Of all the fads and foibles in the long history of human credulity, scientism in all its varied guises — from fanciful cosmology to evolutionary epistemology and ethics — seems among the more dangerous, both because it pretends to be something very different from what it really is and because it has been accorded widespread and uncritical adherence. Continued insistence on the universal competence of science will serve only to undermine the credibility of science as a whole. The ultimate outcome will be an increase of radical skepticism that questions the ability of science to address even the questions legitimately within its sphere of competence. One longs for a new Enlightenment to puncture the pretensions of this latest superstition.
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/the-folly-of-scie...
The issue, in my eyes anyway, is when the scientific method is used as a hammer; when it's used to crush a debate.
The scientific method isn't being used to crush debate. It simply isn't being used.
What's most responsible for crushing debate today is (empirically false) post-modern social constructionism coupled with female mother/protector ethics. Jordan Peterson is one of the best people on these (and many, many other) topics:
This is not an answer to your exact question, but when people say "falsifiable" they usually mean something much more rigorous than what is possible within qualitative research[0] (and I'm not criticising qualitative research here), yet insights can still be gained from it.
I switched from physics to art to (ultimately) design and programming. You have no idea how much ignorance many physicists have of research that isn't easily quantifiable and turned into predictive formulas. I had to go through a period of growing more "aware" of my tunnel-vision myself. As a result, flat-out rejection of entire fields of research, claiming they do not create "real" knowledge is common.
On the flipside there's people trying to apply physics-style reductionism to problems that simply don't fit, because human societies aren't built up of spherical frictionless humans in a vacuum[1].
Example: I did my master thesis of interaction design on gesture interfaces (the waving-hands-in-the-air kind, not the touchscreen kind), a topic that has been researched over forty years but has yet to really break through. One paper I read mentioned that on average the right index finger was raised one-point-zero-something times more often than the left. Sample size twenty or so. I still don't know how that is supposed to help me design better interfaces; right-handedness being the norm is a known, and I cannot conclude anything from these numbers. But hey, it's quantified and measured, therefore "proper" knowledge!
Whatever we need to take for granted in order for a scientific experiment to mean anything at all. Most of mathematics and logic would fall into this category: we can't falsify 1 + 1 = 2 by experiment, but if we throw it out, we won't have any science at all.
A lot of people believe that fundamental principles of ethics also belong there. For example, we may be able to demonstrate whether or not something is a net benefit to the combined happiness of sentient beings, but I cannot see how one might even attempt to falsify the hypothesis that sentient beings matter at all.
1+1=2 is falsifiable as it relates to an experiment. You could show that in an experiment that when you "add" a "one" and another "one" together you do not get "two".
If it doesn't aid in understanding the world then I'm not sure it qualifies as knowledge.
When you add 1kg of some stuff to 1kg of another stuff and end up with 1.97kg instead of 2kg, have you really falsified 1 + 1 = 2, or have you just confirmed that some portion of your material was vaporized in the reaction?
What does the number 1.97 even mean in a world where 1 + 1 ≠ 2? When you falsify 1 + 1 = 2, you also end up denying the validity of the very experiment that you used in the process. If a hypothesis can only be falsified by self-invalidating experiments, does it count as falsifiable?
How do you go about testing the hypothesis that 1 + 1 = 2? Not just showing that a particular physical representation obeys the logical laws of arithmetic, but to test the actual laws themselves.
Under the view I'm describing any statement like that is a kind of definition, not something that is true or false.
You can investigate whether it is consistent with other definitions. I believe that doing so is empirical work, which I think is consistent with a broad notion of science
When we talk about falsification in modern science, we usually mean falsification through empirical experiment. It must involve data from the real world.
If you include thought experiments based on nothing but arbitrary axioms, a lot of crazy claims about supernatural beings and other metaphysical curiosities would also qualify as falsifiable. I'm not sure whether you'd like to go down that rabbit hole. Science is about understanding the actual physical world that we live in -- not some fantasy world no matter how internally consistent it might be.
Isn't the loss of objectivity just a result of the question having more degrees of freedom than it does constraints, and the subjectivity just comes from picking which constraints to assume? Doesn't a well defined goal turn that question into a positive question?
A simpler example could be, "is it better for me to build a bridge over a highway out of cardboard or out of steel?"
It's superficially normative but becomes a positive question as soon as you define the constraint that a bridge that no one needlessly dies while walking across is better than one that kills people.
At that point all of these questions become scientifically approachable, although some are likely still hopelessly complex, as soon as you assume an axiom like, "it is best to maximize the ratio of well being over conscious suffering."
What that axiom should actually be is likely a nearly unapproachably complex amalgamation of philosophy, but it seems more reasonable to work with something than assume that there is no right answer, especially when we seem to be rapidly approaching the point of needing to have software systems make quick ethical decisions.
Yeah, but the constraints themselves that define the scientific endeavour, or the preference over bridges that don't kill people, are not and cannot be scientific.
Science is necessarily neutral in that regard; it's a tool to achieve some goals that, as you said, require a judgement value. There is some moral knowledge that provides value and motivation, and which is not scientific knowledge.
> Is this not just an underdetermined question?
Not in philosophy, no. The mother of all sciences has ways to deal with the question, which is meaningless from a purely scientific POV, but which nevertheless merits being studied. For example, it could guide you to choose and refine the guiding principles for programming your autonomous car, and to analyze whether your missing something in your "amalgamation of philosophy" that you used as the basis of that technology project.
Pragmatic utilitarism. It works and produces most beneficial results among tested methods.
The problem is labelling what is beneficial and what is not. That is a value judgement. But if certain human rights are universal, we can agree on at least a subset of benefits.
That's an acceptance that philosophy is useful. Pragmatic utilitarian is one kind of philosophy.
> The problem is labelling what is beneficial and what is not. That is a value judgement.
See my reply to the other post above. [1] Philosophy is the discipline that specialises in the problem of rational analysis of value judgements. A good way to agree on which rights and valuable benefits to use is to discuss them philosophically.
Some people would say that the relational patterns in numbers are a kind of definition, and that such statements aren't so much truths but consequences of those patterns - and that it's only when you're using the two '1's to represent real world details that the '2' is true or false.
(and BTW, there are real-world situations where '1' and '1' do not make '2'... e.g. putting a snake and a mouse in a box. We only apply maths statements like that to the kinds of entities/situations where they will apply).
It's not an axiom, it's a theorem (or maybe a definition of "2"). The more usual definition of "2" is "S(S(0))" (the successor of the successor of zero). "1" is "S(0)". "S(0) + S(0) = S(S(0))" is a theorem, a consequence of the axioms "for all x and y, x + S(y) = S(x + y)" and "for all x, x + 0 = x".
"axiom" is two letters shorter than "theorem", so no, brevity doesn't cut it as an excuse. The difference between an axiom and a theorem is, undoubtedly, germane to a thread about the different ways we can know things.
I would go further: is "Axioms exist" true? You don't find them lying around in nature. They exist only in people's minds. I would argue that this is an inherent metaphysical question.
The scientismist's (?) standpoint could be that it exists because it is manifested as a concept in human brains. But by the same argument, wouldn't they then need to acknowledge that God exists?
The crux of the matter is to do science, you need formalism to express your theories, to interpret measurement results etc. Those formalisms are what we usually call "math". But any mathematical system has axioms, i.e. something we need to just "believe" in in the first place, and those believes are not themselves provable by science.
Axioms can be shown to be useful or not. This is why some mathematicians reason with or without axiom of choice.
Likewise, systems of axioms can be shown to be consistent or not.
Mathematics is based on logical deduction. You start with a set of rules and you prove additional rules.
Science is based on (lots of things but primarily) empirical induction. You observe some phenomena, decide that they are of the same type, generate a model that predicts how all phenomena of that type behave. By necessity you observe an infinitesimal fraction of the phenomena in your type.
In math proofs are universal and timeless and complete. There is no additional observation to be made. A proof can be wrong, but if we conclude that it is logically correct then that's it. (edit: well, there's the incompleteness theorem: it could be that a set of axioms is inconsistent, but then EVERYTHING based on those axioms becomes invalid. It's still quite different than scientific progress which changes models a little bit at a time.)
Scientific models are approximations of reality(very good approximations often!) but they get tweaked as new observations come in. Or just wholesale thrown out(or at least become obsolete), see Newtonian orbital mechanics vs relativistic orbital mechanics. Newton was right-ish, but relativistic solutions are right-er(possibly fully correct?)[1].
With deductive reasoning you are expanding a definition. With inductive reasoning you are guessing at connections between observed events.
But maybe one day we will know how our brains work, and we will understand what is the neural correlate of "1" , "+" and "2" and we will be able to clearly see that the only answer to 1+1 is 2 in an empirically falsifiable way.
Not related to hypotheses but most axiomatic systems and the apparatus of deduction that accompanies them would probably qualify as they are not scientific (by the circular definition that anything that uses the scientific method is scientific). The most notable example would be mathematics. I'd argue that mathematics provides knowledge (as in it helps me understand stuff better).
1. "There is an objective reality".
2. "Reality is consistent".
3. "The human mind is capable of knowledge about reality".
These all need to be taken as axioms if any further knowledge is going to be possible.
There's a book called Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology which covers this in much more detail. (Ayn Rand gets a bad rep, but few people know about her theories of concepts and knowledge. They indicate the path to solving many of the issues in philosophy of science).
In my view, the whole concept of scientism is the last attempt of philosophy to stay relevant, and it's usually only backed up by appeals to emotion and loaded words.
So, the scientist in me asks: what areas of knowledge are out of the scope of science and the scientific method?
Science can only answer the how? The why is always a philosophical question which has to be loaded with appeals to emotions. Certain personalities are okay with only asking the how, other personalities need the why. Certain other personalities don't need either. They just do. If we stop asking the why, which we more or less have as we think that it's a dead end that leads to nilhism and absurdism then we will accumulate more and more power and use it with delirious overall effects on the systems that we inhabit and will inevitably go extinct.
I dislike this point because it is imprecise. What do you mean by a "why" question? How do objects fall to Earth? Gravity. Why do objects fall to Earth? Gravity.
Well what I mean by why is the overall moral question of doing the right thing for the continued survival of life on the planet. That's more or less a metaphysical thing. And we don't have that figured out. And it does not seem to me that science will provide the answer to this. As science is hierarchical and specialized. It might provide individual answers but it does not provide guidance as to how or why to use those answers. For instance why we must live or do things a certain way. It merely provides knowledge and tools and then we apply that knowledge and tools to act on the world. If we do not act properly on the world with our science we will inevitably destroy the world. Currently we use the economic paradigm as our moral compass, which seems to work in certain cases but in other cases fails. Philosophy is needed to address this sort of deficit in our economic thinking.
> In my view, the whole concept of scientism is the last attempt of philosophy to stay relevant
I'm not the smartest guy around, but I see myself still reading philosophy while still very close to laying on my death-bed, while I know I wouldn't care that much then about whether worm-holes exist or if the physical Universe is finite or infinite. In that respect philosophy will still be relevant, at least for me. I find the human species one of the most interesting things that I've read or heard about, and I think philosophy does a good job of talking about us.
Founding all knowledge on the scientific method is just vulgar empiricism, and it's known to have it's limits, and philosophy isn't just "emotions", since science is part of philosophy itself (asking and answering questions about the world, Truth, etc.)
Large areas of philosophy are routinely demolished by the strangeness revealed by science. Concepts like Time after general relativity, the reach of maths after Godel, existence being coexistence after the discovery of multiverses. Philosophy very often assumes things that the real world ends up proving aren't true.
> existence being coexistence after the discovery of multiverses
Please keep in mind that multiverses haven't actually been discovered. They are a very real possibility if the model of inflation of the early universe (and thus eternal inflation) is correct. But since the Planck satellite hasn't found conclusive b-mode polarisation patterns, inflationary models should be viewed with a bit of scepticism. On the other hand: inflation can explain a lot of problems in the early universe that would arise without it: magnetic monopoles, the large-scale homogenity and isotropy and geometric flatness. So, it remains a valid model, and the best explanation of the very early universe.
We should be aware of the things we don't know, and not just assume multiverses, when there is no conclusive evidence.
Multiverses as a result of space receding faster than speed of light are pretty much universally accepted. Other kinds are more controversial. There are galaxies not co-existant with us in the future that are now.
Ahh, I see, we were talking about different concepts of the multivese then. I'd consider your definition of multiverses still as part of our own universe, just not our observable universe. But I think this is more a question of definition...
For the existence and coexistence they amount to the same. There are galaxies now that will leave our co-existance in the future and still exist. Disproves that existence implies co-existence.
Are you sure you're not just more familiar with science than with philosophy? I don't think any of those examples hold up under the slightest scrutiny. Philosophy is mostly demolished by better philosophy.
Philosophy of science is very relevant and more difficult than ever. But you couldn't do philosophy of quantum mechanics before the science of quantum mechanics. When I say philosophy I mean metaphysics or in general attempts to explain the natural world. A lot of that has been made redundant by science. Not ethics.
Modern scientists don't usually like philosophy and don't write about this stuff from a philosophical point of view. It's more necessary than ever that philosophers get with the program. Pretending that science hasn't taken the lead in explaining the natural world won't help. People like Nick Bostrom who think about what science reveals do, even though he's probably hated in philosophy circles, like Daniel Dennett or Lawrence Krauss are.
Scientists in academia are often ignorant of philosophy; this seems to be a side-effect of increasing specialization and corresponding tunnel vision.
Science as an empirical practice of truth-seeking is reliant on philosophy for its foundations. Of course it is possible to "do science" without having any interest in epistemology, just as it is possible to program computers without having any interest in computer science, or to do mathematics without having any interest in mathematical foundations.
Science is a part of philosophy, and at the same time it extends it. You're assuming that philosophy is only idealist guessing, which is wrong.
I mean, you wouldn't say that "Large areas of science are routinely demolished" by newer science, even though strictly speaking it's true, and you'd therefore give up on science as a whole?
(And if I'd really want to be mean, I'd ask you if science has ever even proven the "real world" exists or that science is true, but I think you got my point.)
Science regularly demolishes science too, of course. Scientists don't have a problem with thatm they just move on. But in my opinion philosophers do.
I know philosophy is extremely rigorous. Science is fiddly, it works in approximations. Philosophers hate ad hocs postulates like dark matter or cosmological constants. They hate not knowing how certain things work. That's part of the problem. They need to apply their rigor to theories that have the chance of being false.
That's an extreme generalisation. Yes, there are philosphers and philosophies that would reject these things, but it's absurd to assume that all do.
You also have to remember that science operates within it's own framework, and assumes concepts of truth that are accepted within this community, such as the scientific method to gain knowledge. But these are presumed to be true, without anyone having had proven them.
Philosophy on the other hand, as a more general subject, even questions these frameworks and has to operate without any pre-given framework. A Platonist won't be shunned by a scientific discovery, since it isn't a threat to it's epistemological framework.
Therefore I say that science is part of philosophy, but this doesn't mean it's wrong or bad. Everyday life proves it's helpfulness. One just has to keep in mind, that there is no proof it's ultimately true, and that all objections are "appeals to emotion". Followers of Scientism, even though they wouldn't say it themselves, do this, dogmatically believing that they are the true way and that's the problem everyone has with them. (I'm not saying it's better when Platonists or anyone else does it, but the others are more common nowadays)
Not all do, but I'd say there's a real disconnect between the disciplines when there should be more teamwork.
If Philosophy is going to argue that the scientific method doesn't work, or that the world doesn't exist, we can't trust our senses or stuff like that, go ahead. Has there been any practical advancement on this line of thinking in the last 50 years? do you envision that the scientific method will be revised by anything discovered in philosophy?
>I'd say there's a real disconnect between the disciplines when there should be more teamwork
Could you explain what you mean with this?
>If Philosophy is going to argue that the scientific method doesn't work
The critique isn't as blunt as you make it out to be. Philosophers argue that the scientific method isn't the ultimate epistemological tool to find out everything and to understand all there is to know.
>that the world doesn't exist
>we can't trust our senses or stuff like that
Just as a side note, this hasn't been disproven, since it's beyond the reach of science. Science, as a materialist/physicalist philosophy presumes itself to be true, while at they same time limiting itself.
>Has there been any practical advancement on this line of thinking in the last 50 years?
What do you mean with "practical advancement"? For one to ask or answer this question seriously, one has to take a lot of things for granted and such as concepts of "practical" or "advancement". And what's so special about the last 50 years?
>do you envision that the scientific method will be revised by anything discovered in philosophy?
Philosophy as a discipline isn't science, you don't "discover" things, since that presumes these truths to be out there, ready to be found, which doesn't mean that people don't search for them.
But besides that, what do you mean with "revised"? The critique isn't as already mentioned, that the scientific method isn't right (it most certainly is a very good tool regarding science itself), but that it can't be the only one, used to find out everything. That's just naive positivism.
Science also doesn't rely only on the scientific method. It relies mainly on maths and logic. Here both philosophy and science meet.
What I mean is that every time this debate happens it's the same a lot of "what do you mean by that?" And "define achievement". My thesis is that as a tool to gain knowledge about the natural world philosophy is not helpful anymore because the parts that are useful, logic and argumental rigor, are integrated in science already. Philosophy is still useful in ethics and morals but not useful in epistemology and metaphysics unless they follow modern science, which very few do.
Well I don't disagree with your thesis in principle, I'm just adding that science is part of philosophy, as it too seeks to find out what is true and what not. And after all, logic and mathematics come from philosophy - there is no clear distinction between the two.
If you are talking about idealist philosophy, and are asking yourself how much their theories on the true substance of the world has contributed to the general wellbeing of the average human being, then I already said, that most people would agree that the products of science, as a materialist philosophy, are more helpful.
Yes you can argue science is part of philosophy, all is. I don't disagree. But there's been a divergence of not in principle, in practice. Philosophy departments and science departments barely talk in my opinion. 50 years ago it was different I think. The copnehaguen school of quantum physics, Bohr and all those guys, read and engaged in philosophy. Nowadays feels like there's a real disconnect. Not long ago discussing with a philosophy professor he told me that "those ignorant monkeys at MIT think they know everything and it's just pseudoscience". There's an feeling of entrenching within philosophy and of disinterest within Science. Another example is those silly Lawrence Krauss feuds with philosophers over his book about "nothing". Science is so strange nowadays, we need a philosophical treatment to make sense of multiverses, inflation, quantum interpretations, etc. Maybe it's more my biased impression than reality, I would be happy to be pointed to work along these lines.
Is philosophy knowledge? Can I use it, for example, to take an informed choice about the real world? Does it at least contain a set of verifiable, falsifiable statements that every practitioner can and has agreed upon?
Surely philosophy of science helps you build your framework of verifiable, falsifiable statements (after all, you need to have a logical framework for choosing which statements can be falsified or verified)!
> Can I use it, for example, to take an informed choice about the real world?
I might remembering it wrong, but I think one of the main questions asked by Socrates was "how can we be good persons?". And "what does 'good' mean?". That question absolutely does inform my every-day choices about the real world, because me not being a religious person and not believing in the after-life and such I base most of my every-day thingies on thinking if what I'm actually doing is "good" or not. Asking yourself that is a philosophical question. That and a little bit of Kant, and his "people should never be means to an end".
One could argue that it is because of philosophy (of science) that you even consider "a set of verifiable, falsifiable statements that every practitioner can and has agreed upon" as a litmus test (or demarcation criterion) for what science is supposed to be.
Probably T <= 0, multiple universes, inside a black hole, etc. You also can't run an experiment on your own life, not really, since you only have one life and that's not a large enough sample. So questions like "what is true for you, uniquely?"
