You seem to have a certain grasp on that subject or at least feel very strong about it.
Unfortunately your post didn't correct any (perceived) mistake, it was mostly a longer way to write "That's not true". Would you be so kind and expand that reply a bit, so that I might find pointers/key words to look up myself?
I have a beginner level interest in philosophy of mind. I can attempt to add some information on how "...and today we're seeing philosophy of mind turn to neuroscience." is very wrong.
Neuroscience studies various structures and mechanisms of nervous system and brain. Even when they seemingly discuss 'consciousness', they tend to simply mean 'awareness'. I think most are generally familiar with other aspects of neuroscience.
In phil. of mind there are categories of consciousness or lack thereof, though Phenomenal Consciousness is more popular area of study (experiential side of consciousness). One of the key subject in Philosophy of mind try to show whether mind can possibly be physical (ex readable article: http://organizations.utep.edu/Portals/1475/nagel_bat.pdf), can mind be described computationally? (ex paper: http://consc.net/papers/rock.html) Phi. of mind also studies accesses of consciousness, study methods on how to go about studying contents of consciousness etc.
I've talked to neuroscientist who despise philosophers talking about conciseness and claim their ideas are silly or can be ignored. There has also been cases where big name neuroscientist proposed silly ideas about mind that philosophers wouldn't begin to consider.
> Neuroscience studies various structures and mechanisms of nervous system and brain. Even when they seemingly discuss 'consciousness', they tend to simply mean 'awareness'.
You should give neuroscientists more credit! Some of them are aware of the philosophical problems surrounding subjectivity, and have tried to tackle them [1]. That's one of my favoured scientific theories on the source of subjectivity.
I can also sympathize with the disdain with whic some neuroscientists view some philosophers of mind. They've debated some completely ridiculous theories of mind in order to rationalize human importance. These consciousness debates are following the arc of vitalism, which the science of biology eventually simply replaced, and I expect these neuroscientists see it as a waste of time for similar reasons.
That attention schema theory is interesting but it still doesn't solve the Hard Problem: why information about colors looks like colors, why information about surfaces feels like a surface... how a biological system could experience joy or sadness, orgasm or terror, etc. They seem to be solving the very narrow problem of self-awareness, but not awareness in general. And I'm pretty self-awareness isn't a prerequisite for general awareness. (Just ask experienced drug users.)
To be fair, no existing theory can explain subjective experience, so it's not a knock on that theory specifically.
There seem to be a subset of human beings who have convinced themselves they aren't conscious, even though it's not clear who they think they've convinced or who did the convincing. If you're one of them, that's okay... it's just not a conclusion I would personally endorse ("I" being whatever force is selecting the words that you're currently reading).
P.S. If something concludes that it's aware, then is it aware it has reached that conclusion? And if so, would that lead to an infinite regress? Perhaps that's what consciousness is... an infinite regress of awareness. :)
Maybe, but also may not be so: it would then cause infinite consciousness/"I" to arise in ~me(?)~, which seems odd. These are very confusing topic that very much interests me.
My understanding is that there are a lot of developed theories in philosophy that tries to explain "ego/I/me" aspect of consciousness. A lot of it is highly technical material. I've been trying to fully understand the content of the book "The Transcendence of the Ego" by Satre for a while, where he claims:
"We should like to show here that the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world. It is being of the world, like the ego of another." -- ie, gets rid of insider "I". Phenomenologically "I" being only a formal thing, not actual. (maybe-helpful discussion if you are interested: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YNFWyYa7ef4)
Phenomenology, the subject, itself is very interesting. It's the most fundamental of sciences (previously thought it was physics).
> That attention schema theory is interesting but it still doesn't solve the Hard Problem: why information about colors looks like colors, why information about surfaces feels like a surface.
Because every sensation has to have some distinguishable characteristics from other sensation for functional purposes. That's not the hardest part of the hard problem, accounting for subjectivity was always the hard part. Certainly there are questions that aren't fully answered, but I think this paper demonstrates that neuroscience can and has started tackling the tough philosophical questions.
> They seem to be solving the very narrow problem of self-awareness, but not awareness in general. And I'm pretty self-awareness isn't a prerequisite for general awareness. (Just ask experienced drug users.)
I don't know what you mean. Certainly "altered states of consciousness" alter the operation of this attention schema theory, by altering signal strength of some perceptions and/or impeding the function of the attention schema apparatus somehow. I'm not sure what you think this means for this theory.
> There seem to be a subset of human beings who have convinced themselves they aren't conscious, even though it's not clear who they think they've convinced or who did the convincing.
You're grossly misrepresenting this position. I and others believe we don't have true subjective awareness. "Consciousness" is merely a label for a reducible phenomenon, like cars. So yes we are "conscious", but we don't mean the same thing you mean by "conscious", which carries far more ontological baggage that's only justified by weak thought experiments.
Finally, your cute yet all too common response begs the question by your use of "who", ie. no one needs convincing to begin with. In fact, if we're just automota then we're merely claiming that our perceptions yield a false conclusion about the existence of subjectivity. That's what it means to be an illusion.
> I don't know what you mean. Certainly "altered states of consciousness" alter the operation of this attention schema theory, by altering signal strength of some perceptions and/or impeding the function of the attention schema apparatus somehow. I'm not sure what you think this means for this theory.
I was just saying that subjective awareness doesn't require awareness of the self as observer. One can become engrossed in a movie without constantly thinking about one's place in relation to the movie. But on second thought, I'm probably misunderstanding some aspect of this theory, as this counterexample seems too obvious.
> I and others believe we don't have true subjective awareness.
I'm afraid this just makes no sense to me. Aren't you subjectively aware of the computer in front of your eyes? If you claim to not have "true subjective awareness", I'm curious what "true subjective awareness" would amount to.
An illusion is when our subjective experience of reality does not match actual reality, but to claim that our subjective experience is itself an illusion? That seems like a contradiction in terms.
Anyway, I'm sorry if this is coming across as flippant. I understand where your belief is coming from (I probably had it myself at one point) but it's just not the way I understand the world now.
For me, the knowledge that I have true subjective awareness is a basic first principle, along the lines of "I think, therefore I am". Maybe I'm a brain-in-a-vat and this is all virtual reality, but I'm definitely experiencing something. Are you trying to deny the fact that I have experiences and sensations, or something else? Maybe we're just talking past each other...
Also, what "weak thought experiments" are you referring to?
> One can become engrossed in a movie without constantly thinking about one's place in relation to the movie.
Being engrossed involves a suspension of awareness.
> I'm afraid this just makes no sense to me. Aren't you subjectively aware of the computer in front of your eyes? If you claim to not have "true subjective awareness", I'm curious what "true subjective awareness" would amount to.
True subjective awareness requires ontologically committing to dualism, because subjectivity is then irreducible. By which I mean that no account for true first-person experience is possible using only third-person objective facts.
> An illusion is when our subjective experience of reality does not match actual reality, but to claim that our subjective experience is itself an illusion? That seems like a contradiction in terms.
That definition of illusion begs the question, like I said, so I categorically reject it. If you eliminate the dependency on "subjective experience of reality" you get "perception of reality does not match actual reality", which is exactly what I said.
> For me, the knowledge that I have true subjective awareness is a basic first principle, along the lines of "I think, therefore I am".
Ah, but this too begs the question! The fallacy-free version is "this is a thought, therefore thoughts exist".
> Also, what "weak thought experiments" are you referring to?
I don't know that I'd say infinite. I mean, sit back and really focus on being aware that you're aware that you're aware... how many layers can you manage? 3? 12? 100?
All that's required to show that philosophy's aim is not to eliminate itself are a few examples of philosophical questions that are not reducible to scientific ones. Naturally the author of the quoted post could still argue that those examples are in fact reducible. They'd be wrong, but I'm sure they could attempt an argument. That's philosophy.
Here are some articles from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the mentioned topics that should point you in the right direction to start thinking for yourself about whether these questions are reducible to the empirical sciences:
What is change? How do we know what we know? What is the relationship between speech and the thing spoken of? What is the relationship between knowledge and the thing known?
To some extend the difference between a science of X and philosophy of X is, that scientists try to answer the question and philosophers try to understand the question. For example, "How does a particle move under constant force." A physicist is content with just describing the movement of the particle, a philosopher will start thinking about questions like, "What is a force?" and "What is a particle?" and go on to question if these are in some sense necessary categories etc.
Unfortunately your post didn't correct any (perceived) mistake, it was mostly a longer way to write "That's not true". Would you be so kind and expand that reply a bit, so that I might find pointers/key words to look up myself?