> The problem is more like that tor relies on a few directory authorities and the only protection they have is geographic distribution and the public outcry should a set of nation state go actually seize them.
Seizing the DirAuth wouldn't achieve anything useful: all the data that the DirAuth has access to is a matter of public record (literally, the role of the DirAuth is to collect that data, sign it cryptographically and vote on it).
A group of nation-states looking to attack Tor this way would need to stealthily subvert a majority of the DirAuth, and manipulate the network consensus in a way that is both hard to detect and allows them to deanonymise users; that's very far from trivial.
Yes, a simultaneous seizure of the DirAuth would do that, breaking Tor relays and clients until the software is updated (the list is in src/or/config.c if you are curious).
On the other hand, it's a move that would require international cooperation <i>and</i> cost lots of political capital, whose only result would be a temporary (but global) DoS.
Seizing the DirAuth wouldn't achieve anything useful: all the data that the DirAuth has access to is a matter of public record (literally, the role of the DirAuth is to collect that data, sign it cryptographically and vote on it).
A group of nation-states looking to attack Tor this way would need to stealthily subvert a majority of the DirAuth, and manipulate the network consensus in a way that is both hard to detect and allows them to deanonymise users; that's very far from trivial.