> Existing key distribution systems may or may not be encrypted, but the reason for encrypting the channel is far more to protect the interests of the requestor than the integrity of the key itself.
btrask wasn't saying that encryption is necessary for key distribution; he/she was saying that HTTPS guarantees identity and integrity, both of which are necessary to trust a key.
> What matters is that the web of trust associated with that key is sound (that is, you have assurance that the key belongs to whom you think it does), and that the integrity of the private key has been maintained.
That's a possible alternative to btrask's proposal, though you're equating "assurance that the key belongs to whom you think it does" with "web of trust". btrask's proposal is a special case of that, in which the web of trust is simply the sender.
> The first problem you point out, that any encrypted channel is not necessarily a secure channel
Correct, but not what btrask said. The first problem he pointed out was the fact that clients need to know whether a host expects secure communication before ever connecting to it.
> though given your misunderstanding on subsequent points I'm not sure how well that applies to this discussion
Clarifying my own post: I'm insisting that neither a trusted or an ecrypted channel are necessary.
I said that an encrypted channel could be used, and that it might not be, but that if used encryption would largely serve as a protection to the requestor, who might otherwise be subject to traffic and/or interest analysis based on the specific keys they requested, which could be presumed to be of interest, or signing keys (I'm thinking PGP protocol here) of keys of interest. Either piece of information would reduce search space for an Eve.
I'm not equating trust of keys to web of trust, I'm stating that in existing (PKI/PGP) protocols, that is the assurance mechanism. And it is independent of either trust OR encryption of the key delivery channel itself.
There seems to be a rather profound difficulty in distinguishing what I've said with what I've said btrask said. I'm not sure how I could be clearer, but I'm open to pointers.
btrask wasn't saying that encryption is necessary for key distribution; he/she was saying that HTTPS guarantees identity and integrity, both of which are necessary to trust a key.
> What matters is that the web of trust associated with that key is sound (that is, you have assurance that the key belongs to whom you think it does), and that the integrity of the private key has been maintained.
That's a possible alternative to btrask's proposal, though you're equating "assurance that the key belongs to whom you think it does" with "web of trust". btrask's proposal is a special case of that, in which the web of trust is simply the sender.
> The first problem you point out, that any encrypted channel is not necessarily a secure channel
Correct, but not what btrask said. The first problem he pointed out was the fact that clients need to know whether a host expects secure communication before ever connecting to it.
> though given your misunderstanding on subsequent points I'm not sure how well that applies to this discussion
That's not very nice.