No, really, why are the departments picking up the tab, even in cases where the city's law prohibits this? The NYU paper has a couple illustrations.
>Only one jurisdiction in my study—El Paso, Texas—reported a
practice of never indemnifying police officers.145 Yet no El Paso officer personally satisfied settlements or judgments against him during the study period. The city of El Paso did, however, pay $279,000 to settle sixteen civil rights cases against its officers between 2006 and 2011. The deputy city attorney in El Paso explained that, because the city is responsible for paying officers’ attorneys’ fees, it
sometimes settles claims against officers because it would be less expensive to pay a small settlement than to continue to pay for the defense of the case. From the deputy city attorney’s perspective, paying a settlement on behalf of an officer to avoid the cost of further litigation should not be understood as equivalent to indemnifying that officer.
>California allows indemnification of punitive damages if the
“governing body of that public entity” finds that “[p]ayment . . . would be in the best interests of the public entity.”
[How do they figure?]
>Some jurisdictions [Las Vegas, New York, Oklahoma City, and Prince George’s County] appear to have indemnified
officers in violation of governing law.
>Jurisdictions may sidestep prohibitions against indemnification of punitive damages by vacating the punitive damages verdict as part of a post-trial settlement.
>Although my study shows that officers almost never contribute to settlements and judgments, I found anecdotal evidence that some government attorneys affirmatively use the possibility that they will deny officers indemnification to gain settlement leverage, limit punitive damages verdicts, and reduce punitive damages verdicts after trial—
only to indemnify their officers once the cases are ultimately resolved.
>During litigation, the threat that a city will deny indemnification may discourage plaintiffs from proceeding with claims against individual officers.
>Only one jurisdiction in my study—El Paso, Texas—reported a practice of never indemnifying police officers.145 Yet no El Paso officer personally satisfied settlements or judgments against him during the study period. The city of El Paso did, however, pay $279,000 to settle sixteen civil rights cases against its officers between 2006 and 2011. The deputy city attorney in El Paso explained that, because the city is responsible for paying officers’ attorneys’ fees, it sometimes settles claims against officers because it would be less expensive to pay a small settlement than to continue to pay for the defense of the case. From the deputy city attorney’s perspective, paying a settlement on behalf of an officer to avoid the cost of further litigation should not be understood as equivalent to indemnifying that officer.
>California allows indemnification of punitive damages if the “governing body of that public entity” finds that “[p]ayment . . . would be in the best interests of the public entity.” [How do they figure?]
>Some jurisdictions [Las Vegas, New York, Oklahoma City, and Prince George’s County] appear to have indemnified officers in violation of governing law.
>Jurisdictions may sidestep prohibitions against indemnification of punitive damages by vacating the punitive damages verdict as part of a post-trial settlement.
>Although my study shows that officers almost never contribute to settlements and judgments, I found anecdotal evidence that some government attorneys affirmatively use the possibility that they will deny officers indemnification to gain settlement leverage, limit punitive damages verdicts, and reduce punitive damages verdicts after trial— only to indemnify their officers once the cases are ultimately resolved.
>During litigation, the threat that a city will deny indemnification may discourage plaintiffs from proceeding with claims against individual officers.
http://www.nyulawreview.org/sites/default/files/pdf/NYULawRe...