"There's the fact that MITM for http is minimally different than https."
Unless I'm missing something important, that can be prevented with key pinning.
Key pinning could do a little towards preventing MITM, but implementing it is dangerous - in fact the whole standard is dangerous. Smashing Magazine went live with it, then had a cert expire before their max-age header did - rendering their site unavailable to repeat visitors. Then there are attacks like pkpransom to deal with, or the fact that Chrome doesn't implement hpkp properly.
Only ~400 sites actually implement pinning. It's going to be more of a security problem than a security solution in the next couple of years.
> Entire point of SSL/TLS is to ensure end to end authenticity and confidentiality.
The point is that country A can strongarm a certificate authority under their domain to sign any certificate they want. So if A wants to MITM google or github they can, and there's no way for you to know which certificate is the real one and which is the fake.
