The EFF is right, but the relevance of the TOS violation is more subtle than the EFF's explanation makes it out to be. Using someone's property without their consent is, of course, a crime. When that property is ordinarily available for public use, consent is presumed, but can be revoked. It's can be criminal trespass to remain in a store after you're kicked out (although usually it's just civil trespass).
Here, "Oracle sent Rimini a cease and desist letter demanding that it stop using automated scripts. It did not, however, rescind Rimini’s authorization to access the files outright." So the question is, was the implied consent to use Oracle's servers effectively revoked?
Arguably not. A public mall can get you kicked off the property for any reason, and can press charges for criminal trespass if you don't leave. But it can't press charges for criminal trespass for violating the sign on the door that says "no hats." And it probably can't press charges for criminal trespass if it sees you wearing a hat and tells you to take it off, but doesn't kick you off the property.
Here, "Oracle sent Rimini a cease and desist letter demanding that it stop using automated scripts. It did not, however, rescind Rimini’s authorization to access the files outright." So the question is, was the implied consent to use Oracle's servers effectively revoked?
Arguably not. A public mall can get you kicked off the property for any reason, and can press charges for criminal trespass if you don't leave. But it can't press charges for criminal trespass for violating the sign on the door that says "no hats." And it probably can't press charges for criminal trespass if it sees you wearing a hat and tells you to take it off, but doesn't kick you off the property.