This was a long anticipated but still powerful ruling. The only surprise was maybe Itu Aba (太平島) being ruled to not be an island.
The court was particularly clear on rejecting the nine-dash line and China's claims of historic waters.
As much as China will say it ignores this ruling, it absolutely puts pressure on China and constricts the language it will be able to use when discussing disputes in the South China Sea. China has particularly relied on claims of historic waters, which will diplomatically make for some extremely awkward press statements for China now.
This may force China into some face-saving agreements, so that it continues to appear strong at home where it has made this into an issue of nationalism, but internationally may try to consolidate what it does hold.
Another likely option is China may try to create a ADIZ over the South China Sea like it did in the East China Sea (and use its somewhat perverted interpretation of when an ADIZ applies), with the idea that if its interests in the sea have been denied, it can try to control the air.
I expect freedom of navigation transits may increase now and with greater certainty, both from the US and from other countries including Japan and Australia, now that we know what features are entitled to a 12-mile territorial sea and which ones are not (due to being submerged at high tide).
I'm optimistic after some initial saber rattling that this may actually lead to a reduction in tensions in the South China Sea, but that is mostly up to China now at this point.
"Itu Aba is not an island" was indeed a surprise, and I think it is a mistake. In particular, it was not part of the case.
The court brought the issue in because it was necessary to rule on Philippines' claim that Mischief Reef is within its EEZ, because if Itu Aba is an island EEZ generated by it needs to be considered. I think this was a bad idea and an underhanded tactic.
I believe the Philippines did actually ask the Tribunal to rule on the status of Itu Aba, for exactly the reason you mention. The Philippines also argued that it was not.
I'm reading the ruling now and it appears the Tribunal based its decision on Itu Aba lacking a "stable community of people." I think most observers expected the opposite decision based on the fresh water on Itu Aba and its capacity to support human habitation.
I do agree though that this is probably the one point in the ruling I disagree with.
Well, that "island" created via an act of human intervention that must be utilized on a regular basis, I'm not sure the habitation angle is completely supportable.
The land reclamation on Itu Aba was almost non-existant compared to the land reclamation China was doing. Itu Aba is the largest naturally occurring feature in the Spratly's and does have fresh ground water.
Well, there is a precedent Nicaragua v. United States where the United States just blatantly ignores the international court's ruling against it, and vetoes any attempt of enforcement by the Security Council. China is also a permanent member, so they will do just the same.
Yep, the one council in the UN that really matters and China can veto any resolution regarding this issue anytime they want. Possession is as they say 9/10 of the law and I doubt any country can wrestle away the islands that China has already developed.
Filipino here - I still applaud our government's efforts in pushing this issue through. This was raised by my country in the ASEAN summits and China through various political and diplomatic channels were able to stop those resolutions.
The huge benefit to this ruling is precedent and credibility. Laying down a trail of rulings against China around the globe, that will facilitate cohesive economic sanctions against them if they attempt to enforce their bogus claims to the waters. One country attempting to sanction China would fail, and China would and could easily retaliate. If most of the developed world signs on to sanctions for their attempts to annex territory ala Russia with Ukraine (except this is dramatically larger), then it will stick. An easy example would be to throw China back out of the WTO, dump their currency / refuse to promote it any higher as a reserve, actually enforce consequences on their dumping practices and other economic misdeeds, and so on.
That's a problem. We don't usually intervene directly against other nuclear armed nations. It's all done through proxies. Who is going to be our proxy navy?
This isn't civil court. All international law is a theatre masking anarchy between nation states. The distribution of justice it provides is roughly proportional to the relative strength and willingness of its participants.
I am no geopolitical expert, but the Chinese seemed to be playing with fire. At which point a war will erupt in the South China Sea, especially when those nations won't take it anymore?
The chinese are getting better at soft power. This is really about oil and natural resources in the South China Sea. A direct confrontation wouldn't be acceptable and it would be costly. If anything I believe they'll put financial and political incentives and convince them to sell the islands.
Which nations? Vietnam, who lost two conflicts with China already, when China was even poorer and weaker than it is now? Or the Philippines, who can barely keep their own state together as it is? Maybe Malaysia, a country constantly rocked by internal dissent because of huge economic inequality? Singapore?
The only nation who might decide they "won't take it anymore" is the United States; but post-Iraq, the US will struggle to justify any significant intervention abroad for another generation, let alone against a nuclear superpower. No, on the military side China is laughing all the way to the naval base on artificial reef.
The question is, what exactly do they think to gain from this aggressive expansionist activity? Hopefully it's just strategic military positioning for the long run. If it's anything they think they can directly leverage (like imposing controls or tariffs on ships going through the area), then they risk a backlash on their commercial interests.
There are probably competing forces inside PRC hierarchies competing over this particular policy. It might well be that sanity will eventually prevail. Launching WW3 over a bunch of rocks just to stick it to your boss, seems a bit too much even for the average military nutcase.
Your premise is entirely backwards. The response is almost universally that this can only be enforced militarily. That's not accurate. China's economy is their achilles heel, not their military.
China's economy is extremely fragile right now, and it's going to remain so. Growth will continue to trend toward zero in real terms, as all the easy growth ended nearly a decade ago (thus they've taken on ~$40-$50 trillion in debt in that time). Their transition over to a service economy is not going to go well. They'll need trillions of dollars in new capital to continue to keep their economy afloat, mostly consisting of trillions of dollars in new debt (far over burdening an already hyper indebted economy). And they'll need that much debt in just the next year. They can't manage any of that in an economic vacuum. There are now countless economic levers to use against China, most of their economy is dependent on external consumption and extremely high levels of exports. Their integration with the global economy has made them dependent in that way. Other Southeast Asian nations are being set up as counters to China manufacturing wise, which has already begun to rip the heart out of China's export economy, leading to their own versions of the US rust belt.
If the other global powers decide China has taken this dispute too far, it will be very easy to punish them with a unified front. Numerous of their industries are violating WTO rules governing dumping for example, the first start would be to finally take action against China for that. Their desire - need - to see their currency continue to gain reserve expansion, could be hampered very easily. There are a dozen other good economic ways the rest of the world can make China's territory annexation painful.
I've said as much when mentioning the risk to their commercial interests, I don't disagree. However, the facts on the ground is that China invested a ton of money on building a military facility on artificial sand right there. You don't do that unless you expect to be there for the long run. Even if they complied with this sort of ruling and recognised someone else's sovereignty, they would likely not leave that base; chances are that they would get a Guantanamo-style agreement, against which there is little anyone can do beyond taking direct military action.
> Vietnam, who lost two conflicts with China already, when China was even poorer and weaker than it is now?
What? I assume at the "two conflicts" you are referring to are
(1) the 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam (Sino-Vietnamese War; Third Indochina War) which had two strategic objectives: forcing Vietnam to withdraw troops from Cambodia, and forcing Vietnam to surrender the Spratly Islands -- neither of which China achieved, as Vietnam diverted no troops from Cambodia and did not surrender the Spratly's,
(2) The period of intermittent armed conflict between China and Vietnam following the Chinese withdrawal after the 1979 invasion (sometimes called the Second Sino-Vietnamese War; sometimes considered with the 1979 invasion part of the Third Indochina War).
Neither of these was a clear win for China, and while China was "poorer and weaker" then than it is now, so was Vietnam.
> Or the Philippines, who can barely keep their own state together as it is? Maybe Malaysia, a country constantly rocked by internal dissent because of huge economic inequality?
Actually -- whether this is good policy or not -- external conflicts are often escalated (not uncommonly resulting in war, whether or not that was the intent) by countries with problems with domestic unity/dissent, specifically to use the external crisis as to either promote unity (by a "rally around the flag" effect) or as a pretext to more vigorously suppress domestic dissent by tying it to the external threat.
> The only nation who might decide they "won't take it anymore" is the United States; but post-Iraq, the US will struggle to justify any significant intervention abroad for another generation, let alone against a nuclear superpower.
Vietnam barely had that much effect, and there's preciously little evidence that Iraq has had anything like Vietnam's effect on the US's political willingness to intervene overseas.
And it is "just" strategic military positioning - to protect the new silk road naval routes. The bases are going to be there so China's naval trade routes cannot be potentially blocked by a hostile naval power.
'somewhat'. The China-Vietnam war was more of a stalemate than the Chinese-proclaimed victory, and war between China and the Philippines would draw in the US, and guess who's going to win that naval battle. Neither side will use nukes over a naval dispute, and China in particular can't afford to get the West off-side, because it's the West that buys the lion's share of it's manufacturing - whereas the West has plenty of other places to look for manufacturing, albeit not at that scale.
The U.S. is so far ahead of China in the arms race already that that will not be an issue for decades, if ever. The issue is political will, because ultimately arms only change minds if they are willing to be used.
China's government would have a much easier time justifying violence in the South China Sea to the Chinese population, than the U.S. government would have with U.S. citizens.
...China, which has displayed a willingness to negotiate in many such situations. In just over 60 years, China has gone from 23 land disputes down to just six. In the majority of its settlements, China accepted less than one-half of the territory it originally claimed. [1]
What's concerning about this is on the end of the slide, there is a text which says:
"The Tribunal in the Hague ruled on Tuesday, July 12, that China's claim was illegal. But it has no power to enforce the decision."
Some questions:
1. If that's the case, then what good would the Hague ruling be if it is not going to be enforced?
2. Who should be enforcing the said ruling in this case?
No one enforces international law except the individual nations themselves.
This is different from a national or (in the U.S.) state government, which is typically embued with police and military powers to enforce the national laws.
The state of Virginia has state police and a state court system that will arrest and put people into state prison if they violate a state law. The U.S. has federal police and a federal court system that will put people into federal prison for breaking federal law.
The U.N. does not have a global police or military force. It can be thought of more as a venue for developing a shared understanding of the world, than a government that creates and enforces its own laws.
In this case, this ruling essentially says that most of the world does not agree with China about its territorial claims. This will lend moral authority to the actions of other nations like the Philippines, U.S., Australia, Japan, when they transit and operate in the South China Sea.
Well that's a good point. It's the difference between the ideal of the UN, vs. the reality of the UN. It's supposed to a fair global venue, but because it lacks any self-sufficient authority, it's dominated by the most powerful nations. That said, China is one of those most powerful nations, so I'd argue that this ruling still has significance.
Maybe someday there will be an actual global government, but right now I don't think that anyone believes we (i.e. human beings) know how to create a well-functioning government that large.
The EU suffers from many of the same problems of the UN, like crazy bureaucracy and dominance by the largest/richest member nations. The U.S. federal government was carefully designed to balance small states and big states, and seems to do a good job of that--but maybe not a lot of other things. And big U.S. states still dominate other areas of national governance, like environmental regs by California, or school textbook standards by Texas.
China's economy isn't expanding faster than the West's. It was.
China's economy is hardly growing at all, and is no longer growing organically. They require extremely vast amounts of new debt to continue growing at just a few percent per year. That's a scenario they can't maintain going forward.
The US economy by itself is expanding as much as China in dollar GDP terms, and is doing so without taking on the kind of debt that China is. Per dollar of debt taken on, the US is getting two to three times as much GDP growth as what China is. China's economy is growing at 2% to 3% currently; with the US economy ~65% larger it can grow quite a bit slower and still outpace China.
$18 trillion * 2% = $360 billion
$11 trillion * 3% = $330 billion
China is unlikely to ever be the extremely fast growth economy it previously was. All the easy economic growth is long since over. And this is without discussing the inevitability that China will run into regular recessions like all other economies do once their growth slows down to normal levels (and ignoring that China is also likely to face far harsher consequences with economic slowdowns given their system of government; which keeps the Chinese leaders up at night). For example they've been in an industrial recession for at least a year now, and their service sector has barely shown any growth. There's no reason to believe their manufacturing will kick back into boom mode ever again, especially with other Asian competitors eroding that base. Their service economy was supposed to take over, and so far it's doing nothing but flailing.
Assuming your 3% number is correct (which I cannot find a source for), China's yearly gains will outpace ours in just under 10 years, overtaking us in raw GDP in 50 years.
That's taking your figures exactly, that is. I highly doubt Chinese GDP growth is at 3%. They might not be able to sustain 8%+ for much longer, but even a 6% annual growth would make their economy larger than the US's in under 13 years, with their annual $ addition to their economy already outpacing ours.
That's the thing. No one who knows what they're talking about trusts the "real growth" numbers. They're all massively inflated by the CCP in order to maintain their growth driven political narrative.
The Tribunal agreed with the Philippines position on almost every question with the exception of 2 features: Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef. Both of those features were found to be high-tide elevations.
The Tribunal also ruled Chinese activity in the region was illegal, found China to be violating its obligations under UNCLOS and failing to protect the natural habitats (including willful destruction of the coral and endangered species). China's harassment of Philippine ships was also ruled illegal. The nine-dash line was ruled invalid. China's claims of "historic waters" was found to be groundless. Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and Reed Bank were found to “form part of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of the Philippines.”
Really, this was about as complete a victory for the Philippines (and refutation of everything China claims and is doing) as possible.
Now the court has ruled all those claims void ("None of the fiercely disputed Spratly Islands, the UN body found, were “capable of generating extended maritime zones" in the article). However still large parts of the Spratleys lie in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines.
The court was particularly clear on rejecting the nine-dash line and China's claims of historic waters.
As much as China will say it ignores this ruling, it absolutely puts pressure on China and constricts the language it will be able to use when discussing disputes in the South China Sea. China has particularly relied on claims of historic waters, which will diplomatically make for some extremely awkward press statements for China now.
This may force China into some face-saving agreements, so that it continues to appear strong at home where it has made this into an issue of nationalism, but internationally may try to consolidate what it does hold.
Another likely option is China may try to create a ADIZ over the South China Sea like it did in the East China Sea (and use its somewhat perverted interpretation of when an ADIZ applies), with the idea that if its interests in the sea have been denied, it can try to control the air.
I expect freedom of navigation transits may increase now and with greater certainty, both from the US and from other countries including Japan and Australia, now that we know what features are entitled to a 12-mile territorial sea and which ones are not (due to being submerged at high tide).
I'm optimistic after some initial saber rattling that this may actually lead to a reduction in tensions in the South China Sea, but that is mostly up to China now at this point.