No, my point is that none of these disciplines have been remotely subsumed by their "rigorous" counterparts, because their subject matter is fundamentally different. All of these "rigorous" fields are, of course, fed by philosophy -- but they are not in a position to turn around and solve philosophy.
For example, linguistics -- understood as the science of language -- will never be able to, say, tell us what the connection is between the word and the world. How would it? And for all the promise of neuroscience, it is not one inch closer to telling us why there is a seeming difference between what physically occurs in a brain during an experience and what that experience is /like/.
There is certainly overlap between rigorous methodologies and philosophy. But the goal of philosophy is not to rigorize its way out of existence.
> No, my point is that none of these disciplines have been remotely subsumed by their "rigorous" counterparts, because their subject matter is fundamentally different. All of these "rigorous" fields are, of course, fed by philosophy -- but they are not in a position to turn around and solve philosophy.
No they can't answer many of the questions some philosophers have asked, but they can and have shown that many of those questions were poorly defined. For instance, biology and biochemistry have completely supplanted the philosophical debate surrounding vitalism.
Slowly but surely, I also predict neuroscience will erode many of the foundations surrounding dualism. Which isn't to say that those fields will be free of philosophical questions at some point, because that's just not how knowledge works, I'm merely saying that many of our current philosophical questions will either be answered or will be shown to be poor questions.
I don't mean to understate or disrespect the scale of the task to which philosophers traditionally apply themselves; you're preaching to the choir there. But I do want to be careful not to inject too much mysticism into the picture.
There is something persistently mystical to qualia, to sensitivity, to experience, the nature of existence, whatever else you want to lump under the category of 'scientifically unsolvable'. Whether you want to address it via Hegelian Contexts or Quinian Nominalism or Protestant Ecstasy; for as many understandings of these phenomena and their motivating metaphysics, there are an equal number of implicit definitions of the word 'rigor'. Even the romantics were still in the business of establishing their own systems within which to do work, in the form of proofs using the rules of those systems. They may not look like scientific systems, but they are still systems to do the work of solving problems, and thus run parallel to scientific systems (as a sibling poster has described).
And so I prefer a much more charitable interpretation of the SO response. I agree with you that the goal of philosophy is not to rigorize its way out of existence - it probably can't, and probably for a superset of the reasons why meta-descriptive paradoxes arise. Nor is it to become a science in the technical sense (i.e., an empirical and deductive process in accordance with the scientific method). But do I think the goal of most philosphers is to build compelling systems within which their apostles may do work, or practice rigor.
> think the goal of most philosphers is to build compelling systems within which their apostles may do work, or practice rigor.
That may or may not be what the modern philosopher's goal is, but I don't think it's fair to say, unequivocally, this was always philosophy's goal all along—or at the very least, such a claim is contested/disputed.
For example, Rorty [1] made the point that philosophy, as an epistemological enterprise that grounds the foundations of other sciences & give them credibility, really found it's start in the early modern philosophers, with their attempt to carve out a place for science inside dominant the religious world.
(At this point philosophy was continuous with the sciences.)
And then continuing w/ Descartes, Locke & Kant, to this version of philosophy which is no longer continuous with science, but rather playing this special epistemological role.
A lot of people jump into the naive belief that science replaces philosophy because philosophy is often the starting point of many of the sciences--as is typical, we see a connection and begin a reductive process that dumbs it all down to a straightforward relation like causality or linear progress, ignoring the actual complexities of the relationship. Nietzsche would scold us!
We tend to forget, of course, that science is really just another, even if it happens to be the most sensible thus far, form of dogma, and philosophy is one of the only, if not the only, discipline that can call it to account.
Philosophy of Science is an incredibly important field and will only become more important as we advance in the sciences--it has revealed and dealt with issues such as, our epistemic prejudice (ie the belief that most people hold that our current science is 'correct' even though history's course would increase the probability that it isn't), whether or not there actually is such a thing as scientific progress, or progress in general, how objectivity, as we frequently understand the concept, is grossly mishandled and probably an impossibility in its purest sense, how methods of verification can lead us astray... the list goes on.
Philosophy is important and I wish more people studied it or at least had a general familiarity with it. It really should be a gen ed requirement down to the Jr. high level.
What is the goal? Is there progress that isn't either turning a problem into not-philosophy or, as one of the OP comments put it, preventing bad philosophy from muddying the conceptual waters? (The latter still counts as net value to the world if the bad philosophy in question is believed by people without being told by bad philosophers. Maybe that happens a lot -- I'm not sure.)
I don't believe there's consensus in this, as philosophy might be the only discipline tasked with defining itself. Still, this is as good an answer as any.
1. the goals of philosophy are clear (since you can tell that this guy's answer is absolutely incorrect--though you have yet to mention what you believe the goals of philosophy to be) but,
2. the questions will never be answered
So you're saying philosophy leads from clear goals to unanswerable questions. Paradoxical.
Socrates said "I know that I do not know." I would recommend that you bring a similar humility to attempted definitions of philosophy.
>But the goal of philosophy is not to rigorize its way out of existence.
doesn't mean you shouldn't put rigor in your response instead of giving, like, your opinion.
>linguistics -- understood as the science of language -- will never be able to, say, tell us what the connection is between the word and the world. How would it?
First of all to understand what you are even trying to say requires linguistics. Secondly, you seem to make an linguistic argument to inform a philosophical idea.
For example, linguistics -- understood as the science of language -- will never be able to, say, tell us what the connection is between the word and the world. How would it? And for all the promise of neuroscience, it is not one inch closer to telling us why there is a seeming difference between what physically occurs in a brain during an experience and what that experience is /like/.
There is certainly overlap between rigorous methodologies and philosophy. But the goal of philosophy is not to rigorize its way out of existence.