be turned into.
Very few people die because they get hit from behind, despite that seeming like the most likely way to get hit. Drivers use the "see and avoid" principle -- if they see you, then it's likely they'll avoid you. If they can't see you (because you're way off to the side of the road), then they have no opportunity to avoid you.
When you "take the lane" as a cyclist and drive your bicycle with traffic, it's very hard to not see you. People will get annoyed, honk, and call you a bastard, but you'll get to your destination safely. And for me, being able to safely go anywhere I want on 20 pounds of steel is much more important than letting a few cars get to the next red light a few seconds faster.
Anyway, we don't need any new infrastructure for cyclists. We need automobile drivers to have a better attitude, and learn to share their resources.
Most cyclists die because they are going straight through an intersection where a car is turning right.
The worst is when the bike lane is sandwiched between automobile traffic on one side and parked cars on the other. That way, not only do you have the problem you point out, but there's also the risk of going headfirst into some guy and his open car door.
Exactly. And if the cars doors don't get you, all the broken glass that blows into the bike lanes will.
The only special cycling facilities I want are those signs that say "bicycles have equal use of road" and the picture of the bicycle on all the lanes. Those make drivers aware that I am not being an ass and trying to delay them, but am rather trying to find a compromise between banning cars and me dying on my bike.
They are pretty good about doing this in Chicago, and I don't detect much resentment that I exist. It's even better in Seattle. (They don't even need signs there anymore, everyone is used to all the bikes.)
The roads were built for multi-ton automobiles and bicycles. Because automobiles are less flexible than bikes in terms of radii and lane widths, their needs set the constraints for those factors. By "posted speeds", I assume you mean the designated upper-limit. No one is proposing that cyclists should be able to ride on roads with minimum limits that cyclists cannot maintain. This isn't that difficult to understand.
Bicycles can travel safely with automobiles. Automobiles, on the other hand, can often not travel safely with each other. Perhaps you mean "quickly" rather than "safely"?
When I'm not cycling I have a Subaru WRX, and yet on the road I'm held up by all these people in SUVs,minivans and pickup trucks that can't do 0-60 in <5secs like I can.
Same on sidewalks - I'm jogging along and the sidewalk is crowded with old people that can't maintain a 50min 10K time, they should get out of my way.
The reason I bike to work is that in the traffic here I can do the trip in 20mins vs >1hour in a car.
The bike computer says I averaged just over 30km/h ,max 70km/h (there's a big hill!)
I even beat the neighbors Porsche on the bike - I don't have the STI and the WRX is detuned in this market so it can't beat the Porshce on it's own!
First, you're putting people in a position where they are on the boundaries of what they consider acceptable. Anything that affects those boundaries, will affect their choice.
Conservatives in general have no problem with tribalism. In the abstract any life is equal to any other life, but it is only reasonable that I should personally protect the lives of my tribe (be that ethnic group, social class, country) more diligently than I do another tribe. So conservatives tilt towards protecting their tribe.
Liberals are not only not comfortable with overt tribalism, they are sensitive to accusations of racism. So when pushed to the boundary, they won't tell the interviewer that they'll kill the black guy - that could be seen as racist. But the white guy doesn't have that protection, so off he goes.
Liberals no more want to off the white guy than conservatives do the black. But silly things like "my tribe" or "I don't want to be seen as racist" affect choices on the boundary.
A rather simpler explanation is simply that the black guy is a member of the liberal tribe. A way to test this: replace "Chip" and "Tyrone" with, e.g., a low income housing or gun rights activist.
Simpler, but I think incorrect. Liberals tend to take positions which include going out of their way to fairly treat people that they very well know don't agree with them. As exhibit A I would take about half the stuff the ACLU does, and as exhibit B most of the efforts to support multiculturalism.
That is not to say that there are not liberal tribes - there clearly are - but the mores that they have push them away from straightforward acceptance of tribalism.
Another flaw in this sort of study is that there's an enormous disconnect between what we say we would do, and what we would actually do.
I might say "yes, I would push Chip/Tyrone over the rail", because I really do believe that's the best thing to do. But if I were actually faced with that dilemma and had to murder someone, could I do it?
It doesn't account for the likelihood that my actions fail to save anyone and simply increase the death toll either, which would be a paralysing fear for many people in real life.
This particular scenario seems an odd one because I simply can't conceive a situation in which I could ever be confident a falling
fat man would stop a moving train. My instinct would surely be to trust everything I'd previously learned about the laws of physics.
There's also the fact that you would be making a complete guess that the man was large enough to stop the trolley in real life, and if he wasn't you would simply be adding another victim. Besides, a man large enough to stop a trolley would be really hard to push.
Exactly. There's no way to know if the action of pushing the fat man onto the tracks would actually stop the train. Worst case scenario, you might end up killing one extra person.
In the 'switching the track' example, on the other hand, the worst case scenario is that your actions have no effect on the outcome and no additional people die than would have died otherwise.
This gave me a headache, and here's why: it's assuming a dichotomy where none may exist.
For instance, I may believe that we should be as consistent as possible in our moral views because society functions better that way. This is a utilitarian argument, but it has deontological implications. Likewise I may feel that my absolute morals requires me always to sacrifice one person for the many. This is a moralistic position which looks like harsh determinism.
Or -- as implied here -- we can just make it up as we go along, mixing and matching.
This study did nothing to disentangle these terms, choosing instead to define them in such broad and contrasting ways as to create a question where none (or a much deeper one) exists.
In short, you should study what you can clearly separate and identify. To do otherwise is to waste your time. And ours.
I read an interesting paper on this phenomenon years ago (that we use morality to justify, not reason).
A summary (not written by me):
According to Haidt's (2001) social intuitionist model (SIM), an individual's moral judgment normally
arises from automatic 'moral intuitions'. Private moral reasoning—when it occurs—is biased and
post hoc, serving to justify the moral judgment determined by the individual's intuitions.
I find the bit about Iraqis vs. Americans a bit superficial. As a liberal, I would consider collateral damage less of a problem when Americans die because all Americans are responsible for the present situation in Iraq, while most Iraqis are innocent bystanders. I view this as utilitarian: if people who start wars have a greater chance of death than people who don't start wars, this should in theory decrease the incidence of war.
Similarly, when we talk about Tyrone vs. Chip, this is a question of a poor man vs. a rich man. But more to the point, "Chip Ellsworth III" evokes a sterotype of the rich Connecticut blueblood, a parasite aristocrat.
A much more interesting study would actually look at people in different clothes, with different skin tones. This just measures people's reaction to someone whose father was overly proud of his lineage and is likely a rich socialite.
Obviously this says something about my politics, but again it doesn't necessarily say anything vis-a-vis deontology vs. utilitarianism. Again, my impression of the name "Chip" is that he's a worthless individual who contributes nothing to society.
However, even if we assume that both are model citizens, it stands to reason that the death of the hypothetical lower-class black man is going to put his family through significant hardship, while Chip's family has enough money that mostly people will be getting a sudden unexpected influx of cash. So the question really becomes: kill one man, or kill one man and ruin his family's chance at a decent life.
If you're going to play the odds and assume the blueblood is a "parasite", shouldn't you also assume that the lower-class black man is not present to support his family anyway?
I didn't mean in your response to the hypothetical question ('assume each is a model citizen') - I meant in real life: "my impression of the name "Chip" is that he's a worthless individual who contributes nothing to society."
I was being honest about my prejudices and examining them. I think yes, from the finish of my comment, I should assume either the best or the worst of both of them.
I would consider collateral damage less of a problem when Americans die because all Americans are responsible for the present situation in Iraq, while most Iraqis are innocent bystanders.
Why would you say that?
If you'll grant me for the sake of argument that the war is justified, then the Iraqi people are every bit as guilty as we are. In both cases, we (and the Iraqis) have allowed our respective governments to do immoral things. The fact that Iraq is not a democracy might temper the blame that we assign, but the fact is that they've failed to rise up to overthrow their evil government. When evil things are being enabled by the contribution one makes to the society, it is (I believe) morally required that it be stopped. (And I note that I am guilty of failing to do so, underscoring the point of the OP)
I am similarly perplexed by people damning the US government, yet maintaining the nobility of our soldiers. If the war is wrong, then the soldiers are wrong for following the orders to fight it. "We did as we were told" is not a moral defense.
You are not your government, and neither are the Iraqis.
If we're talking about collateral damage _in Iraq_ though, it's reasonable to assume firstly that the American (civilian or otherwise) consciously chose to be there, which means they certainly accepted an elevated level of risks and secondly it is reasonably probable that they actively supported and are actively profiting from the war. Choosing a job with an oil company in Basra implies a much greater acceptance of the risks and ethical implications of being there than simply not choosing to overthrow the government.
All you can tell about an Iraqi in Iraq is that they haven't managed to get out yet.
The hawk would no doubt approach with a different line; it is less probable that the American is actively or passively supporting hostile combatants attempting to prolong the war not to mention more likely the American happens to be their old buddy from school.
Either way both are making ostensibly reasonable value judgements.
You are not your government, and neither are the Iraqis.
I would say that our nation is us, and the same is true of the Iraqis. The bad things that my nation does (including the entity that it allows to govern) is my responsibility, especially because its acts are enabled because of my production (i.e., taxes, technology I develop, etc.).
The very same thing is true of Iraqis. They allowed their government to continue to run things the way they are.
You might argue that we live in a democracy, and thus change is easier for us. I would reply that (a) the form of government doesn't matter, in the final accounting a government cannot survive without the acquiescence of its people; and (b) fundamental changes in the USA might actually be more difficult, because its government is stable, entrenched, and incredibly strong.
Given that the only feasible mechanism for the respective populations to promptly remove Bush/Hussein from power in 2003 would involve violence, a significant likelihood of failure and a high degree of probability that any regime emerging to fill the power vacuum would be worse, I'm not remotely convinced that their inaction implies accountability for Bush/Hussein's actions.
Acquiesence != acceptance, never mind accountability.
It's actually an interesting reframing of the original problem: allowing a particular regime to remain in power and embark on a very wrong course of action might be the "least worst" option that is practically possible. In all but the worst case regime the rational utilitarians fearing the consequences of violent revolution actually find themselves in agreement with the pacifist absolutists.
I'll buy your answer, but only to a degree. (partly because it'll help get me off the hook for my own guilt)
It might be that a realistic examination reveals that regime change would be too "expensive", or risks failure either because the current regime wins, or because the replacement is no better ("the king is dead; long live the king").
However, given that analysis, it's still immoral to sit idly by and let events run their course. One would still have, at the very least, the obligation to (a) try to precipitate change in the long term; and (b) possibly contrive to minimize ones own contribution (by way of taxes and other support) to the current regime and its projects.
My impression is that the Iraqi people aren't doing a whole lot in either of those approaches (although I haven't studied it extensively, and what I do know is through the lens of the media). So while your claim may be correct in some cases, I don't see that it's applicable here.
> So the question really becomes: kill one man, or kill one man and ruin his family's chance at a decent life.
In the article they said that conservatives favored killing the "black" man while liberals favored killing the "white" man. It isn't as clear as the background simply providing more data. The internal stereotype and moral values of the subject are also influencing it. It would be a terrible study if they had just lumped everyone into one big pool. It became interesting when they gathered other information about the subjects and then found correlations with their behavior.
Thus, it really isn't about what the common stereotypes are, but rather how two groups can perceive the same situation differently enough to make different decisions.
There's a flaw in the entire data set. I would "kill whitey" or the "blackman" to save the "victim group" but I would know that it was morally wrong. It doesn't test morality, it tests your response to the situation.
Thus my moral code is absolute, and I willing act immorally for a utilitarian outcome.
Here's one I've always liked, along the same lines, that tends to make even the most committed utilitarians pause:
You need to build a driveway up to your new house, and there are two possible routes, each one with a single maple tree in the way. One of the trees is very old, but quite healthy, standing at least 50 feet high. The other was just planted a few months ago, so is still quite small.
You're not the one that's going to cut the trees down, and the cost to do so will be the same in both cases (let's say that the higher cost to cut down the bigger tree is offset by the fact that the person cutting it down wants the wood for himself) - which tree do you cut down, and why?
Now, this doesn't seem like a moral issue. Almost everyone would cut down the smaller tree, for several reasons: it would take less time to grow a new one of the same size, we wouldn't be destroying as much previous "work", etc. Very logical, can't really argue with it.
But I lied. When I said "maple tree", what I really meant was "human", and when I said "you need to build a path to your house," what I really meant was "we're all in a flimsy lifeboat, there's a nasty shark circling, and it wants it some tasty human gubbins[1], so we either need to toss overboard the 50 year old award winning medical research doctor with a loving family of six waiting for him at home, or a newborn baby. Or else we all die!"
[Edit: As I pointed out in response to some of the comments, I probably should have made the doctor younger, to avoid questions about whether he's already used up most of his potential. I'd encourage you to think about what age he'd need to be to change your decision...]
Anyone here actually willing to stand up and say they'd toss the baby? Because from a pure utilitarian point of view, it's the logical thing to do - a newborn baby is a roll of the dice, likely to turn out as a completely average adult, with zero expected value above and beyond any other newborn baby that the same couple has, so they might as well just make another one. OTOH the professor has proven himself to be near the top of the usefulness curve, and the expected value of his remaining years is likely far greater than that of the newborn, even after we factor in the mother's grief over losing her baby.
It's a rare person that would actually make the choice to toss the baby - I certainly don't think I could, but I can't really pin down my logic to anything more compelling (in a rational sense) than "But it's a baby, for God's sake, it just feels so wrong!"
[1]: A strained extension of the term "gubbins" (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/gubbins) outside its usual meaning? Perhaps. But screw it, "gubbins" just sound like they would be so damned tasty, I stand firmly behind my use of the word.
We keep the tree around because of its aesthetic or productive value to us - i.e. the old maple tree is preferable (to us) over the younger. We are inclined, in this case, to preserve the "work" we've already done to raise the tree up to this point. We do not perceive the tree as conscious nor sentient.
The human, however, is, at least in our books. We care about the fact that the child has a lifetime of experiences that it has yet to experience - and we value said experiences, and most of us I think would agree that every human is reasonably entitled to experiencing the highs and lows of life.
I'm not sure if it's valid to harp on people for having different logic and/or morals when it comes to dealing with sentient subjects as opposed to not. It seems to me entirely logically consistent to treat the two differently.
Sentience is certainly a difference between trees and humans, and probably a crucial difference.
However, some studies show that, depending on your definition of sentience, a baby might not fit into the category. There are many things (from memory: seeing moral consequences; some kinds of what if processes; understanding analogies) that aren't available to a person until 5-6 years old. Even trivial concepts such as the idea that an object still exists even when it's out of sight are not in the toolbox of a baby.
I wouldn't argue that if I were you. Who says trees aren't sentient? They may be made of fibers of cellulose, but plants and trees both respond to stimulus. Perhaps they think "slower" and of a different way.
The general consensus is that trees aren't sentient. They may very well be - but that's beyond the scope of this particular argument.
The original assertion is that people are being logically inconsistent by wanting to sacrifice the young tree, yet reluctant to sacrifice the young child. Based on the premise of tree non-sentience, it is entirely logically consistent that the two cases be decided differently.
The problem with tree sentience in general is that we have yet to define "think" in the context you are using it.
Since you are asking for people to stand up, yes I will toss the baby overboard. I have no qualms about it in any way shape or form.
The baby has no value, it won't be able to help with our decision making process to get back to shore, it won't be able to solve problems we may find along the way, if we get stranded somewhere it won't be able to build shelter or find food. At that point the baby is nothing but dead weight that requires a constant amount of resources without any returns.
You could always sacrifice yourself (you have to be in the boat to throw someone overboard). So baby vs doctor is actually a false dilemma.
Also, I'd like to point out that if you make your opinion known that you plan to throw the baby overboard, everyone else is probably going to want to throw you overboard anyway.
But the utility functions are different. baby tree vs adult tree, old tree is better looking(provides more shade more useful right now) old crusty scientist guy vs baby, baby is cuter. If the shark eats the baby it will still be hungry(or get hungry again sooner) old crusty scientist guy is a much larger meal. Also an older scientist might be past his prime and have lower expected utility for the rest of his career while still expecting high pay.
* If the shark eats the baby it will still be hungry(or get hungry again sooner) old crusty scientist guy is a much larger meal.*
We'll assume for the purposes of this thought experiment that the shark just wants a nibble - he'll be satisfied for sure with either one.
Also an older scientist might be past his prime and have lower expected utility for the rest of his career while still expecting high pay.
Yes, I realized this after it was too late to edit (well, I still could edit, but people have already replied, so it wouldn't be fair) - I probably should have made the doctor younger.
But in any case, it brings up the question: how young is "young enough" to prefer throwing a baby overboard to throwing a highly promising child/teenager/adult? Is there a "young enough" age for you, or would you always toss the older person, no matter how likely they were to be exceptional for the rest of their life?
We'll assume for the purposes of this thought experiment that the shark just wants a nibble - he'll be satisfied for sure with either one.
Meh. Then cut off your arm and give it to him. The problem with these philosophical experiments is controlling external variables. It just can't be done.
I think peoples gut reactions is somewhat based on “Number of lost potential decedents in 50-200 years based on primitive life expectancy.” At which point a 15 year old has greater value than both a 50 year old and a baby. This also explains why you get women and children then men then elderly.
The doctor is capable of choosing to sacrifice himself (cough as are you). The baby is not. I don't know whether that argument is outside of the utilitarian sandbox.
Does utilitarianism demand total knowledge? Can't you posit a baby exception wired into your brain (by evolution, $deity, whatever), obey it, and still be an orthodox utilitarian?
A tree, left undisturbed, will go on to live for hundreds of years. So, a tree being relatively elderly does not reduce its remaining life. The medical researcher, on the other hand, has gone through approximately 2/3 of his life. Thinking in terms of person-years saved, it might make sense to save the baby instead. Of course, this is ignoring the aggregate benefit to society the researcher might provide over his remaining years. So it's only utilitarian on an individual level instead of an aggregate level, but it's a utilitarian justification nevertheless.
But then this could just be me trying to retrospectively justify my inclination to save the baby.
the moral line isn't between tossing baby or doctor out. No.
The moral line is between whether you're able to kill a person ("toss out to save somebody else" - our human killer brain is good with coming out with "good/valid" reasons to kill) or not. If you're able to kill, then it is just a small technical detail whom to kill and why.
Actually, I don't think that's true. Studies after world war 2 showed that only 15-25% of soldiers were "effective" and actually fired at the enemy. Modern training mechanisms have increased this ratio substantially, which is also blamed for the increase in PTSD...
If I were to be honest? I'd say the baby. No doubt about it. I'm pro abortion (and yes, this should make a difference in one's decision, after all it's only a few extra months), and I know that more then one primitive society considered infanticide a birth control method. None enjoyed it, but its use was pretty difficult to argue. So I am psychologically equipped to make this choice.
This being said, I would _never_ realistically propose this. The risk of being lynched, or at least severely handicapped socially in a critical situation are not negligible. After all, who would you rather throw, a 50 year old doctor, or a guy who just proposed throwing a baby?
The Wikipedia page http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Dudley_and_Stephens is very interesting; it describes an actual case where one of the people in a lifeboat was killed and eaten by the others, who would have otherwise all died. They claimed it was a "custom of the sea" that you could draw lots and kill one victim in such circumstances, but the court decided in a highly controversial case that necessity is no defence against a charge of murder.
An amusing article about the trolley problem is "Brain Teaser" (http://www.mindspring.com/~mfpatton/harper%27s.htm) which satirizes these ethics problems by adding an absurd number of conditions such as a busload of orphans, transplant patients about to die, a brain in a vat, and the inventor of the pop-top can.
Another difference here is old age. Trees don't really die of old age (to my knowledge, and even if I'm wrong it doesn't matter because most people think trees won't die of old age), so both trees have an equal number of years left in their life expectancy. The doctor has already used up a lot of his potential.
The doctor has already used up a lot of his potential.
But the baby has almost no potential. Well, that's not entirely clear...
Let me be more specific: the baby has some potential, but since it's too young, we don't know where on the Bell curve of potential it lies. Our change in expected value by throwing the baby overboard and making a brand new one is zero (at least once we casually discard the mother's grief, and the general distaste for throwing babies to sharks :) ).
We have to evaluate this against throwing the doctor overboard and starting with a fresh baby - the doctor has already proven that he's somewhere near the top of the Bell curve, so in order to figure out the utility of that trade, we need to consider how much he's likely to accomplish over the rest of his life as compared to what an average baby will accomplish during theirs.
Perhaps making the doctor 50 years old was a bit much, as it does raise questions about how much life he actually has left, and whether the (say) 20 years that he'll actually be practicing can be considered as useful as the 80 years the newborn has in front of it. I think there's still an argument to be made that 20 years of work from a highly qualified researcher is worth "more" than an average lifetime lived by an average person, but it's not crystal clear.
Suppose I'd made the doctor a brilliant 25 year old making great strides in cancer research - would that make a difference to you?
While in real life I'm sure that I couldn't actually bring myself to throw over either one, I agree completely with your analysis of baby vs. professor. I've long had these exact thoughts, and I really can't fathom the knee-jerk counter-rational idea that the baby automatically has the greatest value.
I think there's probably some evolutionary motivations tied up in this. If we weren't hardwired to prioritize the the life of our pre-reproductive members, well...we might not be around for too long. So saving the baby is a utilitarian decision motivated by our genome to ensure its survival!
I love the conflict. I guarantee you that my answer has changed since becoming a father, too.
A bit of indulgent nit-pickery: My first inclination would just be to move the younger tree. It wouldn't add significant costs to the investment of building a new road.
Oddly, my mind went immediately to the 50 yo being larger and, in a flimsy lifeboat, more costly space-wise. In a life-threatening situation, I don't think I would stop to consider the relative benefit of each person to society.
What's really interesting is that we are all here rationalizing whether to throw the doctor or the baby, when the hardest but perfectly politically correct choice is to throw yourself to the sharks.
Self preservation still plays a role. Unfortunately we as humans are wired by nature to always have a me before anyone else unless it is our offspring in which case that role is reversed.
There are multiple things wrong with this, although I know you weren't aiming to exhaustive completeness. So my critique is directed at the philosophical argument, not you personally.
1. The tree issue is a false choice. Maybe I can just dig a hole and transplant the smaller one; perhaps I can modify my needs.
2a. From a callously practical point of view, the 50 year old doctor-professor will make a much larger and more satisfying meal for the hungry shark than the baby, which won't be much more than an appetizer.
Of course, we have to ask why we're putting the interest of humanity in general on such a pedestal, considering that society has yet to dispatch a rescue craft. Maybe we should keep the doctor around to treat the victims of future shark attacks or dehydration; in this sense 'society' looms only as large as our future life expectancy after the shark has gone. Then again, the doctor is heavier than the baby, and will consume a greater amount of food...
2b. Everyone else in this boat must be a Nobel prize winner or something if the successful medical researcher is the most disposable person after the baby. It's another false choice, in that it bolsters the hearer's ego while simultaneously limiting their choices - this exercise doesn't cater for the suggestion that one might sacrifice themselves to save both doctor and baby, for example - although the sad fact is that few people would, so in that sense it's accurately predicated on humans' general selfishness.
However, as a false choice it's dangerously seductive, and politicians work this one (or an inverted version) all the time: "We can't increase the debt (lifeboat)! Should we give a tax cut to the rich so they can create jobs (proven success) or waste it on giving welfare to bums (unknown outcome)?" or alternatively "My opponent is soft on crime. Are we going to get tough on criminals (proven bad) now or wait for some other innocent to die (unknown probability)?" You can construct endless variations on this, regardless of your political leanings: just stick with the formula of "Time is running out - do you want distasteful alternative A or repulsive alternative B?" and just tailor your argument to the known biases of whatever group you are addressing.
Underlying this argument is the implicit threat that if you don't make a choice, you'll be chosen instead. Republicans hint that not voting for the wealthy folks' interests could cause them to cut your job, Democrats murmur that the rich might find themselves sinners in the hands of an angry mob. Broad arguments that suggest joint stakes and responsibility (eg raise some taxes and cut some spending) tend to upset everyone, which is why they're only ever offered by politicians who are leaving office anyway.
2c. Value of the baby is unpredictable. Certainly if you take 100 babies and measure something (anything) about them now or in the future, you'll get a nice Gaussian distribution. But an individual baby's future is no more predictable than an individual roll of a dice. You are not any more likely to throw a 3 or a 4 than a 1 or a 6 or a 2 or a 5, even though the average of 100 throws will converge on a value of 3.5. Evaluating the probability in light of the doctor being a '6' is seductive, but only as long as you keep sidestepping the question of who else is in this boat that makes the doctor seem 2nd-most disposable. If the baby is the child of two world-class geniuses (neither of whom we would throw out before the doctor), then the probability of its future utility is high.
We could also wonder about what the average person will be capable of in 50 years' time thanks to technology, vs. the skilled person of today. Their relative utility to society then may be lower than that of the doctor to society today, but it might be larger in absolute terms. I am particularly wary of assuming the doctor's future utility over 25 years of natural life will exceed that of the average person's 50 years.
But the unpredictability of the individual is the more important factor. Suppose there are 100 lifeboats, none of which know about the others. If all 100 follow your advice and toss the babies, those with excellent future potential will be lost as surely as those of average or lesser potential.
2d. But the big issue here is the moral question, and here we have more rational responses than 'it's a baby, it feels so wrong!' Factors of weight, food consumption, shark appetite and life outcome probabilities aside, the basic argument against such a course is the defenseless nature of the baby; s/he cannot volunteer, acquiesce or even resist being thrown to the hungry shark the way the 50 year old doctor can, and this gives us an excellent reason to refuse the idea.
Is it because of a moral obligation towards defenseless beings? Sort of, but it's not rooted in any abstract philosophy. It's rooted in our self-interest: if we are in favor of sacrificing the defenseless, then then we are advertising our utility calculus to others in the boat. True, we are not sacrificing the baby because of its defenselessness, but we are not letting the fact mitigate against the utility function either. In a future round, we might throw out someone who's asleep because their wakeful utility is similarly imponderable; that increases the danger for all, since all need to sleep; nor can we exclude ourselves, since we began with the position that circumstances brook no delay.
Even if none of us sleep, or more sharks will arrive before we can, revealing our utility calculus allows everyone else to model it for themselves in relation to everyone else. Anyone expecting to be on the wrong end of a future comparison - the doctor/professor, for example - has an enormous incentive to throw us overboard first. Such a person can make a rather compelling argument that 'after me, you're next' to everyone whose assessed utility would be lower than our own; only those for whose survival we are willing to sacrifice ourselves have an incentive to let us remain. We have already demonstrated that we consider ourselves to be at least two steps away from being expendable simply by proposing the baby go overboard; on a practical level we might expect the mother to vote the interests of her baby, and so be similarly expendable to the extent that we consider her objections to increase the risk for the whole group.
On the other hand, if we argue for the survival of the baby, we are advertising our unwillingness to make decisions about unknowables and to defend the vulnerable, an attractive quality to everyone on the boat who is not fully assured of their own survival and social utility. Given the prevalence and success fo tit-for-tat strategies in iterated prisoner's dilemma games, it's probably in our interest to identify ourselves as cooperators rather than defectors. I say probably since there's always the possibility of being on a boat full of defectors...in which case it might be better to take one's chances with the shark, who is at least honest about his intentions.
If this seems a rather involved reply, it's because I've thought about this in more than purely hypothetical terms. A day after her birth, my wife was taken aboard a ship which was part of a refugee convoy of 8 vessels. There was a storm on the second or third night of the journey, and 6 of the boats sank, with no survivors. Besides the horrifying experience my in-laws endured, I'd say she outscores me on a social utility scale too.
Forcing anyone out of the lifeboat is murder, period. If someone chooses to sacrifice themselves for the benefit of the others, good for them. The baby cannot make the choice for itself.
Sure, it's murder. But I suspect most people would, on occasion, find justification to murder in order to save lives (or even just to save "more important" lives - wars are fought all the time on the theory that the lives of a country's citizens are more important than the lives of foreigners).
On reflection, perhaps a better reframing of this thought experiment (to avoid many of the issues that others have brought up) would be that a murderer has broken into your house and tied you up, along with a baby and a highly accomplished but relatively young person, and offers you the choice of which one of the others he's going to kill, along with a credible assurance that he'll kill all of you if you don't choose one (and you're not allowed to pick yourself, just because), and he'll really let the remaining two of you free once you've made a choice. Further, you're not allowed to discuss with the others, so there's no opportunity for anyone to sacrifice themselves.
From just thinking about such "experiments", I'd say that such an event is so outside the experience of most people that they simply would not have a mechanism for making such a decision. The somewhat less painful issues around "the right to die" are still very distressing when you are actually confronted with them. For example, consider the unwillingness of soldiers to fire in combat: http://www.historynet.com/men-against-fire-how-many-soldiers...
Certainly, some people do make such decisions in times of war or times of disaster. I doubt, however, that those folks have dealt with such brutal dilemas would find an evening of exchanging philosophical hypotheticals on the subject terribly enlightening.
Why is this so hard? The law clearly states, if you do nothing you are free. If you do something, you have taken the liability of said action. Unless by doing nothing, you are in violation of your duty. But still I would gladly accept an administrative slap, than a legal one... 100 people or not.
Which brings up another issue with the study. If you use the "rational actors" canard of Econ101. Everyone asked is trying to maximize their economic utility.
So the opportunity cost of inaction beats action. The study should at least require some form of action of roughly equal cost(liabilities and pyhsical action) to occur in order to zero out this input.
I'd also like to rebuff the "action == moral code" statement. There is nothing more common than action that flies in the face of your moral code. Thus the "let he who is without sin" truism.
Effecting a utilitarian outcome despite your moral code does not make it moral in the eyes of the person acting, and it can denote either courage or cowardice.
Interesting. You state that Casey Jones should divert the train, yet this will cause the death of the person trapped on the railway siding. This seems to be inconsistent with your belief that it is always wrong to cause another person's death. It is somewhat perplexing that you responded this way, since you do not believe that this course of action is necessiated by any general moral requirement to maximise the happiness of the greatest number of people. More of this later. For now, let's see what you make of the scenario below.
Choosing to let 1 person die so that 5 can live does not mean I find that action moral. It's simply the better of two options.
That is a moral code. The whole point of the question is whether your code is absolute: can you kill someone if the alternative is worse, or can you absolutely not kill someone regardless of the alternative?
Sometimes the thing that has to die, is my moral code. Of course we must save the most people; of course it is immoral, and my immortal sould will suffer, but I am only one person and its worth it.
That's a pretty simplistic view, no? You don't believe causing a death is different than not preventing other deaths? Or perhaps it is different, but there is a certain moral penalty for letting a person die, and this is less than the moral penalty for letting 5 die? What if instead of 5, it was just a pregnant woman (1.5?)
Admittedly, that question isn't my favorite, as both options are relatively passive. How do you feel about the situations where a more active role is required? Would you push the man over the railing to save 5?
What if it's pushing a philanthropist onto the rails to save 5 serial killers?
I'm not entirely sure what's the goal of this exercise. I'd imagine that in real life, regardless of who's getting killed, most people would simply let things run their courses since inaction is generally less risky than action.
Then, if confronted, I'd guess most people would probably come up with a justification that was favorable to them (i.e. thay would get them out of trouble's way), not follow some strict ethic model.
Most people will claim to have absolutist morals. They will say that it is wrong to kill someone and that ends do just justify means. What becomes interesting is that almost anyone will display circumstantial morals if confronted with a trade-off like this. The interesting question is at what point do their morals change and why.
My theory is that "killing = bad" is a default canned answer that society says is "correct" and people don't really think about what-if-I-am-faced-with-a-tricky-life-or-death-situation scenarios since these scenarios are not realistic to begin with.
I'm not very convinced that the assumption that people have a fixed moral system is correct. It doesn't make a whole lot of sense (evolutionarily speaking) to optimize for some abstract ideal consistency rather than fitting into a group. As far as living in a society goes, telling your social circle that you shun all forms of human killing is one thing, actually making a life-or-death decision when there are tricky caveats is completely different.
You feel this way, but many people will avoid switching the train.
The point of the experiments is to see if (statistically) more or fewer people are willing to switch the train based on the race of the people involved.
You may think its simply of the better of the two options, but other people think that being the person to cause any deaths is simply the better of the two options and its good and useful that we have words like "utilitarianism" and such that let us talk about these differences.
Xenophobia is a well-known behavioral trait, this study seems to indicate xenophilia exists as well (i.e., Americans being more accepting of American causalities than Iraqi).
It bugs me when stuff like that is described as "xenophobia". It's possible to dislike something (or have a preference for the alternative) without fearing it. Even when the basis for the dislike is irrational -- if you prefer chocolate ice cream does that imply that you fear strawberry?
The -phobia suffix doesn't indicate fear exclusively, it's also used to describe profound distaste and dislike. Just like with homophobia, One doesn't have to be specifically afraid of gay people to be homophobic, though that is often the case.
People who choose to not do in Chip Elsworth the 3rd are excessively discounting the future utility of taking this course of action. To wit, being undisturbed by whitey in the future and free to go on to find a white woman wearing a navy blue sweater.
There is a tendency to conflate class issues with race issues in America, and I think that really muddles the debate somewhat.