This is not an issue with online voting, and paper voting does not guarantee that right either.
In Estonian e-voting, you can vote as many times as you want, only your last vote is counted. A week after online voting is closed, there is still a paper voting day, where you can go and override your online vote with a paper vote in the traditional booth. If you were coerced to vote a certain way online, you can still go to this private booth in a public polling place to place your "real" vote.
There are ways to check your vote even in a public polling place. Let's say you need to take a picture of your voting paper before you leave the booth, and you have to send the picture to the person coercing you. The person coercing you is standing outside the booth so that you can't walk back and forth to ask for a new paper.
There are some good reasons against online voting, but most of the obvious ones you can think of are already solved.
In Estonian e-voting, you can vote as many times as you want, only your last vote is counted. A week after online voting is closed, there is still a paper voting day, where you can go and override your online vote with a paper vote in the traditional booth.
So they can unambiguously tie a specific vote to a voter, yet nobody is concerned about the possibilities of retribution against certain voters?
Yes, they can at some point in the flow unambiguously tie a specific vote to a voter. Postponing the "separation" to after the paper ballots have been cast is then a simple trick. How it works is they encrypt the vote (using assymetric encryption), and then sign that datapackage with the private key on your ID card.
Once the votes need to be counted, the signature is removed, and all the resulting encrypted vote data is then sent (without identifying information) to a third server which has the private key to decrypt the votes. They are decrypted and then counted. This third server has no access to identifying information. The server stripping votes from identifying information has no access to the decrypted data.
Which is still coercing your vote. Not to mention normal postal voting is also susceptible to the same problem, and I bet we'd all agree that's much less secure, yet we still use it.
In Estonian e-voting, you can vote as many times as you want, only your last vote is counted. A week after online voting is closed, there is still a paper voting day, where you can go and override your online vote with a paper vote in the traditional booth. If you were coerced to vote a certain way online, you can still go to this private booth in a public polling place to place your "real" vote.
There are ways to check your vote even in a public polling place. Let's say you need to take a picture of your voting paper before you leave the booth, and you have to send the picture to the person coercing you. The person coercing you is standing outside the booth so that you can't walk back and forth to ask for a new paper.
There are some good reasons against online voting, but most of the obvious ones you can think of are already solved.