English-prime, of course, relates well to common scientific jargon. Things never are until you can say with precision and confidence that they are. Instead they "might" or "may" and are always qualified by lists of assumptions. Even the structure of scientific papers is carefully wrought so that background and assumptions play an important role in the opening, then methods, then uninterpreted results, then beliefs and interpretations in order of increasing scope (and decreasing likelihood).
It's amazingly tiresome, but it's a culture designed to — used properly — prevent you from thinking yourself into a corner or over-stretching your evidence. I wouldn't be surprised if it also inspired creativity and diminished functional fixedness as well.
Interesting, but I'm not convinced the examples support the argument. English uses 'is' to refer to a permanent characteristic or a temporary state, depending on context. Other languages have two separate words (e.g. Spanish with 'estar' & 'es'). If the context is unclear, or you want to introduce clarity, say 'John is being grumpy' - rather than 'John is grumpy' - if you want to convey that John's surly mood is temporary or uncharacteristic. Avoiding the word 'is' often just makes communication needlessly long-winded.
Wave theory vs Particle theory is another matter - both are models that have acknowledged drawbacks, neither 'is'.
I do agree with the meta-point that trained clarity of expression can induce clarity of thought & is therefore worthwhile.
Even better, in reconstructed Proto-Indo-European there are several different verbs which merged to become the conjugations of "to be" in English. That's why the forms are so irregular. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-European_copula
> Philosophical arguments about objects in “reality” having a certain metaphysical essence are somewhat dubious. Does wood really have a wood-ness? (No, but certain types of wood have certain properties, especially when examined through human instruments.)
I don't think anyone right now (in anglophone analytical philosophy) conflates predication with identity.
But there is an interesting and far-reaching debate about so-called natural kinds (typically water, gold etc.). In fact a widespread view is that, after Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, water does indeed have an essential wateriness beyond its surface characteristics. This has interesting consequences in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds).
> Do I really have a fundamental me-ness? (No, my behavior and personalities are situation-dependent and have little to do with Zachary Burt the human being.)
I've never met you, but I'm sure that your behaviour and personality has _something_ to do with you the human-being. Doesn't your body behave?!
You may also be interested to know that many people have very different intuitions from yours. One in particular from John Perry, is roughly that first-person indexicals cannot be parsed out in terms of other descrptions (the essential indexical).
> Indeed, any description of something has to be argued in such a way that it can be understood or articulated through the faculties of the Homo sapiens.
"But there is an interesting and far-reaching debate about so-called natural kinds (typically water, gold etc.). In fact a widespread view is that, after Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam, water does indeed have an essential wateriness beyond its surface characteristics. This has interesting consequences in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind "
I have a hard time understanding what this characteristic would be that isn't emerging from our interpretation of reality rather than reality as such.
Roughly speaking, the idea is that water in our universe is essentially H2O. The intuition is that if we went to another universe where there was watery stuff that duck-typed as water but had underlying composition XYZ, it would not be water.
Doesn't sound too controversial, but has interesting implications (e.g. it's an a posteriori necessity!). And there's also some interesting and powerful explications of "our universe" and "another universe" to do with the nature of counterfactuals.
For an alternative take, see Dupré, John. (1995). The Disorder of Things. Harvard University Press. Introduces the delightful notion of "promiscuous realism"!
Quantum is a word that get's used a lot. So now we also have quantum psychology.
And from that an entire literary category will be established. Without substance, without actually being based on any hardcore facts, but with plenty of storytelling.
I interpreted your comment as "Quantum psychology sounds like bullshit, because I've never heard of it and I can't conceive of a way for quantum mechanics to relate to psychology." This may be a poor interpretation as that may not be what you meant. Can you please help me understand, Yoda? Also, if you disagreed with any of the explicit points, please elaborate instead of engaging in evasive platitude-laced rhetoric.
P.S. All concepts are necessarily invented. If you disagree (perhaps you subscribe to Plato's theory of "forms"?) then your perspective will be challenged if you read the post. (shortcut for the lazy: ctrl/cmd-f, "Does wood really have a wood-ness")
Although no quantum physicist by any stretch, I have read enough to know that you can't just throw a word like quantum psychology around.
The question is not whether I have heard of it but whether such a breakthrough discovery has been made that we can talk about Quantum Psychology.
Let me remind you that with regards to quantum mechanics there are three areas that need to be covered.
The mathematical part (which is relatively easy and proven)
The experimental part (which is also proven (Bells theorem))
And the philosophical part (i.e. what does this all mean)
The latter is by no measurement proven or done with yet.
There are several competing interpretations from the Copenhagen interpretation to M-Theory/Many Worlds/Minds theory.
None of them have successfully been able to create a consistent theory that embed both the classical local world view and the quantum mechanical world non-local world view.
So excuse me for not just jumping on the wagon of a cool sounding theory but fundamentally unsupported theory from a non physicist.
But you where right in your interpretation of what I said. Quantum Psychology does sound like bullshit. Not because I haven't heard of it but because there is no basis to claim it on. There might be with time who knows, but right now, you will be hard pressed to find any well respected physicists who would support such a concept.
Quantum Psychology discusses all of this, from Copenhagenism to the Many-worlds interpretation. The point is by calling "Quantum Psychology" bullshit, you're engaging in the same sort of fallacious rhetoric that my post cautions against. Again, I ask you - what, specifically, disturbed you?
There are many books that discusses "all of this" it doesn't really matter.
What matters is evidence. And there is no evidence what so ever so far that quantum mechanics affect our brains whether you call it the quantum mind or whatever clever word you might find.
You can't solve this by creating a field called quantum psychology and then work your way backwards. It's not that kind of intellectual challenge.
The problems are much more fundamental. Had the author been an actual physicist he would have known that.
So no I am not engaging in any fallacious rhetoric.
I don't even have to disagree with some of what you say in that post to still be dismissive about the term Quantum Psychology and Wilson's attempt to claim certainty where none exist at all, pseudoscience at it's worst.
Wilson doesn't claim any certainty about some "Quantum Psychology". You're projecting, constructing a STRAW MAN and tearing him down. If you want to cite something specific, then do so, otherwise, please stop talking. I've enjoyed your other comments, especially about physics, but in this specific case you really don't know what you're talking about. You're engaging in a lame status transaction without being able to back it up with any concrete terms. Good social tactics but really lame for any sort of intellectual discussion.
That's not what I meant by certainty. But I can see it might be unclear.
Seriously though. And I am not trying to be contrarian.
Can you please explain to me how this
In examples 7 and 8, Standard English again assumes indwelling spooks and continues to separate observer and observed; English Prime assumes no spooks and reminds us of QUIP (the QUantum Inseparability Principle, so named by Dr. Nick Herbert), namely, the impossibility of existentially separating observer and observed.
I mean I am a monist, I don't believe you can separate the observer and the observed. But QUIP and QUIM?
Have you tried to look up QUIP? Did you see how many of those new uses of quantum exist. Quantum Tantra?!? I mean really?
You want me to take that stuff serious?
And when you finally get to something that actually mentions QUIP and is not some new age rambling (and I say that as one who actually believe some new agers know what they are talking about), what I get is by no metrics comparable to eprime.
They discuss two completely unrelated things. Semantics and QM are NOT related.
I think RAW's point is that the principles of QM provide support for a philosophical viewpoint that can be practiced through adjusted semantics.
As far as the QUIM, I would like to see some data before making a judgment. I don't have sufficient understanding of the related physics to make theoretical conjectures about its plausibility (or absurdity).
And that is exactly where he streches it too far. There is no support for that. Non zero nada nilsch. He just takes one semantic interpretation and applies it to another. But qm isn't about semantics. Our interpretation isn't qm, qm is mathematical and experimental. Every interpretation we choose to put on top, only relates to what happens in the qm world and that is by no metrics what happens in the physical, let alone semantic world.
Good ol' Mr. Hedley in 7th Grade English class refused to let any of us use the following words the entire year: am, is, are, was, were, be, been. Any paper turned in that contained one of those had to be re-written. My English, and clarity of thought, improved more that year than during any other equivalent span in my life.
The examples seem misleading. You not only change the verb, you're adding a prepositional phrase to clarify things.
The originals would be almost as insightful if you added the prepositional phrase and left the verb alone. Conversely, changing the verb without adding the prepositions doesn't actually clarify much.
I've noted in my personal experiences interacting with people at work that the best engineers tended to speak in English Prime a lot -- at least when something important was at stake, such as troubleshooting some problem with a piece of software used by the business.
It's amazingly tiresome, but it's a culture designed to — used properly — prevent you from thinking yourself into a corner or over-stretching your evidence. I wouldn't be surprised if it also inspired creativity and diminished functional fixedness as well.